ELLINGTON, P. J., BETHEL, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
Alfaro appeals from the trial court's order granting a
divorce from Johnny Alfaro. She argues that the trial court
erred by awarding Johnny her separate and marital property.
Because neither party asked the trial court to make factual
findings, we are unable to conclude that the trial
court's equitable distribution of marital property was
improper as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.
Accordingly, we affirm.
and Gloria were married in 1982, and in 2017, the trial court
entered a final judgment and decree of divorce. At issue on
this granted discretionary appeal is the trial court's
disposition of the house (and its associated equity) in which
the couple resided, as well as various items of furniture in
and Gloria gave drastically different testimony regarding the
events preceeding their divorce. Gloria testified that she
and her mother put down a deposit to purchase the house in
which the couple resided. Gloria testified that she had lived
at the house since 1991, and "in and out after
2011." Gloria further stated that up until 2010 when she
discovered that Johnny was having a relationship with
Gloria's cousin, she maintained a familial and sexual
relationship with Johnny. Gloria would usually stay at the
house and she would purchase groceries and other household
items and come to the house to cook, clean, do household
chores, and look after the children. Gloria's nephew
testified that whenever he came to the house, Gloria was
there cooking and cleaning. Gloria testified that she was
unable to stay at the house full-time due to Johnny's
drinking problem and domestic violence incidents between the
couple. The parties agree that Johnny paid the household
bills and that the house is in Johnny's name. However,
Gloria testified that much of the furniture inside the house
was donated to her by individuals for whom she worked
testified that he and Gloria separated in 2002 when Gloria
left the house. When asked whether Gloria continued to come
to the house after this time, Johnny conceded it was
"possible" because he worked 11 hour days and the
couple's three minor children were there.
a hearing, the trial court awarded the house and the
furniture inside of it to Johnny and assigned all
responsibility for any associated expenses to him. This
contends that the trial court erred in awarding the house and
furniture to Johnny because some of this property was
separate and because the remaining marital property should
have been divided equitably. This enumeration lacks merit.
of property in a divorce action is a two step process."
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136, 136 (1) (414
S.E.2d 474) (1992). First, the property must be classified as
either marital or non-marital, as only marital property is
subject to division. See id. See also Flesch v.
Flesch, 301 Ga. 779, 780 (1) (804 S.E.2d 67) (2017).
"Second, the marital property must be divided, not
necessarily equally, but equitably. The first step is a
question of law; the second step is a matter held in the
trial court's discretion." Goldstein, 262
Ga. at 136 (1) (citation omitted). Marital property is that
"acquired as a direct result of the labor and
investments of the parties during the marriage[.]"
Pina v. Pina, 290 Ga. 878, 878 (725 S.E.2d 301)
(2012) (citation omitted).
which items of property can legally constitute a marital or
non-marital asset is a question of law for the court,
"whether a particular item of property actually
constitutes a marital or non-marital asset may be a question
of fact for the trier of fact to determine from the
evidence." Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 133
(1) (587 S.E.2d 600) (2003) (citation omitted). This Court
reviews those findings of fact pursuant to the "any
evidence" rule, "under which a finding by the trial
court supported by any evidence must be upheld."
Flesch, 301 Ga. at 780 (1). Further, "the
actual division of marital property will be upheld as long as
it falls within the broad discretion of the factfinder."
Mathis v. Mathis, 281 Ga. 865, 866 (642 S.E.2d 832)
(2007) (citation omitted).
case at bar, there was conflicting evidence concerning the
marital contributions of each spouse. Thus, the trial court,
sitting as the trier of fact in a bench trial, was required
to determine whether and to what extent a particular asset is
marital or non-marital and then exercise its discretion to
divide the marital property equitably. See Mathis,
281 Ga. at 867. Here, the trial court recognized that the
house was marital property but awarded any interest in it to
Johnny and not Gloria. Further, the trial court awarded to
each party the personal property that was currently in their
possession, which for Johnny, included the furniture in the
final judgment and decree of divorce entered in the case at
bar contains the results of the trial court's
determination of whether and to what extent each asset was
marital or non-marital, and its attempt to divide any marital
property equitably. But the judgment does not contain any
findings of fact that clarify the rationale used by the trial
court to reach its result.
However, a superior court judge is not required to make
findings of fact in a nonjury trial unless requested to do so
by one of the parties prior to the entry of the written
judgment, and neither party asked the trial court to make
findings of fact. Inasmuch as the issues on appeal depend
upon the factual determinations made by the trial court as
factfinder and neither party asked the trial court to make
factual findings, we are unable to conclude that the ...