Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Badiki

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

December 31, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAULINE MEDIKO BADIKI, FERDINAND MEDIKO, and MONICA MEDIKO, Defendants.

          UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER AND FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          ALAN J. RAVERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Pending before the Court are the following pretrial motions filed by Defendants Pauline Mediko Badiki (“Pauline”), Ferdinand Mediko (“Fred”), and Monica Mediko (“Monica”): (1) a motion to sever, [Doc. 31]; (2) a motion for a Jackson-Denno hearing and to suppress statements, [Doc. 32]; (3) a motion to suppress evidence seized by search warrants, [Doc. 34]; and (4) a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search for emails and electronically stored information, [Doc. 38]. The Court held an evidentiary hearing as to Monica's statements, [Doc. 40 (hereinafter “T”)], because only Monica made statements that the Government intends to introduce at trial. For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motions to suppress be DENIED and the motion to sever be DENIED IN PART AND DEFERRED IN PART to the District Judge.

         I. Introduction

         Defendants are charged in a 37-count indictment with: (1) wire fraud conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 1349 (Count 1); (2) wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1343 (Counts 2-13); (3) theft of government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 641 (Counts 14-25); and (4) Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (“WIC”) fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 & 42 U.S.C. § 1760(g) (Counts 26-37). [Doc. 1 at 1-10]. The indictment also contains a forfeiture provision. [Id. at 10-11].

         II. Motion to Suppress Statements, [Doc. 32]

         The Court held a Jackson-Denno[1] hearing on the motion to suppress, after which the parties filed post-hearing briefs. [Docs. 41, 42, 43, 44]. With briefing completed on the motion to suppress statements, the undersigned turns to its merits.

         A. Facts

         This motion revolves around statements Monica made during the execution of a federal search warrant at her place of business. On June 11, 2013, at approximately 9:30 a.m., United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Office of Inspector General Investigations (“OIG”) Special Agents Frederick McCree (“McCree”) and Douglas Bridges (“Bridges”), four other USDA-OIG agents, and an Atlanta Police Department (“APD”) officer executed a search warrant at Poly-Plex Pharmacy, Inc. (“Poly-Plex”) located in Atlanta, Georgia. T2, 4-5, 18-20.[2] Monica was a pharmacy technician for Poly-Plex, [Doc. 1 at 4], and was married to Fred, Poly-Plex's Chief Executive Officer. [Id.]. Pauline is Fred's sister, and was the founding owner and operator of Poly-Plex. [Id.].

         The USDA agents entered the Poly-Plex location through the front door, while the APD officer waited and remained outside. T21-23. The agents entered the store in a single-file line; the first five agents were armed with handguns and the sixth agent was armed with a shotgun. T5-6. All of the agents carried their weapons in a low-ready position, meaning that their weapons were pointed towards the ground. T6-7. They all wore protective raid vests that had either “POLICE” or “USDA” along with an official badge indicating that the agents were law enforcement. T5. Upon entering the 1, 000 square foot pharmacy, the agents loudly stated that they were police and had a search warrant. T6. Immediately upon entry, the agents conducted a protective sweep of the premises, which took about ten minutes. T7, 8. At the time of the execution of the warrant, there were six Poly-Plex employees present, including Monica. T7. Monica's 12 year old daughter also was present, and was hysterically crying. T31-32.[3] During the protective sweep, the pharmacists stayed in the pharmacy area while the other employees were gathered on the right side of the retail area of the store. T8.

         After conducting the sweep, the agents holstered their weapons. T12. They announced that they were there to execute a search warrant, and that the Poly-Plex employees were not under arrest and they could stay on the premises, but if they wanted to leave, they would not be allowed reentry while the warrant was being executed. T7, 8, 9. Each employee elected to remain. T9. Also, the agents announced that any customers who needed to get a prescription filled would be allowed to enter and then leave. T20.

         The USDA agents solicited each employee for an interview. T8, 9, 10. None refused to be questioned. T10.[4] Monica was the first person approached for an interview. T15. In requesting an opportunity to question her, Monica was advised by McCree that, “[i]f you don't mind we'd like to talk to you, you're not obligated to talk to us, and I just want to ask you a few questions, ” to which statement Monica responded affirmatively. T16.

