MCFADDEN, P. J., RAY and RICKMAN, JJ.
related appeals concern a fatal, multi-vehicle collision. The
State charged Dannie Mondor with hit and run (OCGA §
40-6-270 (b)) and with first degree vehicular homicide
predicated upon the hit-and-run offense (OCGA § 40-6-393
(b)). In response to Mondor's special demurrer, the trial
court dismissed the indictment. Apparently anticipating that
the State will re-indict him, the trial court also rejected
constitutional challenges that Mondor made to the hit and run
and vehicular homicide statutes and to a statute barring him
from introducing evidence of the accident victim's seat
belt use (OCGA § 40-8-76.1).
No. A18A0268, the State appeals from the trial court's
ruling on the special demurrer. Because the indictment
contains the elements of the hit-and-run statute and
sufficiently notifies Mondor of the accusations against him,
we reverse the trial court's order granting his special
demurrer and dismissing the indictment.
No. A18A0269, Mondor appeals from the trial court's
rulings on the constitutional arguments. Because this
cross-appeal may fall within the Supreme Court's
exclusive jurisdiction, we transfer it to our Supreme Court.
Agreed-to facts from appellate briefs.
their appellate briefs, the State and Mondor agree that the
accident occurred on an interstate highway. Mondor was
driving a large recreational vehicle and was towing a
trailer. The State alleges that the front right bumper of
Mondor's recreational vehicle struck the left rear bumper
of a second vehicle during a lane change. The second vehicle
lost control and struck a third vehicle. The passenger in the
third vehicle died after being ejected from the vehicle.
After the accident, Mondor stopped on the side of the road at
a nearby exit. He then apparently drove to a shopping center
parking lot, called the police to report the accident, and
waited for their arrival.
A18A0268 - Special demurrer to indictment.
special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of
the indictment. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga.App. 588,
591 (2) (730 S.E.2d 69) (2012). "In reviewing a ruling
on a special demurrer, we apply a de novo standard of review,
because it is a question of law whether the allegations in
the indictment are legally sufficient." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) McGlynn v. State, 342 Ga.App.
170, 175 (2) (803 S.E.2d 97) (2017). Mondor was entitled to
an indictment "perfect in form" because he filed
his special demurrer before going to trial. Kimbrough v.
State, 300 Ga. 878, 881 (3) (779 S.E.2d 229) (2017).
inquiring whether an indictment is sufficient to withstand a
the applicable standard is not whether [the indictment] could
have been made more definite and certain, but whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged,
and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are
taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record
shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hairston v.
State, 322 Ga.App. 572, 575 (2) (745 S.E.2d 798) (2013).
trial court granted Mondor's special demurrer and
dismissed the indictment, finding that the indictment was
"not perfect in form and substance" because it
"makes no mention of any knowledge by [Mondor] of any
death, damage, or injury." The State argues that the trial
court erred in concluding that the indictment did not
sufficiently allege all of the elements of the hit-and-run
offense. We agree with the State.
required by OCGA § 40-6-270 (a), "[t]he driver of
any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person . . . shall immediately stop such vehicle
at the scene of the accident or shall stop as close thereto
as possible and forthwith return to the scene of the accident
and shall [render specified assistance]." Further,
"[i]f such accident is the proximate cause of death or a
serious injury, any person knowingly failing to stop and
comply with ...