BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and REESE, JJ.
personal-injury action arising from a motor-vehicle accident,
Sabrina Francis appeals the trial court's order granting
Robert Chavis' motion to enforce a settlement agreement.
For the reasons explained below, we reverse.
outset, we must expound on the applicable standard of review.
When a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is decided
without an evidentiary hearing, the issues raised are
procedurally analogous to those in a motion for summary
judgment. See Tillman v. Mejabi, 331 Ga.App. 415,
415 (771 S.E.2d 110) (2015); Brooks v. Ironstone
Bank, 314 Ga.App. 879, 881 (726 S.E.2d 419) (2012)
(where trial court decides the case on motion and not by
bench trial, issues raised are analogous to those in a motion
for summary judgment). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the movant
must show that the "documents, affidavits, depositions,
and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue" on whether a
settlement was reached. Tillman, 331 Ga.App. at 415.
On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review to the trial
court's determination to enforce the settlement
viewed, the record shows that on November 13, 2014, Francis
was driving her Henry County Sheriff's Department vehicle
when she was rear-ended by Robert Chavis's vehicle.
Chavis admitted liability for causing the accident. In
October 2016, Francis retained counsel and filed suit,
claiming she had already incurred medical expenses exceeding
$7, 000 and expected significant future medical expenses
based on her doctor's recommendation for surgery to
correct herniated discs aggravated by the accident. Chavis
then filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement. In
support of the motion, Donna Madison, a claims associate at
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State
Farm"), Chavis' liability carrier, submitted an
affidavit stating that on July 29, 2016, she spoke to Francis
on the phone regarding the claim she had filed following the
accident. According to Madison, during their conversation,
Francis purportedly agreed to settle her claims for $3, 433,
which equaled her medical expenses at that time plus $1, 000
for pain and suffering. She also averred that she explained
to Francis that State Farm would be required to pay the
applicable workers' compensation lien of $890.70 out of
the settlement proceeds and that Francis agreed that she and
her husband would sign and date the Release, which Francis
requested be sent to her via postal mail. That same day,
Madison mailed Francis a release and cover letter confirming
the terms of their settlement agreement. The telephone
conversation was apparently not recorded.
affidavit, Francis admitted to speaking with Madison on July
29, 2016, but denied agreeing to the terms of State
Farm's settlement offer. After receiving the cover letter
and release agreement, Francis averred that she threw the
documents in the trash because she did not agree to the
terms. Following a hearing, the trial court granted
Chavis' motion, finding that the correspondence between
Madison and Francis, together with Madison's affidavit,
were sufficient to establish the existence of an enforceable
oral settlement agreement. This appeal followed.
related enumerations of error on appeal, Francis asserts the
trial court erred in granting the motion to enforce because
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there was
an agreement to settle. In considering whether to enforce a
settlement agreement, we first turn to the principle that
"[t]he law favors compromise, and when parties have
entered into a definite, certain, and unambiguous agreement
to settle, it should be enforced." (Punctuation and
citation omitted.) Johnson v. DeKalb County, 314
Ga.App. 790, 793 (1) (726 S.E.2d 102) (2012). See also
Pourreza v. Teel Appraisals & Advisory, Inc.,
273 Ga.App. 880, 882 (616 S.E.2d 108) (2005)
("Compromises of doubtful rights are upheld by general
policy, as tending to prevent litigation, in all enlightened
systems of jurisprudence.") (citation omitted).
"Under Georgia law, an agreement alleged to be in
settlement and compromise of a pending lawsuit must meet the
same requisites of formation and enforceability as any other
contract." S. Medial Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 216 Ga.App. 289, 291 (2) (454 S.E.2d 180) (1995).
"In this regard, it is well settled that an agreement
between two parties will occur only when the minds of the
parties meet at the same time, upon the same subject matter,
and in the same sense." (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Id. Thus, "[a]bsent [a] mutual
agreement, there is no enforceable contract as between the
parties." Anderson, 295 Ga.App. at 854 (1)
("It is the duty of courts to construe and enforce
contracts as made, and not to make them for the
parties.") (citation omitted).
as here, "the existence of a binding agreement is
disputed, the proponent of the settlement must establish its
existence in writing." (Citation omitted.)
Pourreza, 273 Ga.App. at 882. We have often
explained that "[t]he writing which will satisfy this
requirement ideally consists of a formal written agreement
signed by the parties. However, letters or documents prepared
by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement
will suffice." (Citation omitted.) Id.
Chavis contends that, notwithstanding Francis' denial
that she agreed to settle the case, the documents prepared by
Madison in response to the conversation and Madison's
affidavit establish as a matter of law that a binding
settlement agreement was reached. But because the trial court
did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, Chavis' burden to
show that a settlement was reached is similar to that on
summary judgment: viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Francis as the nonmoving party, was there a
genuine issue of material fact on any element of Chavis'
case? Clearly, there was here when each party submitted
opposing affidavits about whether there was a settlement
reached at all during the oral, unrecorded
although Madison's July 29, 2016 letter purported to
memorialize the parties' oral agreement to settle,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Francis
as the nonmoving party, particularly given Francis'
affidavit that directly contradicted Madison's assertion
that they had reached an agreement at all, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether the letter memorialized
the parties' agreement to settle or was an offer by
Madison to settle for the terms set out in the letter and
release. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
granting Chavis' motion to enforce the parties'
settlement agreement. See City of Albany v. Freeney,
313 Ga.App. 24, 28 (1) (720 S.E.2d 349) (2011).
reversed and case remanded.
Barnes, P J, and Reese, J, concur.
 We note that, had the trial court
heard testimony and acted as the finder of fact regarding
Chavis' motion to enforce settlement agreement, we would
instead review the order under a clearly erroneous standard.
See Brooks, 314 Ga.App. at 881; Griffin v.