United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
E. SELF, III, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
approximately six months, Plaintiff worked for Defendant
Mines Enterprises in Butts County, Georgia. [Doc. 8 at 3].
Plaintiff alleges that during that time Mines Enterprises
discriminated against him on the basis of his religion.
[Id.] Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he
“was never promoted, he never received a pay raise,
[and] at numerous occasions negative comments were made by
the defendants toward Plaintiff's religious
beliefs.” [Id.] Plaintiff also claims that
Mines Enterprises never gave him days off to conduct his
religious activities, even though “Defendants readily
gave other employees days off to perform their personal
work.” [Id. at 4]. During Plaintiff's
employment, Mines Enterprises also allegedly forced Plaintiff
to do other employees' work. [Id.]
point in March 2016, Mines Enterprises terminated
Plaintiff's employment. [Doc. 8 at 4]. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Mines instructed managers to terminate him due to
his religion. [Id. at 3]. Afterward, Defendants
allegedly “made false and defamatory statements about
Plaintiff to [his] prospective future employers, ”
including statements that “Plaintiff is not a good
employee, has attendance issue[s], and is not a hard working
person.” [Id. at 4]. As a result of these
statements, Plaintiff allegedly was denied employment by
other entities. [Id.]
Plaintiff's Original Complaint.
filed the instant lawsuit on February 6, 2017, seeking
damages for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,
(“Title VII”), and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) and invasion of
privacy under Georgia law. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff's Title
VII claim rested on his assertions that Defendants subjected
him to “unwarranted criticism, ” disparagement,
threats, and harassment due to his religion and that
Defendants failed to “eliminate a general and
consistent pattern and practice of religious
discrimination.” [Doc. 1 at 3]. In support of his IIED
claim, Plaintiff stated only that he was “subjected to
extreme emotional distress by unreasonable conduct” and
that he has “no means of relief for such damages under
federal law.” [Id.] Finally, Plaintiff's
invasion of privacy claim was supported only by his
conclusion that “Defendants invaded Plaintiffs [sic]
privacy and hence are liable for damages under Georgia
law.” [Id. at 4].
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
April 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc.
4], asserting the same causes of action as those in his
original Complaint [Doc. 1] and making no material
substantive changes to his alleged facts and claims. The
Court reviewed the Amended Complaint [Doc. 4] as required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to determine if was frivolous or
malicious or if it otherwise failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. [Doc. 7]. After enumerating the
elements of each of Plaintiff's claims, the Court
ultimately found that “Plaintiff's threadbare
allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” [Id. at 5].
Specifically, the Court found the following deficiencies in
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Doc. 4]:
For instance, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to
discrimination based on his religion, but he fails to
identify what his religion is. Plaintiff also fails to allege
any facts describing when the alleged termination occurred,
who made that decision, and how that decision was
discriminatorily based on Plaintiff's religion.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual basis
whatsoever for the “pattern of discrimination and
misconduct” that caused him extreme emotional distress,
or what conduct resulted in defamation to character. Finally,
Plaintiff fails to attach a copy of his EEOC charge, as
required in a Title VII case, and thus Plaintiff fails to
give Defendant fair notice of what his claims are and the
grounds upon which they rest.
[Doc. 7 at 5-6].
these deficiencies, the Court allowed Plaintiff to recast his
Complaint and ordered him to do so within 21 days of the date
of the Order. [Doc. 7]. The Court ordered Plaintiff to
provide specific facts as to Defendants' alleged
discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and defamation, and ordered him to attach a copy of his EEOC
charge to the recast complaint. [Id. at 6]. The
Court also gave clear warning that Plaintiff's recast
complaint must comply with the directives in the Order.
[Id. at 7].
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
attempted compliance with the Court's Order [Doc. 7],
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 8] on
September 6, 2017. In it, Plaintiff re-alleges his Title VII,
IIED, and defamation claims against both Defendants. 1.
Plaintiff's Title VII claims.
regard to his Title VII claim, Plaintiff states that he
belongs to the Muslim religion, that Defendant Mines made the
decision to fire Plaintiff, and that Defendant Mines
instructed managers to fire him because of his religion.
[Doc. 8 at 3, 4]. Otherwise, Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint states only that “Plaintiff belongs to a
protected class, ” that he “was qualified for the
job position, ” that he “suffered an adverse
employment action when he was terminated, ” and that
Defendant Mines “replaced Plaintiff with an individual
who belonged to defendant mines [sic] religion.”
[Id. at 3].
also appears to allege that he suffered disparate treatment
during his employment that is separate and distinct from the
alleged discriminatory firing. Specifically, Plaintiff states
that he “was never given any day off to conduct his
religious activities” even though “Defendants
readily gave other employees days off to perform their
personal work.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff also
claims that Defendants promised him a pay raise which was
never fulfilled, and Plaintiff was never promoted.
[Id.] Defendants also allegedly made “a lot of
negative comments…solely because of Plaintiff's
religious beliefs.” ...