United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
K. EFPS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate at Augusta State Medical Prison (ASMP) in
Grovetown, Georgia, is proceeding in forma pauperis
in this case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis,
Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect
potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d
782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165
Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006).
names (1) ASMP Warden Edward Philbin and (2) Correctional
Officer Michael Allen as Defendants. (Doc. no. 10, pp. 1-2.)
Taking all of Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, as
the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the
facts are as follows.
March 28, 2018, Plaintiff was incarcerated in segregation
housing unit 12-A-1 at ASMP. (Id. at 2.) Officer
Allen handcuffed Plaintiff before leading him toward the
showers. (Id.) While Plaintiff and Officer Allen
were on the way to the showers, two inmates, who were not
escorted by prison guards or wearing restraints, exited their
nearby cell and approached Plaintiff and Officer Allen.
(Id.) Officer Allen abandoned Plaintiff, who was
still handcuffed, and another officer had to call for backup
because Officer Allen did not have a radio. (Id. at
2-3.) Officer Allen also did not have “pepper spray,
nightstick, electric tase-gun, partner, or anything else that
could've been used as a tool to effectively protect
himself - let alone [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff was “punched, kicked in the face, and beaten
mercilessly in the back of [his] head with a state-issued
combination lock.” (Id.) Plaintiff was taken
by ambulance to the Medical College of Georgia in Augusta,
where Plaintiff received four staples for his head injuries.
states incidents “very similar to this [one] had
already occurred a few times before.” (Id.)
Plaintiff states Defendants should have known the doors in
the unit were faulty, creating a substantial risk he would be
harmed, and yet failed to respond reasonably to protect him.
(Id.) Plaintiff also states Officer Allen violated
GDOC and ASMP policy by escorting Plaintiff alone and
abandoning him during the attack. (Id. at 4.) As
relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, $45, 000 of
compensatory damages from Defendant Allen, $50, 000 of
punitive damages against Defendants jointly and severally,
and costs. (Id. at 6.)
Legal Standard for Screening
amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if
it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366
Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the allegations in the amended
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That
is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, '” or if it
“tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short,
the complaint must provide a “‘plain
statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that
the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient
standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal
construction does not mean that the Court has a duty to
re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450
F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's Claim Should be Dismissed for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies\
Exhaustion Requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
1997e(a) of the PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Dismissal for
failure to state a claim is appropriate if it is clear from
the face of a complaint that the plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 215 (2007); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,
1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Solliday v. Federal Officers,
413 Fed.Appx. 206, 208 (11th Cir. 2011); Anderson v.
Donald, 261 Fed.Appx. 254, 256 (11th Cir. 2008). The
PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement “applies to
all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or
occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
520 (2002). Moreover, the Court ...