United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
ORDER
J.
Randal Hall, Judge
Before
the Court is Plaintiff's pro se Motion to
Recuse. (Doc. 18.) Therein, Plaintiff requests that both the
undersigned and United States Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker
recuse themselves "from this case and any further cases
involving" Plaintiff.[1] (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts
that recusal is required of the undersigned and Magistrate
Judge Baker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because
"this Court's history of orders shows a pattern by
both Judge Hall and Magistrate Baker of treating [Plaintiff]
disparately and discriminatorily as compared to other cases,
and saying anything it can to rubbers tamp-dismiss any and
every case he files."[2](Id. at 4.) A short history of
this case's factual background and proceedings is
available in the Court's Order dated January 14, 2018 and
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation entered
herein. (See Docs. 4, 14.)
Recusal
is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Jones
v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 Fed.Appx. 808,
810 (11th Cir. 2012). Under Section 144, a judge must recuse
himself when a party to a district court proceeding * files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favor of any adverse party." 28 U.S.C.
§ 144. "To warrant recusal under § 144, the
moving party must allege facts that would convince a
reasonable person that bias actually exists." Chris
to v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000);
see also Jones, 459 Fed.Appx. at 811 ("The
facts alleged in the affidavit must show that the bias was
personal, not judicial in nature." (citing United
States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 682 (5th Cir.
1977))). Section 455(a) requires recusal wherewan
objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the
facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's
impartiality." Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855
F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) . Any doubts must be
resolved in favor of recusal. United States v.
Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989) . Generally,
judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis for recusal
or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving party]
establishes pervasive bias and prejudice."[3] Jones,
459 Fed.Appx. at 811 (citing Archbold-Newball, 554
F.2d at 682). "Neither a trial judge's comments on
lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction
between the court and counsel constitute pervasive
bias." Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of
Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted).
Here,
Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse is rife with feeble
conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements
and over-simplifications of the relevant cases'
proceedings and the Court's Orders and reasoning in
relation thereto. More importantly, however, Plaintiff's
allegations stem solely from his disagreements with the
rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and myself and the unsound
assumptions Plaintiff has drawn therefrom. (See Doc.
18, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported instances of alleged
bias/prejudice, including disparate docket management,
incorrect application of legal precedent,
"flipflopping" instructions, and sua
sponte resolution of various issues (i.e., acting as a
"surrogate prosecutor")).) These are reasons for
appeal, not recusal. See Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). Moreover, Plaintiff's motion
fails to: (i) establish pervasive judicial bias or prejudice
against Plaintiff; (ii) demonstrate deep-seated or
unequivocal antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible; or
(iii) otherwise raise an objective doubt about the assigned
judges' impartiality. Accordingly, recusal by the
assigned judges is not warranted.
Based
on the foregoing and upon due consideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's
Motion to Recuse (doc. IB) is DENIED.
ORDER
ENTERED.
---------
Notes:
[1] Notably, Plaintiff has filed identical
motions for recusal in two other matters he has brought in
this Court, namely: (i) Daker v. Allen, No.
6:17-cv-23 (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 3, 2017) (the "Allen I
Case"); and (ii) Daker v. Allen, et al., No.
6:17-cv-79 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Dec. 6, 2017) (the
"Allen II Case"). (See Allen I Case, Doc.
95; Allen II Case, Doc. 52.) Short histories of the factual
background and proceedings of the Allen I Case and Allen II
Case are available in the Orders entered in those respective
matters. (See, e.g., Allen I Case, Docs. 10, 15, 52, 93, 94;
Allen II Case, Docs. 17, 21, 22, 30, 42.)
[2] (See also Doc. 18, at 4
("Magistrate Smith [sic] has displayed a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible. Judge Story [sic] has ruled against [Plaintiff]
on numerous issues and requests for relief that, taken
together, demonstrate a pattern of judicial conduct of such
pervasiveness that an outside observer could fairly question
the district court's impartiality." (internal
quotations, citations, and alterations omitted));
id. at 9 (w[W]hatever Plaintiff requests,
then Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall do the opposite out of
spite."); Id. at 17 (“In Judge
Hall's biased and prejudiced eyes, Plaintiff can do no
right, and Judge Hall will find a pretext to dismiss
anyways."); id. at 22 ("Magistrate Baker and Judge
Hall have acted as a surrogate prosecutor." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).)
[3]
See also Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) “[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion. In and of themselves (i.e., apart
from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they
cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source;
and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree
of favoritism or antagonism required (as discussed below)
when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably,
they are proper grounds for appeal, not for re cusal. Second,
opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced
or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings,
or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias
or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a
trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile
to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not
support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if
they reveal an opinion that derives from an extra judicial
source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree
of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible. An example of the latter (and perhaps of the
former as well) is the statement that was alleged to have
been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921), a World War I espionage case against
German-American defendants: 'One must have a very
judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the
German Americans' because their 'hearts are reeking
with disloyalty.' Not establishing bias or partiality,
however, ...