         Monica was questioned in a private office in the back of the premises, which room was located next to the restroom. T11, 33-34. Monica was positioned in the chair furthest from the door during the interview, while McCree and Bridges sat closest to the door. T14. There is no evidence that the seating arrangement was anything but happenstance. T14, 71.[5] The door to the office was, for the most part, left ajar during the interview, except for when the adjacent restroom was in use. T14.

         The demeanor of the interview was cordial and conversational. T33. Although their firearms created a bulge under their shirts, McCree or Bridges did not unholster their weapons during the interview. T51-53. They still wore their body armor and vests labeled with law enforcement insignia. T11. Monica was not promised anything in return for her cooperation, nor was she threatened or physically touched in anyway. T53-54. The entire interview lasted two hours. T54.

         During the interview, McCree spoke of the existence of an undercover video that purported showing Monica engaging in an illegal transaction. T23, 36. The interview was broken up into two segments due to McCree going back to the USDA office to retrieve the video in order show Monica its contents. T23, 36, 54.[6] During this intermission, Monica was not handcuffed nor restrained in any way. T55. She was allowed to reenter the main store area where she and other store employees were watched, for safety reasons, by another agent. T55, 67. McCree testified that when he came back to Poly-Plex, he recalled asking Monica if she wanted to go to the backroom to watch the video. T56. However, Bridges could not recall if she was ordered back to the interview room for the second part of the interview. T81.

         The interview was not recorded by the agents, but instead, Bridges took notes of the interview. T56, 69. These notes were compiled to produce a Memorandum of Interview to support the agents' version of the events that transpired. T34.

         The agents did not read Monica her Miranda[7] warnings before conducting the interview, T15-16, since they did not consider her to be under arrest. T17, 59. Monica never requested an attorney, nor asked to terminate the interview. T17, 59-60. Neither Monica nor any other person at Poly-Plex was arrested that day. T18.

         B. Parties' Contentions

         Monica argues that based on the totality of circumstances she was in custody and therefore needed to be read her Miranda warnings before being interrogated. [Doc. 41 at 11 (citing United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006))]. She contends that an interview being in a police-dominated atmosphere is a factor in favor of a finding that the interview was custodial. [Id. (citing United States v. Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. 850, 852 (11th Cir. July 3, 2013))]. In support, she argues that the execution of the search warrant of Poly-Plex entailed a police-dominated atmosphere for the following reasons: the pharmacy was only 1, 000 square feet, and yet was crammed with six armed agents in raid gear; one of the six agents was holding a shotgun; the agents took control of the pharmacy through screaming and brandishing of their weapons; Monica's daughter was crying hysterically; she could not leave the pharmacy since she would not be allowed to return; and she could not ask questions to the agents without first being subjected to an interview. [Id. at 11-12]. She also argues that there was no corroborating evidence, such as written notes, memoranda, or video, to support the agents' testimony that the interview was consensual, [id.], stating that the only evidence the government has produced has been oral testimony from the agents and the Memorandum of Interview. [Id. at 17]. The Memorandum of Interview, however, did not state how the agents approached her for the interview, and whether the agents advised her that she does not have to speak with them―two key facts that must be known in a determination of custody. [Id.]. She also points out that the agents were not able to recall certain key facts that would be relevant in the custody inquiry, such as: whether the agents checked her lab coat for weapons and patted her down prior to the interview; whether she was ordered to sit in the seat furthest from the door during the interview; and whether the agents told her that she could stop the interview at any time or request an attorney. [Id. at 13-14].[8] She contends that even though she was never formally arrested, there are facts to support that her freedom was restrained to a degree similar to formal arrest. [Id. at 14-15]. That is, she was under the agents' dominion for the following reasons: the agents seized the pharmacy and exercised control over who would be allowed to come in or out; she was placed in a small backroom where she was questioned by two agents; the door of the interview room was blocked by the agents; and she was placed under guard by a different agent during the break in the interview. [Id. at 14-15]. Monica contrasts this case with other Eleventh Circuit cases that found the defendants in those cases to not be in custody, pointing out that those cases involved either a situation where the defendants scheduled the date and time for agents to come and interview the defendants at their place of business or a situation where the agents unambiguously communicated to the defendants that they were free to leave at any time during the interview. [Id. at 15-16 (citing United States v. Lazarus, 552 Fed.Appx. 892 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014); United States v. Maldonado, 562 Fed.Appx. 859 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014); Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 852)].

