BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and REESE, JJ.
March 13, 2013, appellant Johnny M. Brown entered a
negotiated guilty plea to five counts of child molestation.
The trial court sentenced Brown to ten years to serve on
Count 1 and probation on the remaining counts, for a total
sentence of forty years, with the first ten years to be
served in confinement and the remainder to be served on
probation. On September 21, 2017, Brown filed a motion to
correct void sentence based on the trial court's alleged
failure to follow the requirements of former OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (b) in sentencing him. The trial court denied
Brown's motion, and Brown filed this appeal. As more
fully set forth below, we now vacate Brown's sentence and
remand for resentencing.
the version of the statute in effect in 2013 when Brown was
sentenced, the trial court was required to sentence
Brown to a "split-sentence" consisting of a minimum
term of imprisonment, as specified in the Code section for
the offense of child molestation, followed by an additional
probated sentence of at least one year on each
offense. Former OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b); Riggs v.
State, 301 Ga. 63, 64 (1) (799 S.E.2d 770) (2017);
Jackson v. State, 338 Ga.App. 509, 510-11 (790
S.E.2d 295) (2016); McCranie v. State, 335 Ga.App.
548, 555 (4) (782 S.E.2d 453) (2016); Daniels v.
State, 344 Ga.App. 190, 191-92 (_ S.E.2d _) (2018).
Here, the trial court sentenced Brown to confinement only on
Count 1 and to probation only on the remaining four
counts. The State concedes that Brown was not
sentenced as required by former OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b),
but points out that the trial court had discretion under
subsection (c) of relevant version of that code section to
deviate from the mandates of subsection (b) under certain
circumstances, and urges us to remand to the trial court so
that the trial court can make findings concerning whether it
had reason to deviate in this case. However, subpart (2) of
former OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) requires the trial court to
issue a written order setting forth the reasons for any
deviation in sentencing pursuant to this section, and the
trial court did not enter such an order in this case. See
Jackson, 338 Ga.App. at 510-11; McCranie,
335 Ga.App. at 555-56 (4); Daniels, 344 Ga.App. at
191-92. In the absence of anything in the record to indicate
that the trial court intended to deviate from the mandatory
minimum as allowed by the applicable version of OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (c),  the proper remedy is to vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing.
Brown does not raise as error the probation only sentences
for child molestation,  we also note that former OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (b) required that the sentence for any person
convicted of a sexual offense include the mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment specified in the code section for that
offense and "no portion of the mandatory minimum
sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, or probated . .
." Former OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b). As we explained
above, there was no indication that the trial court entered
written findings necessary to deviate from the mandatory
minimum. Therefore, those sentences are void for this
additional reason. Accordingly, we vacate Brown's
sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of a new
sentence on each count as required by former OCGA §
vacated and case remanded for resentencing.
Barnes, P J, and Reese, J, concur
 We note that a void sentence may be
attacked at any time, even in cases where the sentence was
entered on a guilty plea, and that a direct appeal will lie
from the denial of a motion to correct or vacate a void
sentence where the defendant raises a colorable claim that
the sentence is in fact void. McCranie v. State, 335
Ga.App. 548, 555 (4) (782 S.E.2d 453) (2016).
 Brown was sentenced on April 12, 2013,
and he moved to correct his void sentence on September 21,
2017. We note that a void sentence may be vacated at any time
and a challenge to such a sentence is not waived. "[A]
sentence is void if the court imposes punishment the law does
not allow."New v. State, 327 Ga.App. 87, 106
(5) (755 S.E.2d 568) (2014).
 The sentencing provisions applicable
to the offense of child molestation are set out in OCGA
§ 16-6-4 (b).
 After Brown was sentenced, OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (c) was amended to allow a trial court to deviate
from the mandatory minimum when the prosecuting attorney and
the defendant have agreed to a sentence below the minimum.
Although it appears that there may have been such an
agreement in this case, that version of the statute did not
go into effect until after Brown was sentenced. See Ga. L.
2013, p. 233, § 9.
 See Hughes v. State, 341
Ga.App. 594, 597-98 (3) (802 S.E.2d 30) (2017) (appellate
court is required to correct a void sentence, and its