ANDREWS and BROWN, JJ.
a jury trial, Inyang Oduok was convicted of failure to yield
the right of way. He appeals pro se, raising numerous claims
of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
two enumerated errors, Oduok argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. On appeal
from a criminal conviction, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no
longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. See Nolan v.
State, 257 Ga.App. 767 (572 S.E.2d 100) (2002). We do
not weigh the evidence or resolve issues of witness
credibility, but merely determine whether the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. As we have explained:
Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, including the
State's witnesses, are a matter of credibility for the
[jury] to resolve. As long as there is some competent
evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact
necessary to make out the State's case, the verdict will
Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
viewed, the evidence shows that on February 2, 2016,
authorities were called to the scene of a two-vehicle
collision at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal
in Dekalb County. The responding officer identified Oduok as
one of the drivers and took his statement. According to
Oduok, he was in the left turn lane just before the
collision, waiting to turn left. He commenced his turn when
the traffic signal displayed a green left turn arrow, but a
car approaching from the opposite direction entered the
intersection "trying to beat a yellow [light], traveling
straight," and collided with Oduok's vehicle.
on his knowledge of the light cycles at the intersection, the
responding officer doubted the accuracy of Oduok's
account. After further investigation, the officer determined
that Oduok had failed to yield while making the left turn and
issued him a citation. At that point, Oduok changed his
description of events, insisting to the officer that the
other driver was "attempting to run a red light."
adverse driver, Tanisha Green, testified at trial that Oduok
turned left in front of her as she traveled straight through
the intersection on the green light, striking her car. Oduok
disputed this testimony, asserting that he was turning left
on the green arrow when Green's car "came straight
and shot into [his] car." The jury, however, found him
guilty of failure to yield the right of way.
to OCGA § 40-6-71, "[t]he driver of a vehicle
intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into
an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction
which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to
constitute an immediate hazard." The State presented
evidence that Oduok turned left at an intersection in front
of a car approaching from the opposite direction, causing a
collision. Although Oduok asserts that the other driver was
at fault, that driver offered contrary testimony, and the
jury was authorized to resolve this evidentiary conflict
against Oduok. His effort on appeal to characterize the
State's witnesses as "highly questionable"
essentially asks us "to retry his case, reweigh the
evidence, and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which
we cannot do." Cook v. State, 238 Ga.App. 341,
342 (1) (518 S.E.2d 749) (1999) (citations omitted). The
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion
that Oduok failed to yield, in violation of OCGA §
40-6-71. See Nolan, supra; Cook, supra.
Oduok further argues that his conviction must be vacated
because OCGA § 40-6-71 does not regulate
"intersections controlled by a traffic light."
According to Oduok, his failure to yield violation should
have been charged under OCGA § 40-6-21, rather than OCGA
§ 40-6-71. He thus contends that the accusation was
initial matter, Oduok waived this claim by failing to raise
it below through a special demurrer. See Ervin v.
State, 298 Ga.App. 409, 411 (680 S.E.2d 448) (2009);
Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 307, 309 (2) (656
S.E.2d 920) (2008). Even absent waiver, however, we find no
merit to his claim. The provision cited by Oduok, OCGA §
40-6-21, is a "definitional section" that describes
the various traffic signals on the roadway, but does not
define a violation of the law. State v. Nix, 220
Ga.App. 651, 653 (1) (469 S.E.2d 497) (1996). Instead, the
legislature specifically addressed failure to yield through
OCGA § 40-6-71, which by its plain terms requires a
driver "intending to turn to the left within an
intersection" to yield to oncoming traffic. Nothing in
the statutory language restricts its application to
intersections without a traffic signal. And we have routinely
affirmed convictions under OCGA § 40-6-71 for failure to
yield at traffic-light controlled intersections. See
Nolan, supra; Cook, supra.
State properly charged Oduok with failure to yield pursuant
to OCGA § 40-6-71. To the extent any language in
Bailey v. Bartee, 205 Ga.App. 463, 463-464 (1) (422
S.E.2d 319) (1992) (physical precedent only), or Corley
v. Harris, 171 Ga.App. 688, 689 (3) (320 S.E.2d 833)
(1984), suggests a different conclusion, that language is
Again asserting that he was charged under the wrong
provision, Oduok claims that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on OCGA § 40-6-71. Given our