         Monica also argues that the Government has the burden to demonstrate that the interview was not the product of custodial interrogation. [Id. at 16-17 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 (1974))]. She submits that the totality of circumstances lead to a finding that she was in custody and had to be advised of her Miranda rights. [Id. at 18].

         In response, the Government argues that Monica's motion should be denied. [Doc. 42 at 6]. It asserts that she was not in custody because the agents told her she was free to leave, never restrained her movement, conducted the interview in the neutral setting of her workplace, maintained their weapons in holsters during the interview, and arrested no one on the day of the search. [Id.].

         The Government also argues that the defendant has the burden of establishing that she was held in custody during this interview, [id. (citing United States v. Blocker, No. 1:14-CR-228-AT-AJB, 2016 WL 3281018, at *16 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 29, 2016), adopted by, No. 1:14-CR-228-AT, 2016 WL 3259096 (N.D.Ga. June 14, 2016))]; and contends that her citation to Matlock for the proposition that the Government bears the burden of proving that an interview was not custodial is inapposite, since Matlock never addressed the issue of custodial interrogations, but instead addressed the issue of consent to search a premises. [Id. (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178)].

         The totality of the circumstances, the Government asserts, establishes that Monica's questioning was not a custodial interrogation because: (1) the interview took place at her workplace; (2) she was told she was free to leave; (3) she was not physically restrained or handcuffed during the interview; (4) the agents did not brandish weapons during the interview; (5) the interview was not excessively long in duration; (6) the agents questioned her in a normal tone of voice and did not touch her during the interview; and (7) no one was arrested at the conclusion of the interview or search. [Id. at 7-8]. It further submits that courts are much less likely to find the circumstances custodial when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings of the defendant. [Id. at 8 (citing Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 851; Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348)]. It posits that the backroom of the pharmacy is a familiar or at least neutral surrounding. [Id.]. The Government also states that she was unambiguously told that she was free to leave and was not under arrest, a powerful factor in the custody inquiry. [Id. at 9 (citing Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 851)]. The agents told all employees after the protective sweep that they were free to leave and no one was under arrest. [Id. at 9]. The agents also told Monica that she was not obligated to speak to them, and instead, she voluntarily chose to stay. [Id. at 9-10]. The Government also points out that Monica was never handcuffed, and although she claims that the interview was custodial because the environment was police-dominated, courts have recognized that such temporary physical restraint for officer safety during a search warrant execution does not mean that occupants are in custody. [Id. at 10-11 (citing Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 852; United States v. Young, No. 316-CR-00006-TCB-RGV, 2017 WL 653556, at *5 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 25, 2017))].

         It next argues that the coercive environment that exists in virtually every interview by a police officer is not sufficient to establish a custodial interrogation. [Id. at 7 (citing Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 851; United States v. Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000))]. The Government also argues that the temporary detention of occupants during a search warrant does not automatically transform the search into a custodial interrogation. [Id. at 12 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701-02 (1981))].

         Further, the Government claims the fact that no guns were brandished during the interview is a factor weighing against a finding of custody. See Street, 472 F.3d at 1309. Courts have long recognized that brandishing firearms upon entry in a search warrant execution does not make subsequent questioning custodial if the weapons are holstered during the interview. [Id. at 12 (citing Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 852; United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881-82 (11th Cir. 2010))]. The Government maintains that the ambiguity of whether after the protective sweep the shotgun remained visible during Defendant's interview should be construed in its favor since it is Defendant's burden to prove that she was in custody. [Id. at 13 (citing Blocker, 2016 WL 3281018, at *17)].

         The Government also contends that the questioning was not lengthy, since the interview lasted two hours, citing T16-17, 54, 56; and noting that courts have had cases last much longer than that, upwards of seven hours, but yet still find that the defendants in those cases were not in custody. [Doc. 42 at 13 (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 515 (2012); United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 2001); Muegge, 225 F.3d at 1269, 1271)]. The Government also indicates that Defendant took a break during the interview, and chose to stay and be re-interviewed when Agent McCree came back with the undercover video. [Id. at 13-14]. It also submits that the agents not touching Monica or using an aggressive tone to compel her compliance also lead to a conclusion that this was not a custodial interrogation. [Id. at 14 (citing Street, 472 F.3d at 1309; Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881)].

