Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Speedy Care Transport v. George

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Third Division

December 28, 2018

SPEEDY CARE TRANSPORT et al.
v.
GEORGE (two cases).

          ELLINGTON, P. J., GOBEIL and COOMER, JJ.

          ELLINGTON, PRESIDING JUDGE.

         Speedy Care Transport, Inc. and Veranetta Roscoe (Ms. Roscoe), non-parties, appeal from the order of the Superior Court of Fulton County denying their motion to quash a subpoena directed to disinterested third party SunTrust Bank by party Christina George. George is litigating child support and contempt matters with her former husband, James Roscoe (Mr. Roscoe). The subpoena sought, among other things, production of banking records of Ms. Roscoe and Speedy Care Transport, a company owned by Ms. Roscoe. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to quash because (i) its order was based on erroneous factual findings, and (ii) Ms. Roscoe's and Speedy Care Transport's records were not, for numerous alleged reasons, relevant and discoverable. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.[1]

         The records show the following.[2] George and Mr. Roscoe divorced in 2009. George was awarded primary physical custody of their two minor children. Mr. Roscoe and Ms. Roscoe married in 2015. Ms. Roscoe is the owner of Speedy Care Transport. Mr. Roscoe worked for Speedy Care Transport.

         On May 8, 2017, Mr. Roscoe filed a complaint against George for modification of custody, visitation, and child support, and for citation of contempt, in the Superior Court of Fulton County (the "First Action"). On June 13, 2017, George answered and asserted a counterclaim for modification of parenting time and child support. Also on June 13, 2017, George filed a petition for modification of legal custody and for contempt in the Superior Court of Fulton County (the "Second Action"). Mr. Roscoe dismissed his complaint on June 20, 2017, but George's counterclaim remains pending in the First Action.

         On December 13, 2017, George, with reference to both the First Action and the Second Action, served a subpoena for the deposition of nonparty SunTrust Bank, which sought:

All records, including but not limited to complete bank statements, cancelled checks, checks submitted for deposit, and deposit slips for any account in the name of Speedy Care Transport Inc., . . . and/or any account for which [Ms. Roscoe] has signature authority from January 1, 2013, through and including the date of this subpoena.

         The Appellants moved to quash the subpoena. The trial court refused to quash the subpoena, finding that the information sought from SunTrust regarding Appellants was "plainly relevant and discoverable." Specifically, the trial court's factual findings show:

[A]ll parties agree that Non-Party [Ms.] Roscoe is Respondent [Mr.] Roscoe's new wife, that they live together, and that [Mr.] Roscoe does not have a bank account or any credit cards. Further, all parties agree that Speedy Care Transport is a company owned by Non-Party [Ms.] Roscoe and that [Mr.] Roscoe is listed as Registered Agent for that Company. [Mr.] Roscoe is an employee of Speedy Care Transport, although he reports he is paid very little by that company.

         The trial court nevertheless limited the subpoena pursuant OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), after expressly balancing the relevance of the information sought and the annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, and expense claimed by Appellants. As to Speedy Care Transport's bank statements, the trial court ruled that the names of employees other than Mr. Roscoe and Ms. Roscoe be redacted, and that statements from before January 1, 2016 need not be produced. As to Ms. Roscoe's personal accounts, the trial court ruled that statements from before January 1, 2016 need not be produced.

         The trial court's order on the discovery dispute was entered in both actions. Appellants appealed from the order entered in the First Action, giving rise to Case No. A18A1479, and in the Second Action, giving rise to Case No. A18A1459. We have consolidated these appeals, which raise the same claims of error, for the purposes of this opinion.

         1. In related claims of error, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence sought by the subpoena was relevant because (i) the trial court improperly relied on evidence adduced at a status conference at which Appellants did not participate, and (ii) the trial court's findings that Mr. Roscoe was an owner and registered agent of Speedy Care Transport, and as to the amount of money paid to Mr. Roscoe, misstate the evidence and are inaccurate. We will not disturb the trial court's factual findings if there is any evidence to support them. See, e. g., Gerald S. Mullis, P.C. v. Sikes, 244 Ga.App. 368, 369 (2) (535 S.E.2d 533) (2000).

         (a) In her reply below to Appellant's motion to quash, George relied on a December 15, 2017, "120[-]Day[] Status Conference," at which the trial court apparently heard argument on Mr. Roscoe's separate motion to quash the subpoena at issue here, as showing that the subpoenaed documents were relevant.[3] Appellants argue that, inasmuch as they never had an opportunity to participate in the status conference, or were even notified of the conference, they were unfairly prejudiced "to the extent the trial court included information from the status conference" in ruling on the Appellant's motion to quash. The trial court's order addressing Appellant's motion to quash showed that it considered "the pleadings, the law, and the [January 22, 2018] telephone conference conducted with the parties."[4] Thus, it is not apparent from its order that the court relied on the 120-day status conference for purposes of its findings of fact. Further, the Appellants do not point to any statutory or other legal requirement which contemplates that they, as nonparties, must receive notice of and an opportunity to participate in the parties' status conference. Accordingly, Appellants show no error.

         (b) Appellants further contend that the trial court made inaccurate factual findings that "were not included in either Appellants' or [George's] papers." Specifically, Appellants dispute the trial court's findings that (i) Mr. Roscoe was a registered agent of Speedy ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.