ELLINGTON, P. J., BETHEL, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
Slaughter appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial
following his convictions for one count each of rape, incest,
and child molestation. Slaughter argues that the trial court
erred because the State failed to prove venue as to all
charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was erroneously
charged on venue, and he received ineffective assistance. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence is viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no
longer enjoys the presumption of innocence." State
v. Robinson, 275 Ga.App. 117, 117 (619 S.E.2d 806)
(2005) (citation omitted). So viewed, the record shows that
the victim, K. S., lived with her mother and saw her father,
Slaughter, on weekends. K. S. testified that beginning when
she was eight years old, her father would touch her private
parts and have sexual intercourse with her, sometimes
physically restraining her. These assaults occurred in DeKalb
and Fulton county. The abuse continued for many years through
the time K. S. turned twelve and reached sixth grade. K.
S.'s three-year-old sister, T. S., also demonstrated
signs of abuse. For instance, while showering with K. S., T.
S. attempted to touch K. S.'s private parts. When asked
who had showed T. S. how to do such a thing, T. S. responded
"My daddy did." K. S. eventually disclosed the
abuse to her aunt, and then her mother. A physical
examination of K. S. revealed that she had contracted a
sexually transmitted infection. Slaughter was indicted on one
count each of rape, child molestation, and incest. A jury
found Slaughter guilty of all charges. Slaughter filed a
series of motions for a new trial, which the trial court
denied, and this appeal followed.
Slaughter first argues that the State failed to prove venue
in Fulton County for each of the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt and that his motion for directed verdict and for a new
trial should have been granted on these grounds. We disagree.
Our Georgia Constitution requires that venue in all criminal
cases must be laid in the county in which the crime was
allegedly committed. Venue is a jurisdictional fact, and an
essential element in proving that one is guilty of the crime
charged. Like every other material allegation in the
indictment, venue must be proved by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof of venue is a part of the State's
case, and the State's failure to prove venue beyond a
reasonable doubt renders the verdict contrary to law, without
a sufficient evidentiary basis, and warrants reversal.
Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 901-902 (2) (537 S.E.2d
80) (2000) (footnotes and citations omitted). The State may
use direct or circumstantial evidence to meet its burden.
Id. at 902-903 (2).
K. S. testified that her father first began abusing her while
he lived with her aunt (who resided in DeKalb County), K. S.
testified that the abuse continued to her father's
residence that he shared with his then-girlfriend. A
detective testified that her father's residence was
"646 Abner Street Southwest, Atlanta, " which he
testified was located in Fulton County.
states that the detective's testimony as to his address
was a mistake, as his correct address was actually "646
Atwood Street." Slaughter argues that the
detective's mistake in identifying Slaughter's
specific street address means that there is no evidence
supporting venue. Slaughter's argument is incorrect.
"This is not a case where a crime scene was described
but its location left unspecified, or where a street address
alone was offered as proof of venue without
reference to a city or county." Schofield v.
State, 261 Ga.App. 70, 71 (582 S.E.2d 11) (2003)
(emphasis added). Rather, the detective testified that the
crime scene was in Atlanta and in Fulton County. And another
witness testified as to the correct street address for
Slaughter. We note both that Slaughter could have explored
this alleged conflict in the evidence in his
cross-examination of the detective, "and also that he
was free to argue the significance of the alleged conflict to
the jury in closing. Any conflict in the evidence created by
a misstatement of the address was resolved by the jury . . .
in favor of venue in Fulton County." Id. at 71
(citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court did not err in
denying Slaughter's motion for directed verdict and
motion for a new trial on these grounds.
Slaughter next argues that the trial court committed plain
error in charging the jury on venue because it included in
its instruction language that was inapplicable to the case.
More specifically, Slaughter objects to the portion of the
jury instruction that provided: " . . . and a
prosecution in any case in which it cannot be determined in
what county the crime was committed, venue is proper and may
be proved in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that it might have been committed . . .
." The State concedes this portion of the jury
instruction was inapplicable.
concedes that he did not object to this instruction at trial,
and therefore we review the instruction for plain error.
See Givens v. State, 294 Ga. 264, 266 (2) (751
S.E.2d 778) (2013). "Thus, we must consider whether the
instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and
whether it likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings." Id. (citation omitted).
a general rule, a trial court does not err when it charges a
Code section in its entirety, even though some part of that
section may be inapplicable to the allegations of the
indictment and the evidence presented at trial. In such
circumstances, error will be found only where it appears that
the inapplicable part of the charged statute either misled
the jury or erroneously affected the verdict."
Hernandez-Garcia v. State, 322 Ga.App. 455, 460 (2)
(745 S.E.2d 706) (2013) (citations omitted). Therefore, for
the jury charge at issue to constitute reversible error,
there must be a reasonable possibility that, as a result of
the charge, the jury convicted Slaughter of the charged
offenses in a manner not alleged in the indictment. See
id. at 460-461 (2).
the trial court instructed the jury that venue in Fulton
County was a jurisdictional fact that had to be "proved
by the State beyond a reasonable doubt as to each crime
charged in the indictment just as any element of the
offense." Further, the State introduced testimony from a
detective that established that Slaughter's residence was
in Fulton County and other testimonial evidence established
Slaughter's correct street address in Fulton County.
Because the charge required the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that venue was in Fulton County, which the
jury could do based on the evidence presented at trial, the
extraneous instruction did not likely affect the outcome of
Lastly, Slaughter argues that he received ineffective
assistance at trial because his counsel failed to file a
special demurrer seeking more definite dates in the
indictment, failed to object during trial to the testimony
regarding T. S.'s ...