United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
FRANKLIN L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
RANDAL HALL, CHIEF JUDGE.
is presently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution
in Jesup, Georgia. Petitioner, proceeding pro se,
initiated the present action with the filing of a petition -
in which he purportedly seeks a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 - in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. (Doc. 1.)
Contemporaneously with the filing of his petition, Petitioner
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP"). (Doc. 2.) Petitioner subsequently filed a
motion to supplement his instant petition. (Doc. 4.) Mindful
that ''Petitioner's warden is the proper
respondent to a habeas petition" and that “a
district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving
present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is
within its territorial jurisdiction, " the D.C. District
Court transferred this action to this Court for resolution.
(Doc. 5 (citations omitted).)
Court has previously imposed filing restrictions on
Petitioner due to his past abusive-filing practices. (See
Williams v. Parden, Case No. 4:11-cv-213 (S.D. Ga.
dismissed Jan. 31, 2012), Doc. 66, at 3-6.) These filing
restrictions are applicable to the present action because
Petitioner has sought leave to proceed IFP. (Id. at
4 ("As to any future civil actions sought to be
commenced [IFP] by [Petitioner] . . . .").) And while
these filing restrictions “do not apply ... to any
proper application for a writ of habeas corpus"
(id. at 6), as explained below, the instant petition
is not a "proper" application for a writ of habeas
Petitioner has filed a petition challenging the sentence of
imprisonment imposed upon him by this Court in the matter of
United States v. Williams, Case No. 5:06-cr-14 (S.D.
Ga. sentence imposed June 20, 2007). While nominally-styled
as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the instant
petition is in fact a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
because it collaterally attacks the validity of his federal
sentence via claims that fall within the scope of Section
2255(a). (See Doc. 1.) Petitioner,
however, has previously filed numerous Section 2255 petitions
in this Court. (See, e.g., Williams v.
United States, Case No. 5:08-cv-34 (S.D. Ga. dismissed
Aug. 10, 2009); Williams v. United States, Case No.
5:09-cv-104 (S.D. Ga. dismissed May 28, 2010); Williams
v. United States, 5:11-cv-19 (S.D. Ga. dismissed June
15, 2011); Williams v. United States, Case No.
5:11-cv-73 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Oct. 26, 2011); Williams
v. United States, Case No. 5:11-cv-77 (S.D. Ga.
dismissed Dec. 2, 2011); Williams v. United States,
Case No. 5:12-cv-25 (S.D. Ga. dismissed June 20, 2012);
Williams v. United States, et al., Case No.
5:12-cv-40 (S.D. Ga. dismissed July 16, 2012); Williams
v. United States, Case No. 5:12-cv-43 (S.D. Ga.
dismissed July 16, 2012); Williams v. United States,
Case No. 5:13-cv-17 (S.D. Ga. dismissed May 30, 2013).
Petitioner's instant petition is a successive Section
2255 petition because it seeks to relitigate issues that this
Court has previously-rejected on the merits or that
Petitioner could have raised in his prior Section 2255
petitions. Accordingly, before filing his instant successive
petition in this Court, Petitioner was obligated to move in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
for an order authorizing this Court to consider
Petitioner's instant successive petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Because Petitioner failed to
obtain this authorization, this Court is without jurisdiction
to consider his instant petition. See Farris v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003)
("Without authorization, the district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a second or successive
petition." (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d
1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997)).
the foregoing and due consideration, IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that Petitioner's instant habeas corpus
petition (doc. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to
TERMINATE all motions and deadlines and
CLOSE this case. Further, because Petitioner
has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, the Court preemptively
DENIES any forthcoming motion for the
issuance of a certificate of appealability that Petitioner
may file with regards to this matter. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
482-84 (2000). Moreover, because there are no non-frivolous
issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in
good faith and therefore the Court also preemptively
DENIES any request by Petitioner for IFP
status on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
 Williams v. United States,
Case No. 1:17-cv-2759 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 17, 2017).
 See Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P.
Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.l (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[I]t is uncontroversial that federal prisoners cannot
avoid the procedural restrictions on § 2255 motions by
changing the caption on their petition to § 2241. A
prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court judgment may
proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside
the scope of § 2255(a), that is, claims concerning
execution of his sentence." (internal citations
omitted)). Notably, this Court has previously advised
Petitioner that he "cannot circumvent the requirements
for § 2255 motions by styling his petition for habeas
corpus as being filed pursuant to § 2241."
(See, e.g., Williams v. Tamez,
Case No. 5:11-cv-18 (S.D. Ga. dismissed May 27, 2011), Doc.
6, at 5; Williams v. ...