Lavoris Jackson was tried jointly with Ramel Brown,
both were convicted for murder and other crimes arising out
of the shooting death of victim Curtis Jordan.  Witnesses
testified that on the afternoon of the shooting, a person who
was known to be a member of the Bloods street gang, and who
was wearing a red bandana indicative of being in that gang,
taunted a group of other men that included Jackson, who was
wearing a blue or purple bandana, indicative of being in a
gang other than the Bloods. Jordan, also wearing a red
bandana, and who was identified at trial as a member of the
Bloods street gang, was riding a bicycle nearby when this
occurred. According to one of the witnesses, he smiled and
laughed at the taunting. Later that evening, witnesses saw
four men together in the apartment complex where the taunting
had occurred, including Brown, who was holding a shotgun, and
Jackson, who was holding a handgun. One witness saw both
Brown and Jackson shooting their respective weapons, and she
saw a third person with them whom she could not identify. She
also saw an unidentified man shooting a shotgun out the
window of a truck that was passing by. That witness saw the
victim running and then falling to the ground, after which
she saw Jackson, Brown, and the third person fleeing on foot
in the direction taken by the truck. The victim collapsed and
died at the scene. In this witness' first interview with
a detective, she did not mention Jackson, but in her second
interview she stated that she saw him shooting a handgun,
which was consistent with her trial testimony. The evidence
demonstrated the victim was shot twice with a shotgun,
including once with a shotgun slug, and five to six times
with a handgun. The medical examiner testified that the
wounds from the handgun bullets, by themselves, could have
produced death from bleeding, but the immediate cause of
death was the wound caused by a shotgun slug to the
victim's torso. We affirm appellant's convictions.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the convictions. He argues that because the evidence
established that the victim died as a result of a shotgun
wound, and no evidence was presented that he fired a shotgun
at the victim, he could not be found guilty of the crimes
charged. He also argues that even though two witnesses
testified they saw appellant holding a handgun, only one
witness testified consistently with her earlier statement
that appellant fired the handgun. That witness also testified
that an unknown male leaning out of a truck fired shots from
a shotgun. While acknowledging that the credibility of
witnesses is a matter solely within the province of the jury,
appellant nevertheless asserts that the totality of the
evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find
appellant guilty, as charged in the indictment, of murder
"by shooting [the victim] with a shotgun, " or
guilty of felony murder or aggravated assault with a shotgun
because the evidence showed only that he fired a handgun,
whereas his co-defendant fired the shotgun.
ignores that sufficient evidence was presented to support his
convictions, at least as a party to the crimes charged. See
OCGA § 16-2-20. The trial judge properly instructed the
jury on the law of party to a crime and mere presence. While
proof of shared criminal intent with the actual perpetrator
of the alleged criminal act is necessary to be convicted as a
party to a crime, such intent may be inferred from the
defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime.
See Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1) (785 S.E.2d
285) (2016). The element of shared intent certainly may be
inferred from the evidence presented in this case. Even where
it is undisputed that the victim was shot by another person,
every person concerned in the commission of the crime may be
convicted of the crime. See Jones v. State, 292 Ga.
656, 658 (1) (a) (740 S.E.2d 590) (2013). The evidence
presented to the jury was sufficient to support
appellant's convictions as a party to the crimes. See id.
See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
indictment charged appellant with murder as well as felony
murder for causing the victim's death "by shooting
him with a shotgun . . . ." The evidence was sufficient
to show that appellant's co-defendant was the party who
actually shot the victim with a shotgun, whereas it showed
that appellant, standing nearby, shot the victim with a
handgun. As noted above, the evidence was also sufficient to
support the appellant's conviction as a party to the
crime of shooting the victim with a shotgun and killing him.
Nevertheless, appellant asserts he was entitled to a jury
instruction on proximate causation, which was not given.
Acknowledging that he did not request such an instruction or
raise an objection on this ground to the jury instruction
that was given, appellant argues the trial court committed
plain error by failing to give an instruction on proximate
cause. Appellant further acknowledges that to meet the burden
of showing plain error, he must demonstrate that the
instruction was erroneous, that it was obviously so, and that
the error likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See
Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 615 (5) (724
S.E.2d 377) (2012).
considering whether error exists in the instructions to the
jury, this Court considers the instructions as a whole.
Sapp v. State, 290 Ga. 247, 251 (2) (719 S.E.2d 434)
(2011). In this case, the trial court's instruction on
murder, felony murder, and on the law of party to a crime,
was sufficient to inform the jury that, in order to convict,
it had to determine [appellant] caused or was a party in the
causing of [the victim's] death, and thus no error is
shown by the trial court's failure to give a charge on
proximate cause. See Pennie v. State, 292 Ga. 249,
252 (2) (736 S.E.2d 433) (2013).
Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741, 746 (3) (755 S.E.2d
777) (2014) (in which the evidence showed it was
appellant's co-defendant who was armed and fired the gun,
resulting in the robbery and kidnapping victim's shooting
death). See also Williams v. State, 298 Ga. 208, 218
(7) (779 S.E.2d 304) (2015). The trial court read the
indictment to the jury, which accused appellant of causing
the victim's death by shooting him with a shotgun. It
properly instructed the jury on the law of party to a crime
and mere presence. The jury instruction defined murder and
felony murder, including the element that the accused caused
the death of another human being. With respect to the felony
murder charges, appellant's convictions were vacated by
operation of law; nevertheless, we note that the trial court
properly instructed the jury regarding the necessary
relationship between the charged felonies and the homicide.
Despite the trial court's failure to give a separate
instruction on proximate causation, the charge to the jury in
this case, when considered as a whole, created no obvious
error with respect to the element of causation in the crimes
for which appellant was convicted.
affirmed. All the Justices concur.
 This Court affirmed co-defendant
Brown's convictions in Brown v. State, 300 Ga.
446 (796 S.E.2d 283) (2017).
 The crimes occurred on September 21,
2012. On February 26, 2013, a Fulton County grand jury
returned an indictment charging appellant with criminal
street gang activity, malice murder, felony murder
(aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a shotgun),
felony murder (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon),
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (a handgun), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a
jury trial conducted between March 3, 2014 and March 7, 2014,
the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Appellant
was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder and
fifteen consecutive years for criminal street gang activity.
In addition, appellant was given a five-year suspended
sentence for the guilty verdict for possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, and five-year sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to be served
concurrently with the sentence for criminal street gang
activity and murder. The guilty verdicts for felony murder
were vacated by operation of law, and the remaining guilty
verdict for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was
merged for purposes of sentencing. Appellant filed a timely
motion for new trial on March 11, 2014, which was later
amended. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the
motion as to the guilty verdict for criminal street gang
activity. Thereafter, the trial court granted the
prosecutor's motion to enter a nolle prosequi order for
that charge. In response to a motion for clarification of ...