SPEEDY CARE TRANSPORT et al.
GEORGE (two cases).
ELLINGTON, P. J., GOBEIL and COOMER, JJ.
ELLINGTON, PRESIDING JUDGE.
Care Transport, Inc. and Veranetta Roscoe (Ms. Roscoe),
non-parties, appeal from the order of the Superior Court of
Fulton County denying their motion to quash a subpoena
directed to disinterested third party SunTrust Bank by party
Christina George. George is litigating child support and
contempt matters with her former husband, James Roscoe (Mr.
Roscoe). The subpoena sought, among other things, production
of banking records of Ms. Roscoe and Speedy Care Transport, a
company owned by Ms. Roscoe. Appellants contend that the
trial court erred in denying their motion to quash because
(i) its order was based on erroneous factual findings, and
(ii) Ms. Roscoe's and Speedy Care Transport's records
were not, for numerous alleged reasons, relevant and
discoverable. We affirm for the reasons set forth
records show the following. George and Mr. Roscoe divorced in
2009. George was awarded primary physical custody of their
two minor children. Mr. Roscoe and Ms. Roscoe married in
2015. Ms. Roscoe is the owner of Speedy Care Transport. Mr.
Roscoe worked for Speedy Care Transport.
8, 2017, Mr. Roscoe filed a complaint against George for
modification of custody, visitation, and child support, and
for citation of contempt, in the Superior Court of Fulton
County (the "First Action"). On June 13, 2017,
George answered and asserted a counterclaim for modification
of parenting time and child support. Also on June 13, 2017,
George filed a petition for modification of legal custody and
for contempt in the Superior Court of Fulton County (the
"Second Action"). Mr. Roscoe dismissed his
complaint on June 20, 2017, but George's counterclaim
remains pending in the First Action.
December 13, 2017, George, with reference to both the First
Action and the Second Action, served a subpoena for the
deposition of nonparty SunTrust Bank, which sought:
All records, including but not limited to complete bank
statements, cancelled checks, checks submitted for deposit,
and deposit slips for any account in the name of Speedy Care
Transport Inc., . . . and/or any account for which [Ms.
Roscoe] has signature authority from January 1, 2013, through
and including the date of this subpoena.
Appellants moved to quash the subpoena. The trial court
refused to quash the subpoena, finding that the information
sought from SunTrust regarding Appellants was "plainly
relevant and discoverable." Specifically, the trial
court's factual findings show:
[A]ll parties agree that Non-Party [Ms.] Roscoe is Respondent
[Mr.] Roscoe's new wife, that they live together, and
that [Mr.] Roscoe does not have a bank account or any credit
cards. Further, all parties agree that Speedy Care Transport
is a company owned by Non-Party [Ms.] Roscoe and that [Mr.]
Roscoe is listed as Registered Agent for that Company. [Mr.]
Roscoe is an employee of Speedy Care Transport, although he
reports he is paid very little by that company.
trial court nevertheless limited the subpoena pursuant OCGA
§ 9-11-26 (c), after expressly balancing the relevance
of the information sought and the annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, and expense claimed by Appellants. As to Speedy
Care Transport's bank statements, the trial court ruled
that the names of employees other than Mr. Roscoe and Ms.
Roscoe be redacted, and that statements from before January
1, 2016 need not be produced. As to Ms. Roscoe's personal
accounts, the trial court ruled that statements from before
January 1, 2016 need not be produced.
trial court's order on the discovery dispute was entered
in both actions. Appellants appealed from the order entered
in the First Action, giving rise to Case No. A18A1479, and in
the Second Action, giving rise to Case No. A18A1459. We have
consolidated these appeals, which raise the same claims of
error, for the purposes of this opinion.
related claims of error, Appellants maintain that the trial
court erred in finding that the evidence sought by the
subpoena was relevant because (i) the trial court improperly
relied on evidence adduced at a status conference at which
Appellants did not participate, and (ii) the trial
court's findings that Mr. Roscoe was an owner and
registered agent of Speedy Care Transport, and as to the
amount of money paid to Mr. Roscoe, misstate the evidence and
are inaccurate. We will not disturb the trial court's
factual findings if there is any evidence to support them.
See, e. g., Gerald S. Mullis, P.C. v. Sikes, 244
Ga.App. 368, 369 (2) (535 S.E.2d 533) (2000).
her reply below to Appellant's motion to quash, George
relied on a December 15, 2017, "120[-]Day Status
Conference," at which the trial court apparently heard
argument on Mr. Roscoe's separate motion to quash the
subpoena at issue here, as showing that the subpoenaed
documents were relevant. Appellants argue that, inasmuch as they
never had an opportunity to participate in the status
conference, or were even notified of the conference, they
were unfairly prejudiced "to the extent the trial court
included information from the status conference" in
ruling on the Appellant's motion to quash. The trial
court's order addressing Appellant's motion to quash
showed that it considered "the pleadings, the law, and
the [January 22, 2018] telephone conference conducted with
the parties." Thus, it is not apparent from its order
that the court relied on the 120-day status conference for
purposes of its findings of fact. Further, the Appellants do
not point to any statutory or other legal requirement which
contemplates that they, as nonparties, must receive notice of
and an opportunity to participate in the parties' status
conference. Accordingly, Appellants show no error.
Appellants further contend that the trial court made
inaccurate factual findings that "were not included in
either Appellants' or [George's] papers."
Specifically, Appellants dispute the trial court's
findings that (i) Mr. Roscoe was a registered agent of Speedy