MCFADDEN, P. J., RAY and RICKMAN, JJ.
McFadden, Presiding Judge.
these related appeals, Janet Hardee appeals from orders
issued by the Probate Court of Newton County granting James
B. Whitlock, Jr.'s petitions to probate the wills of
Georgia Anne C. Whitlock and James B. Whitlock (the
testators). Hardee challenges the probate court's
jurisdiction, arguing that, although the testators were in
the care of a nursing home in Newton County at the times of
their deaths, they were not domiciled in Newton County. But
the probate court's factual findings authorized the
exercise of jurisdiction and Hardee has not shown by the
record that those factual findings lacked evidentiary
support. So we affirm.
Probate Code provides that "[t]he probate court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills"
and that "[t]he county of domicile of the testator at
death shall give jurisdiction to the probate court of that
county." OCGA § 53-5-1 (a), (b). As to a testator
in the care of a nursing home, the Probate Code states:
The domicile of a testator who was in the care of a nursing
home or other similar facility at the time of death shall be
presumed to be the county in which the testator was domiciled
immediately before entering the nursing home or other
facility; provided, however, this presumption may be
rebutted. If it is determined by the probate court that the
testator considered or, in the absence of an impairment of
mental faculties, the testator would have considered the
county in which the facility is located to be the
testator's domicile, then for purposes of this Code
section that county shall be considered the testator's
county of domicile.
OCGA § 53-5-1 (c).
acquire a domicile, "[t]here must be a concurrence of
actual residence and the intention to remain[.]"
Worsham v. Ligon, 144 Ga. 707, 711 (87 SE 1025)
(1916) (citations omitted). Accord Midkiff v.
Midkiff, 275 Ga. 136, 137 (1) (562 S.E.2d 177) (2002);
Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 12 (3) (274 S.E.2d
314) (1981). "If a person actually removes to another
place, with the intention of remaining there for an
indefinite period of time as a place of fixed domicile, such
place becomes his domicile. A floating intention to return to
a past residence does not retain that original
domicile." Conrad v. Conrad, 278 Ga. 107, 108
(597 S.E.2d 369) (2004) (citations, punctuation and emphasis
omitted). See also Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 692
(1) n. 3 (740 S.E.2d 613) (2013); Worsham, supra.
orders on appeal state that the probate court received
evidence at a hearing on the issue of the testators'
domicile. "Where a probate court sits as a finder of
fact, we accept [her] findings if they are supported by any
evidence, " In the Estate of Price, 324 Ga.App.
681, 681 (751 S.E.2d 487) (2013) (citation omitted),
including her findings regarding domicile. See In the
Interest of M. P., 338 Ga.App. 696, 701 (1) n. 15 (791
S.E.2d 592) (2016). The record, however, contains no
transcript of the hearing. As the appellant, Hardee bears the
burden of showing error by the record, and "without a
transcript, [we] must assume that the evidence adduced below
was sufficient to support the probate court's
findings." Price v. Price, 281 Ga. 126, 127
(636 S.E.2d 546) (2006) (citation omitted).
probate court's findings included the following: The
testators lived in a nursing home in Newton County at the
times of their deaths. Before moving into the Newton County
nursing home, they had lived in Fulton County for more than
40 years in their own home and then had lived in Hardee's
residence in Rockdale County for a month and in a Rockdale
County nursing home for approximately half a year. Both
testators suffered from dementia and required constant care.
They ate all of their meals at the nursing home and returned
to the nursing home after any doctor appointments or
hospitalizations. The testators had moved personal property,
including furniture, into the Newton County nursing home.
There were no plans for the testators to return to their
Fulton County home, which Hardee was preparing to sell under
a power of attorney, and "there was no credible evidence
that either [testator] planned to move from [the Newton
County nursing home]." The probate court expressly
rejected as not credible Hardee's testimony that the
testators planned to return to her residence in Rockdale
County. See generally Cruver v. Mitchell, 289
Ga.App. 145, 147 (1) (b) (656 S.E.2d 269) (2008) ("On
appeal, we must defer to the probate court's credibility
determinations.") (citations omitted).
these facts, the probate court concluded that Whitlock, Jr.
"successfully rebutted the presumption regarding
domicile [in OCGA § 53-5-1 (c)] and [found that] Newton
County was the established domicile of the [testators] at the
times of their deaths." Reviewing de novo the probate
court's application of law to her factual findings, see
In re Estate of Price, 324 Ga.App. at 681, we
discern no error. The probate court could infer from the
facts recited above that the testators intended (or would
have intended, absent impairment of their mental faculties)
to remain in the Newton County nursing home indefinitely. So
the probate court was authorized to find that Whitlock, Jr.
rebutted the statutory presumption that the testators'
domicile did not change when they moved into the nursing
home. See OCGA § 53-5-1 (c).
Hardee has not shown by the record that the probate court
erred in finding that the testators were domiciled in Newton
County at the times of their deaths. It follows that Hardee
has not shown that the probate court erred in exercising
jurisdiction over the petitions to probate the testators'
wills. See OCGA § 53-5-1 (b).