United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Dublin Division
VICTOR L. CONEY, Plaintiff,
LAURENS COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; DANIEL LAMPP, Deputy Sheriff; STEVEN CADY, Deputy Sheriff; SHERRY MANGUM, Deputy Sheriff; WILSON BUSH, Deputy Sheriff; and DEIDRE BYRD, Investigator, Defendants.
K. EPPS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
currently incarcerated at Georgia Diagnostic &
Classification State Prison in Jackson, Georgia, commenced
the above-captioned case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
regarding events alleged to have occurred in Laurens County,
Georgia. Because he is proceeding IFP,
Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect
potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d
782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F.
App'x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006).
SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
names as Defendants (1) Laurens County Sheriff Department;
(2) Daniel Lampp; (3) Wilson Bush; (4) Deidre Byrd; (5)
Steven Cady; and (6) Sherry Mangum. (Doc. no. 7, pp. 2-5.)
Taking all of Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, as
the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the
facts are as follows.
October 29, 2015 at approximately 3:30 p.m., Plaintiff was a
passenger in Christopher Smith's vehicle, which Laurens
County Sheriff deputies stopped on S. Washington St. in front
of RAWL's. (Id. at 7-8.) During the stop, Smith
admitted to smoking marijuana and consented to a search of
his vehicle. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Lampp searched
the vehicle and found “alleged contraband” in the
console. (Id.) Despite Smith admitting to Defendant
Byrd the contraband was his, Defendant Lampp arrested
Plaintiff because he was seated closest to the console.
(Id.) After arresting Plaintiff, Defendants Lampp,
Byrd, and Cady took Plaintiff to his residence on S.
Jefferson St., where they met Defendants Mangum and Bush.
(Id.) Defendants conducted a warrantless search of
Plaintiff's residence. (Id.)
construing Plaintiff's allegations in his favor and
granting him the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
derived from the facts alleged, the Court finds Plaintiff has
arguably stated viable individual capacity claims
under § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment, as
well as related common law claims for false arrest and
imprisonment, against Defendants Lampp, Byrd, Cady, Mangum,
and Bush. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d
1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A warrantless arrest
without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides
a basis for a section 1983 claim.”); Hughes v.
Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
plaintiff may maintain § 1983 action for unlawful search
even if followed by conviction); Campbell v.
Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A
§ 1983 claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of
common law false imprisonment and a due process violation
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Townsend v.
Coffee Cty., Ga., 854 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Ga.
2011) (“Plaintiff asserts both unreasonable seizure and
excessive force claims against Defendant Grantham under
§ 1983, properly invoking the Fourth Amendment.”).
In a companion Report and Recommendation, the Court
recommends dismissal of Defendant Laurens County Sheriff
Department, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, and
Plaintiff's official capacity claims against remaining
IS HEREBY ORDERED that service of process shall be
effected on Defendants. The United States Marshal shall mail
a copy of the amended complaint (doc. no. 7) and this Order
by first-class mail and request that the defendants waive
formal service of the summons. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d). Individual
defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving
the summons, and if a defendant fails to comply with the
request for waiver, the defendant must bear the costs of
personal service unless good cause can be shown for failure
to return the waiver. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2). A defendant whose
return of the waiver is timely does not have to answer the
complaint until sixty days after the date the Marshal mails
the request for waiver. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3). However,
service must be effected within 90 days of the date of this
Order, and the failure to do so may result in the dismissal
of any unserved defendant or the entire case. Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(m). Plaintiff is responsible for providing sufficient
information for the Marshal to identify and locate the
defendant to effect service.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon
the defendants, or upon their defense attorney if appearance
has been entered by counsel, a copy of every further pleading
or other document submitted to the Court. Plaintiff shall
include with the papers to be filed a certificate stating the
date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to
the defendants or their counsel. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5; Loc. R. 5.1.
Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name
of the court, the title of the action, and the file number.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). Any paper received by a District Judge or
Magistrate Judge that has not been properly filed with the
Clerk of Court or that fails to include a caption or
certificate of service will be returned.
Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any discovery that
may be initiated by the defendants. Upon being given at least
five days notice of the scheduled deposition date, Plaintiff
shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall
answer, under oath and solemn affirmation, any question that
seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition
or giving evasive or incomplete responses to questions will
not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe
sanctions, including dismissal of this case. The
defendants shall ensure that Plaintiff's deposition and
any other depositions in the case are taken within the
140-day discovery period allowed by this Court's
this action is pending, Plaintiff shall immediately inform
this Court and opposing counsel of any change of address.
Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this case.
must pursue this case; if Plaintiff does not press the case
forward, the Court may dismiss it for want of prosecution.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41; Loc. R. 41.1. If Plaintiff wishes to obtain
facts and information about the case from the defendants,
Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 through 37 (containing the rules governing
discovery and providing for the basic methods of discovery).
Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it
within four months after the filing of the last answer of a
defendant named in the complaint screened herein.
are a practical method of discovery for pro se
litigants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 33. Interrogatories
shall not contain more than twenty-five questions.
Id. Plaintiff must have the Court's permission
to propound more than one set of interrogatories to a party.
Discovery materials should not be filed routinely with the
Clerk of the Court; exceptions include when the Court directs
filing; when a party needs such materials in connection with
a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary;
and when needed for use at trial. If Plaintiff wishes to file
a motion to compel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, he should
first contact the attorney for the defendants and try to work
out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to
compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he
has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to
resolve any dispute about discovery. Loc. R. 26.5.
must maintain a set of records for the case. If papers are
lost and new copies are required, these may be obtained from
the Clerk of the ...