         Finally, the Government contends that the fact that Monica was not formally arrested after the interview further demonstrates that she was not in custody. [Id. at 14-15 (citing Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 852; United States v. Herron, No. 2:14-CR-23-FtM-38DNF, 2015 WL 867309, at *17 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2015))]. It submits that the totality of circumstances shows that Monica was not in custody, and that this interview was merely routine questioning incident to the execution of a search warrant, and therefore the agents had no need to read Monica her Miranda rights. [Id. at 15-16].

         The Government also contends that Monica voluntarily made her statements to the agents as evidenced by the lack of any coercion, physical force, or promises, and her clear understanding of the agents' questions in this non-custodial setting. [Id. at 6]. It notes that in Blocker, the court found that the defendant's statements were voluntary based on the facts that: (1) the defendant's intelligence was demonstrated by his computer science degree; (2) the length of questioning was only two to four hours with no indication that the defendant was unwilling to answer questions; (3) any physical force was limited to grabbing the defendant to remove him from the house; (4) the defendant volunteered to assist the agents during questioning; (5) law enforcement did not communicate any sort of promises or inducements; and (6) the agents did not trick or deceive the defendant in any way. [Id. at 17 (citing Blocker, 2016 WL 3281018 at *19)]. The Government argues that this case is very similar to Blocker, in that: Monica's intelligence is demonstrated by her occupation as a pharmacy assistant, a job that requires the ability to assist pharmacists and respond intelligently to patients' questions, [id. at 17]; Monica was only questioned for two hours with an hour-long break, and she never asked to terminate the interview nor ever requested an attorney. [Id. at 18]. The Government maintains that she was never physically touched throughout the interview. [Id.]. The agents never promised nor threatened Monica. [Id.]. It additionally argues that there is no evidence that the agents engaged in any trickery or deceit in approaching her for an interview. [Id.]. Indeed, the Government points out that Monica actively assisted the agents during the interview by volunteering to show agents material in her email account on the computer. [Id.]. The Government concludes that in totality the record supports that Monica gave her statements voluntarily. [Id. at 18].

         In reply, Monica contends that the familiar setting of the interview does not matter if it is drowned out by a police-dominated atmosphere as the case is here. [Doc. 43 at 5]. She argues that the record, including the Memorandum of Interview, fails to support the Government's assertion that she was unambiguously advised that she was free to leave. [Id. at 8]. Monica also contends that she was a target pursuant to a USDA investigation, [id. at 9], and that a reasonable person under government investigation would feel compelled to stay for the interview and watch the content of Agent McCree's video to offer a rebuttable explanation. [Id.].

         As for voluntariness, Monica argues that the issue of voluntariness is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances and the burden is on the Government to establish, that a statement is voluntary. [Id. at 14-15 (citing United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010))]. She argues that she was surprised at her place of employment by agents with a warrant, where the agents indicated to her before the interview that she was the focus of their investigation. She contends that she did not voluntarily participate in this interview. [Id. at 15].

         In sur-reply, the Government argues that Monica's assertion that in order to be a voluntary statement a defendant must speak to the Government is incorrect. [Doc. 44 at 1]. It points out that Monica cited no case law in support of this proposition, and whether she spoke unprovoked by law enforcement officials is irrelevant in the voluntariness inquiry. [Id. at 1-2 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir. 1996))]. The Government also argues that Defendant is incorrect in stating that it is relevant in the voluntariness calculus when the agents told her that if she left the pharmacy she could not come back until after the search warrant is complete. [Id. at 2]. The Government argues that offering the option to stay or leave for good during the execution of a search warrant should not factor into whether she was exposed to a coercive setting. [Id. at 2 (citing Young, 2017 WL 653556, at *2, 6)]. Finally, the Government argues that Monica's contention that her interview was involuntary due to her being the target of the investigation is incorrect because there will always be coercive aspects to any law enforcement interview, but that does not mean that conduct is egregious enough where the interview would be involuntary. [Id. at 2-3 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977))].

         C. Discussion

         Monica's motion to suppress raises two issues: (1) whether she was in custody at the time of the questioning, and thus the agents were required to advise her of the Miranda warnings before questioning her; and (2) whether her statements were made voluntarily, and not the product of coercion by law enforcement.

         1. Custody

         The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Based on this Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court adopted a rule in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that “certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000).

