United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
before the Court is Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief (ECF
Nos. 10, 1). For the reasons explained below it is
recommended that Respondents' motion be granted and
Petitioner's application for relief be dismissed.
is a native and citizen of Honduras. Pet. 5, ECF No. 1; Mot.
to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 7, ECF No. 10-1. He first came to the
United States as a 10-year-old unaccompanied minor. Pet. 5.
On April 20, 2006, he was ordered removed in absentia by an
Immigration Judge. Id. at 5-6. He was granted
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA")
status on October 22, 2013. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 8. That
status expired in October 2015. Pet. 6. Petitioner was
arrested on August 7, 2017, in Raleigh, North Carolina for
failure to appear in state court regarding various driving
citations. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 7. In September 2017, he
re-applied for DACA status. Id. at 1. On May 25,
2018, Petitioner's application for DACA was denied by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS"). Id. Meanwhile, he was taken
into custody by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE') in December 2017. Id.
Court received Petitioner's application for habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on June 10, 2018 (ECF No. 1). It
was labeled "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,"
but alleged four separate causes of action
("COAs"). The first COA was for "habeas
corpus" release from detention. Id. 7-9. The
second COA was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 553, and alleged that
Respondents acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
denying Petitioner's DACA application, violated
USCIS's procedures for processing such applications, and
failed to follow the new rulemaking requirements of the APA
to the extent they changed the requirements for DACA. Pet.
9-10. The third COA alleged that Respondents violated the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying
Petitioner's DACA application without adequate process.
Id. at 10-11. The fourth COA requested
attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA"). Id. at 11. Petitioner requested,
among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief along
with a release from custody. Id. at 3, 12.
27, 2018, Petitioner was removed from the United States to
Honduras. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 1. Respondents filed
their motion to dismiss on July 10, 2018, contending that
Petitioner's removal mooted his petition. Mot. to Dismiss
3, ECF No. 10. Petitioner filed a response opposing the
motion on July 13, 2018, and Respondents replied on July 27,
2018 (ECF Nos. 11, 12).
Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief
first COA seeks his release from detention under the
authority of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Pet. 7-9. His removal from the country rendered this request
III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to the consideration of 'Cases' and
'Controversies.'" U.S. Const, art. Ill. §
2; Soliman v. United States, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242
(11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding appeal moot where
petitioner was removed from the United States). "The
doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case or
controversy limitation because 'an action that is moot
cannot be characterized as an active case or
controversy.'" Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242
(citation omitted). "[P]ut another way, a cause is moot
when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to
which the court can give meaningful relief."
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
"Therefore, 'if events that occur subsequent to the
filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the
ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief,
then the case is moot and must be dismissed.'"
Id. (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d
1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
from the United States pursuant to a final order of removal
generally moots an alien's habeas challenge to his
continued detention. See, e.g., Soliman, 296 F.3d at
1243-44. "However, dismissal after [removal] is not
automatic; a habeas petition continues to present a live
controversy after the petitioner's release or deportation
when there is some remaining 'collateral consequence'
that may be redressed by success on the petition."
Martinez v. Sessions, No. 2:18-cv-58-FtM-99CM, 2018
WL 1830845, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2018) (citing
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998)).
his removal from the country and release from detention,
Petitioner argues his petition is not moot because he has
suffered collateral consequences in the form of
"concrete legal disadvantages." Pet'r's
Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 11. He points to his COAs
under the APA and Fifth Amendment as being
disadvantaged. Id. Further, he asserts his
deportation created a legal disadvantage to obtaining DACA
because of the requirement of a continuous presence in the
United States for DACA eligibility. Id. at 3.
collateral consequences identified by Petitioner, however,
stem not from his detention but from the removal order.
See Ferry v. Gonzales,457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th
Cir. 2006) (finding alien's inability to return to the
United States to be a consequence of his removal order, not
his detention); see also Jackson v. Holder, 893
F.Supp.2d 629, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying petitioner's
request for declaratory judgment that his continued detention
was unauthorized by the INA and/or violated the Fifth
Amendment because "any continuing injury to the
petitioner stems not from his detention, which has ended, but
from the final removal order"). Petitioner did not
challenge his removal order in this Court. ...