United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
K. EPPS, IMED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate at Augusta State Medical Prison (ASMP) in
Grovetown, Georgia, is proceeding in forma pauperis
in this case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis,
Plaintiff's complaint must be screened to protect
potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d
782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165
Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006).
names (1) Deputy Warden of Security T. Tremble and (2)
Sergeant Minor as Defendants. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 1, 4.) Taking
all of Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, as the
Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts
are as follows.
December 15, 2017, while incarcerated at ASMP, Sgt. Minor and
Mr. Tremble moved Plaintiff to unit 12.B.2, a
“notoriously know[n] dangerous housing unit.”
(Id. at 5.) Prior to the transfer, Plaintiff warned
Sgt. Minor Plaintiff was transgender and would not be safe in
the new housing unit. (Id.) Sgt. Minor responded,
“Hell, most of them are in the closet.”
(Id.) Plaintiff complied to avoid receiving a
disciplinary report and “spending the holidays in the
hole.” (Id.) Unit 12.B.2 is “known as a
‘Thunderdome' and ‘Gangland'” at
ASMP, as “most of the inmates housed [there] are
violent” and would be “hostile to
transgenders.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff is
transgender, a Prison Rape Elimination Act victim, and has
been convicted of a sexual offense, Plaintiff “was not
housed according to [Plaintiff's] classification
status” after being transferred to unit 12.B.2.
December 18, 2017, after being moved to unit 12.B.2, fellow
inmate Marcus Warner stabbed Plaintiff eleven times while
Plaintiff was sleeping. (Id. at 6.) Warner was
serving a sentence of twenty-five years for a hate crime.
(Id.) Security footage shows Warner entering and
leaving Plaintiff's room, Plaintiff leaving the room
bleeding, and Warner surrendering to prison officials.
(Id.) By housing Plaintiff in unit 12.B.2,
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's
safety. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants
“barred from future employment with the Georgia
Department of Corrections . . . (lifelong) full coverage
health insurance, and $5 million for pain and
suffering.” (Id. at 7.)
Legal Standard for Screening
complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366
Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, '” or if it
“tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short,
the complaint must provide a “‘plain
statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that
the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient
standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal
construction does not mean that the Court has a duty to
re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450
F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's Claim Should be Dismissed for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
The Exhaustion Requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform
1997e(a) of the PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Dismissal for
failure to state a claim is appropriate if it is clear from
the face of a complaint that the plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 215 (2007); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,
1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Solliday v. Federal Officers,
413 Fed.Appx. 206, 208 (11th Cir. 2011); Anderson v.
Donald, 261 Fed.Appx. 254, 256 (11th Cir. 2008). The
PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement “applies to
all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or
occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
520 (2002). Moreover, the Court ...