HUNSTEIN, JUSTICE. 
Denirio Perrell Cunningham was tried and convicted of murder
and related offenses in connection with crimes he committed
against David Rucker, Ashley Gay, and their two minor
children. Cunningham appeals, alleging that the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that
the trial court erred by improperly admitting evidence
pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse
Cunningham's convictions and sentences for false
imprisonment and the related weapons charges because of
insufficient evidence, but we affirm his remaining
convictions and sentences.
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the
evidence presented at trial established that, on the evening
of June 14, 2012, Cunningham and his co-defendant, Joseph
Harris,  asked their acquaintance, Keith Alexander,
for a ride to Brooks Crossing Apartments in Clayton County so
that Harris could, ostensibly, retrieve some clothing.
Alexander agreed and Harris provided directions so that
Alexander could drive the men to the apartment complex.
9:00 p.m., Ashley Gay and David Rucker had just put their
children to bed when they heard banging on the balcony door
of their second-floor apartment. Soon thereafter, they heard
the sound of someone climbing through their closed window
blinds. Rucker and Gay barricaded themselves and their two
screaming children (D. R., a minor girl, and D. R., a minor
boy) in the back bedroom of the apartment. Cunningham and
Harris kicked in one bedroom door before proceeding to the
back bedroom where the family was hiding. After the men
succeeded in kicking down that door, Rucker pushed the men
out of the room and down the hallway, shouting, "No bro,
no bro, my kids in here." Gay heard a gunshot, then the
apartment fell silent. When Gay looked around the corner, she
saw Rucker lying on the floor.
and Harris hurried back to Alexander's car. They jumped
inside and told him to "pull off, pull off."
Alexander drove away, asking the men numerous times what had
happened, but neither man would answer. Finally, when
Alexander pulled into the driveway of a friend's house,
Harris, who looked upset, responded, "Man, stuff got
real crazy in there." Alexander continued to push for
information; Cunningham explained that he and Harris were
"trying to hit a lick" and admitted to shooting
arrived at the scene and found Rucker unresponsive. The
medical examiner determined that Rucker died from a single
gunshot wound to the chest and found signs of blunt force
trauma to Rucker's face and forehead. During their
investigation, officers located a chair positioned on top of
the air conditioning unit just below the victims'
second-floor balcony and found a window screen lying on the
victims' balcony. Gay told officers that the two
intruders had on black masks and black gloves, and, though
she did not see their faces, she believed "Joe,"
one of Rucker's longtime friends, might have been
responsible. Law enforcement dusted the apartment's
balcony door for prints and located a fingerprint that
matched Harris' left index finger.
days later, Alexander informed law enforcement that
Cunningham and Harris were involved in the victim's
murder. The two men were subsequently arrested and held at
the Clayton County Jail. While there, both men made numerous
incriminating statements to other individuals regarding their
participation in the crimes. While incarcerated, Cunningham
also attempted to have Alexander killed in order to prevent
him from testifying. At trial, the State introduced evidence
via Rule 404 (b) of a prior robbery allegedly committed by
Cunningham first argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions. When evaluating the sufficiency of
evidence, the proper standard of review is whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). "This Court
does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony;
instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, with deference to the jury's assessment of
the weight and credibility of the evidence."
(Punctuation and citation omitted.) Hayes v. State,
292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 S.E.2d 313) (2013). Moreover, a
"reviewing court must consider all of the evidence
admitted by the trial court, regardless [of] whether that
evidence was admitted erroneously." (Punctuation and
citations omitted.) Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 388
(810 S.E.2d 515) (2018).
in this manner, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Cunningham's convictions and sentences for malice murder,
burglary, aggravated assault of Gay, cruelty to children,
criminal trespass, and the related weapons charges. However,
as we did in Harris' appeal, see Harris v.
State, 304 Ga. 276 (1) (818 S.E.2d 530) (2018), we find
that the evidence was insufficient to support
Cunningham's convictions and sentences for false
imprisonment and his convictions and sentences for possessing
a firearm during the commission of the false imprisonment of
Gay and her two minor children.
person commits the offense of false imprisonment when, in
violation of the personal liberty of another, he arrests,
confines, or detains such person without legal
authority." OCGA § 16-5-41 (a). Here, there is no
evidence that Cunningham arrested, confined, or detained any
of the victims. Indeed, the victims chose to
barricade themselves and their children in their back bedroom
and tried to stop Cunningham and his co-defendant from
entering. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to
establish Cunningham's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
regarding the three counts of false imprisonment and the
three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a false imprisonment, and his convictions and sentences
for the same must be reversed. See Harris, 304 Ga.
at (1); Ward v. State, 304 Ga.App. 517 (1) (c) (696
S.E.2d 471) (2010).
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent pursuant
to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) to introduce evidence of a prior
home invasion and armed robbery allegedly committed by
Cunningham and Harris. At a pre-trial hearing on the notice,
the State made a proffer showing as follows. Two months prior
to Rucker's murder, Rogers Glenn was at home with his
girlfriend when Harris and a masked man (later identified as
Cunningham) entered the residence. Both men were armed and
held the victims at gunpoint. After Cunningham struck Glenn
over the head, rendering him unconscious, Cunningham forced
the girlfriend to perform oral sex on him at gunpoint. The
men then stole wallets, cash, jewelry, and electronics from
the home; the victims' wallets were later recovered from
State requested that this other acts evidence be admitted at
trial in order to establish intent, motive, and plan.
Cunningham objected. The trial court admitted the evidence
for the purposes of demonstrating "intent, preparation
and plan," concluding that the probative value of the
other acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice. Cunningham asserts that the admission of this
evidence at trial was error.
without deciding, that the trial court's ruling was
erroneous, based upon the strong evidence establishing
Cunningham's guilt, including witness testimony, the many
incriminating statements made by both defendants, and the
evidence that Cunningham attempted to have the State's
key witness, Keith Alexander, killed prior to trial, we
conclude that it is highly probable that any error did not
contribute to the jury's guilty verdict. See Timmons
v. State, 302 Ga. 464 (2) (b) (807 S.E.2d 363) (2017);
Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285 (2) (b) (745 S.E.2d
Finally, Cunningham argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file an alibi notice prior to
trial, and for failing to call Eric Todd as an alibi witness
at trial. In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's
performance was professionally deficient and that, but for
such deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). "If the defendant
fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland
test, this Court is not required to examine the other."
(Citation omitted.) Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557,
565 (788 S.E.2d 484) (2016). "A court considering a
claim of ineffective assistance must apply a 'strong
presumption' that counsel's representation was within
the 'wide range' of reasonable professional
assistance." (Citation omitted.) Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d
624) (2011). "In reviewing the trial court's
decision, we accept the trial court's factual findings