         “The right to Miranda warnings attaches when custodial interrogation begins.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1148 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, Miranda does not apply “outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984). A defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes when “there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984)). “[W]hether a suspect is ‘in custody' is an objective inquiry.” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270; see Street, 472 F.3d at 1309 (holding that the custody inquiry is an objective standard from the perspective of a reasonably innocent person). Thus, the actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant, and the reasonable person from whose perspective “custody” is defined is a reasonable innocent person. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations, citations, alteration, and emphasis omitted). Therefore, “[a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his [or her] situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).

         The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that she was subjected to custodial interrogation. United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[I]f a defendant shows that a confession was obtained while he was under custodial interrogation, the government then has the burden of proving that the defendant voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination.”)[9]; see also United States v. Peck, 17 F.Supp.3d 1345, 1353-54, 1362 (N.D.Ga. 2014) (Totenberg, J., adopting Baverman, M.J.) (lengthy discussion that de le Fuente still requires defendant to first carry the burden in showing he was in custody and that Miranda warnings are necessary). The Eleventh Circuit considers several factors in applying this objective test, “including whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled.” Street, 472 F.3d at 1309 (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Long, 866 F.2d 402, 405 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Howes, 565 U.S. at 508 (citations omitted) (identifying some factors to consider, including location of the questioning, its duration, the types of statements made during the questioning, the presence of physical restraints, and the release of the suspect at the end of the questioning); Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348-49 (holding that defendant was not in custody in part because he was in a familiar setting-his girlfriend's house-and because, “[a]lthough an officer accompanied him throughout the house for safety reasons, he was free to eat, smoke, use the phone, and move about as he wished”).

         In this case, Monica did not establish that she was subject to custodial interrogation. Here, every factor that courts have considered in a custody analysis point away from a finding of custody. “The circumstances before the court fall outside the Miranda paradigm[, ] that is, interrogation of a suspect at the police station, or similar circumstances establishing the functional equivalent of an arrest requiring Miranda warnings.” United States v. Toumasian, No. 1:10-CR-0291-TCB-JFK-3, 2011 WL 3798223, at *10 (N.D.Ga. July 19, 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-CR-291-TCB-3, 2011 WL 3738980 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 22, 2011).

         First, the questioning not only occurred at her place of work, but also in a private office. T11, 33-34. “[C]ourts are much less likely to find the circumstances custodial when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the [defendant]'s home.” Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 882 (same); United States v. Lazarus, 552 Fed.Appx. 892, 894 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014) (defendant not in custody when interviewed “at a neutral location, an office at her workplace”); United States v. Sosa, No. 1:15-cr-20170-KMM, 2015 WL 6751062, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2015) (finding no custody and stating, “The interview took place at Sosa's place of business, a factor which is particularly relevant to the custody analysis.”) (citing Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348); United States v. Basil, 268 F.Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (finding no custody where defendant was questioned in his own office, with his wife and employees present on the premises).

         Second, the questioning only lasted two hours and over a third of this time was not spent actually questioning, but just waiting for the session to proceed again. T54. Similar periods of questioning have found to not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Muegge, 225 F.3d at 1269-71 (two-and-a-half hours); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 655-58 (two hours).

         Third, the agents told Monica that she was not under arrest and could leave the premises. T7. The Court finds the agents' testimony credible on this point despite Bridges not including it in his Memorandum of Interview. “Unambiguously advising a defendant that he is free to leave and is not in custody is a powerful factor in the mix, and generally will lead to the conclusion that the defendant is not in custody absent a finding of restraints that are ‘so extensive that telling the suspect he was free to leave could not cure the custodial aspect of the interview.' ” Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Muegge, 225 F.3d at 1271). Further, McCree asked Monica if she would like to be questioned, T10, 15, 16, and advised her that she was not obligated to speak to them. T16. Such a statement was found to be proof of no custody in Matcovich, 522 Fed.Appx. at 852.

         Fourth, the agents did not promise Monica any benefit for answering questions, nor did they threaten nor physically touch her in anyway. T53-54. Fifth, Monica was never handcuffed, T55, nor did the agents ever brandish their weapons at her. T51-53; see United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[n]o handcuffs [being] employed, and no guns [being] drawn” is a factor that disfavors a finding of custody); see also United States v. Colon, 579 Fed.Appx. 791, 793-94 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2014) (finding defendant not in custody where he was interrogated in his home, was told he was not under arrest and did not have to talk to the agents, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.