United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
the Court is Geoffrey Mclsaac's Motion to Intervene, doc.
17, and Plaintiff John Rauback's Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint, doc. 18. For the following reasons,
Mclsaac's Motion to Intervene should be
DENIED, and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint should be DENIED IN PART AND
DEFFERED IN PART.
2008, the Savannah Airport Commission ("SAC")
employed Rauback as Director of Administration and Finance
and, later, as Assistant Executive Director. Doc. 18-1 at
1-2. He reported to Defendant Kelly. Id. at 8. In
2015 and 2016, Plaintiff reported certain allegedly unlawful
activities, but had to escalate those reports when Kelly
ignored them. Id. at 8-9, 11. Plaintiff claims that
Defendant Kelly retaliated against him as a result.
Id. at 10-11.
from Plaintiffs employment woes, Geoffrey Mclsaac- Airport
Security Manager-also began to experience harassment from his
supervisor-Fred McCosby. Id. at 18. Mclsaac is an
armed forces veteran and suffers from PTSD and believes the
harassment was caused by his veteran status. Id.
After an unsuccessful attempt at resolution, Mclsaac
complained to Plaintiff and the SAC Human Resources
Department that McCosby was harassing and discriminating
against him because he was a disabled veteran. Id.
at 11-19. Plaintiff-who reviewed the report of
discrimination-verbally counseled McCosby for his behavior on
March 21, 2017. Id. at 12. The next day, McCosby
filed a grievance against Plaintiff with Defendant Kelly.
Id. However, McCosby later rescinded the grievance.
Id. On April 13, 2017, Plaintiff told Defendant
Kelly that he was concerned about possible legal exposure
stemming from McCosby's behavior towards Mclsaac,
expressed concerns with the way Defendant Kelly was handling
the issue, and requested copies of any grievances which had
been filed against him. Id. at 13-15.
2, 2017, Defendant Kelly placed Plaintiff on involuntary paid
administrative leave. Id. at 15. On May 25, 2017,
Defendant Kelly attempted to terminate Plaintiffs employment,
but later continued the leave pending an investigation.
Id. at 16. Defendant SAC terminated Plaintiffs
employment in January of 2018. Id.
Plaintiff was on leave, Mclsaac filed an internal grievance
against McCosby. Id. at 23. When McCosby's
derogatory behavior continued, Mclsaac informed the Human
Resources Department that he would be filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 25. Mclsaac
subsequently "wrote up" McCosby five times in one
day for filing his complaint. Id. In December of
2017, McCosby denied Mclsaac a performance-base pay increase
and placed him on probation. Id. Mclsaac was
subsequently terminated in February of 2018. Id.
Mclsaac and Plaintiff were not fired by the same person. Doc.
19 at 2.
1, 2018, Plaintiff filed this case in the Superior Court of
Chatham County against the City, the SAC, and Greg Kelly.
Doc. 1 at 1. Plaintiff brings claims under the First
Amendment, the Georgia Whistleblower Act, and the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
("USERRA"). Id. After removal to this
Court, Mclsaac filed a Motion to Intervene, doc. 17, and
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint,
doc. 18. Mclsaac seeks to join Plaintiffs action and bring
five additional claims for First Amendment retaliation,
retaliation in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act,
discrimination in violation of the USERRA, retaliation in
violation of the USERRA, and hostile work environment in
violation of the USERRA. Doc. 18-1. Plaintiff seeks to add
Mclsaac as a plaintiff and McCosby as a defendant. Doc. 18.
can intervene or join in one of two ways: of right or with
the Court's permission. After review of the record in
this case, Mclsaac does not meet the requirements for either.
Intervention or Joinder of Right
Rule of Civil Procedure 24 establishes when a person may
intervene as of right. It states that
(a) . . . [o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
parties agree that Mclsaac has no statutory right to
intervene. As a result, Mclsaac only has a right to intervene
if he meets the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
Intervention of right under this section requires (1) a
timely motion, and (2) an interest relating to the property
or transaction at issue, which (3) might be practically
impeded or impaired by the disposition of the action and (4)
is inadequately represented by the existing parties.
Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight of Am.,
Inc.,272 Fed.Appx. 817, 819 (11th Cir. 2008).
"Once a party establishes all the ...