ELLINGTON, P. J., BETHEL, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
primary question this Court must answer in this case is
whether a valid and enforceable insurance contract was
created between Southern Trust Insurance Company (Southern
Trust) and Ronald E. Cravey. Cravey and Auto-Owners Insurance
Company (Auto-Owners), who seek to benefit from the existence
of such a contract, argue that a valid contract does exist.
Southern Trust, which disputes the existence of a valid and
enforceable insurance contract, argues that it does not, that
Auto-Owners therefore cannot bring a subrogation claim
against it, and that the trial court's summary judgment
order should be reversed accordingly. Southern Trust further
argues that the trial court should have considered deposition
testimony from another case in deciding the motions for
summary judgment. We find that Southern Trust's arguments
lack merit for the reasons set forth below, and we affirm.
outset, we note that insurance in Georgia is a matter of
contract, and this Court has long held that such contract
disputes are "well suited for adjudication by summary
judgment because construction of a contract is ordinarily a
matter of law for the court." Maxum Indem. Co. v.
Jimenez, 318 Ga.App. 669, 669 (734 S.E.2d 499) (2012)
(citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
record shows that the underlying suit involved a house fire
on a property located in Helena, Georgia. The property was
Cravey's primary residence until approximately 2011. On
February 9, 2013, Cravey entered into a rent-to-own contract
with Kim Clark and Jay Floyd, wherein Cravey agreed to
transfer ownership of the property to Clark and Floyd upon
receipt of $92, 500.00. Cravey maintained insurance coverage
for the house with Auto-Owners up to a limit of $104, 000.
However, Cravey told Clark and Floyd that they would have to
obtain renter's insurance.
did not obtain renter's insurance, but instead sought to
obtain an additional homeowner's policy. On March 21,
2013, Southern Trust issued an insurance policy to Clark,
covering the house up to a total limit of $175, 000. The
policy listed Cravey as an additional insured, noting his
interest to be: "Insured is purchasing home from Eddie
Cravey." Cravey did not ask Clark to obtain this policy
on his behalf, and he did not know initially that Clark had
obtained it or that he had been listed as an additional
15, 2013, a fire destroyed the house and its contents. Cravey
submitted a proof of loss to Auto-Owners, which paid for the
loss. Cravey did not submit a claim to Southern Trust.
Trust claimed that the insurance policy had been cancelled as
of May 20, 2013, and that notice had been provided to Clark.
However, Southern Trust conceded that Cravey, as an
additional insured, had not been "properly notified of
the cancellation" and that the cancellation therefore
did not apply to him. However, Southern Trust indicated that
recovery of any benefits from the policy would be secondary
to the policy Cravey maintained with Auto-Owners. Finally,
Southern Trust noted that Cravey's policy with
Auto-Owners appeared to fully indemnify him for the loss.
Southern Trust later disclaimed that Cravey was entitled to
any benefits under the policy, asserting that Clark had made
misrepresentations in securing coverage and no valid policy
as a subrogee of Cravey, demanded that Southern Trust pay its
share of the claim pursuant to OCGA § 33-4-6. Southern
Trust refused. Auto-Owners then brought suit against Southern
Trust to recover these amounts, and the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing,
trial court granted Auto-Owners' and Cravey's motion
for summary judgment, but denied Southern Trust's motion.
The trial court found that Southern Trust had failed to
cancel the policy as to Cravey, who was a third party
additional insured. Thus, the trial court ruled that the
policy remained valid and enforceable as it relates to
Cravey. This appeal followed.
Southern Trust first argues that the trial court erred in
finding a valid insurance policy with respect to Cravey
because Clark did not have actual or apparent authority to
procure the policy on his behalf, Cravey never ratified the
policy, and Cravey could not have been a third party
beneficiary to the insurance contract. In response,
Auto-Owners argues that the trial court correctly found
Cravey to be a third-party beneficiary to the insurance
contract between Southern Trust and Clark. We agree with
beneficiary of a contract made between other parties for his
benefit may maintain an action against the promisor on the
contract." OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). "A third party
has standing to enforce a contract under OCGA § 9-2-20
if it clearly appears from the contract that it was intended
for his benefit; the mere fact that he would benefit from
performance of the contract is insufficient." City
of Atlanta v. Atlantic Realty Co., 205 Ga.App. 1, 6 (3)
(421 S.E.2d 113) (1992) (citation omitted). "A contract
is intended to benefit a third party when the promisor
engages to the promisee to render some performance to a third
person." Scott v. Mamari Corp., 242 Ga.App.
455, 457 (1) (530 S.E.2d 208) (2000) (citation omitted).
Cravey is specifically named on an endorsement as an
additional insured on the Southern Trust policy. That
endorsement extends the definition of "insured" to
include Cravey with respect to the applicable coverage
provisions. Thus, the contract was clearly intended, on its
face, to benefit Cravey. See, e.g., City of
Atlanta, 205 Ga.App. at 5-6 (3) (party intended to be
named as an insured on insurance policies required by the
applicable contract is a third party beneficiary). See
also Hicks v. Continental Ins. Co., 146 Ga.App. 124, 125
(245 S.E.2d 482) (1978) (party entitled to be an insured or
additional insured under an automobile policy is a
third-party beneficiary). It is irrelevant whether Clark had
actual or apparent authority to procure the policy on
Cravey's behalf or whether Cravey ratified the policy
Cravey was still a third-party beneficiary to the Southern
Trust insurance contract under the terms of the endorsement.
The trial court did not err in denying Southern Trust summary
judgment on these grounds.
Southern Trust next argues that Auto-Owners was not entitled
to subrogation. More specifically, Southern Trust argues that
it would be inequitable to permit subrogation under the facts
of this case because Cravey did not know of the policy, did
not request or authorize the policy, and did not pursue
coverage under the policy when he discovered its existence.
doctrine of contribution "between co-insurers is based
upon the ground that where several policies in different
offices insure the same party upon the same subject-matter
against the same risk, as there can be but one loss and one
indemnity, the several offices, as between themselves, must
contribute proportionably to the loss, though each is liable
to the insured for the entire loss, unless there is a special
agreement that each shall be liable only for its proportional
part." Fireman's FundIns. Co. v.
Pekor, 106 Ga. 1 (2) (31 SE 779) (1898) (citation
omitted). See also Couch on Insurance § 218:3
(3d ed. 2017) ("In the context of multiple concurrent
insurance, contribution is only appropriate where the
policies insure the same entities, the same ...