United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Linda T.
Walker's Final Report and Recommendation 
(“Final R&R”) recommending that this action
be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
February 20, 2018, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se,
filed his Complaint  seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 from the members of the Georgia Board of Pardons and
Paroles (the “Parole Board”) and an unidentified
“Subject Matter Expert” (“SME”) on
parole guidelines. (See generally ). Plaintiff
alleges that the SME prepared a parole document showing
Plaintiff's risk factors and calculating his risk score
for parole. ( at 3). “With cruel intention, ”
the SME allegedly falsely stated in the document that
Plaintiff was not employed at the time of his arrest.
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the SME's false
statement regarding his employment adversely impacted his
risk score and recommendation regarding parole.
(Id.). Plaintiff contends that, had the
recommendation been made based on his correct employment
status, he would have received parole after nineteen months
imprisonment, in April 2017. (Id.). Instead, the
Parole Board used the document prepared by the SME and
determined that Plaintiff should tentatively be paroled after
twenty-two months' imprisonment, in July 2017.
(Id.). Plaintiff seeks $1.2 million “for lost
time and painful hardship” and “to be released
from prison with no parole or probation.”
March 8, 2018, the Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiff's
Complaint and issued her Final R&R, recommending that
this action be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
parties did not file objections to the Final R&R.
Frivolity Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
federal court must screen “a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is
required to dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, ” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous, and must be dismissed,
where it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100
(11th Cir. 2008).
filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply
with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms.
Inc., 146 Fed.Appx. 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Even though a pro se complaint should be
construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must
state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief.”
Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F.Supp.2d 26, 28 (D.D.C.
2007). “[A] district court does not have license to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 297 Fed.Appx. 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or
modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S.1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With
respect to those findings and recommendations to which
objections have not been asserted, the Court must conduct a
plain error review of the record. United States v.
Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). The parties did not file
objections to the Final R&R, and the Court thus reviews
it for plain error.
central claim is that he was wrongfully denied a shorter
parole term based on a false representation to the Parole
Board relating to his employment status at the time of his
arrest. A Georgia state prisoner does not, however, have a
liberty interest in parole, and he may not pursue a claim in
federal court alleging that the Parole Board's exercise
of its discretion to deny him parole was a violation of his
due process rights. See Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944,
946 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Georgia prisoner's
due process claim regarding his parole determination was
“foreclosed” because “a Georgia inmate has
no liberty interest in parole”). A due process claim is
viable only if the Parole Board takes flagrant or
unauthorized action that causes a prisoner harm. Monroe
v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11th Cir. 1991). The
Parole Board may not “rely on knowingly false
information in their determinations.” Id. at
Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's Complaint
fails to state a viable due process claim for “at least
two reasons.” ( at 4). The Magistrate Judge first
found that Plaintiff did not allege facts to support a
finding that the Parole Board knew the SME used false
information to prepare its recommendation. (Id.).
The Magistrate Judge noted that “[t]he claim fails for
that reason alone.” (Id.); see also Dixon
v. State Bd. of Pardons and Parole, No. 1:01-cv-599-JEC,
at *3 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 19, 2001) (dismissing under § 1915A
claim that parole board ...