United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
ORDER
J.
RANDAL HALL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED DISTRICT COURT.
Before
the Court is Plaintiff's pro se Motion to
Recuse. (Doc. 52.) Therein, Plaintiff requests that both the
undersigned and United States Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker
recuse themselves "from this case and any further cases
involving" Plaintiff.[1] (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts
that recusal is required of the undersigned and Magistrate
Judge Baker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because
"this Court's history of orders shows a pattern by
both Judge Hall and Magistrate Baker of treating [Plaintiff]
disparately and discriminatorily as compared to other cases,
and saying anything it can to rubberstamp-dismiss any and
every case he files."[2](Id. at 4.) A short history of
this case's factual background and proceedings is
available in the Court's Order dated December 6, 2017 and
prior Orders entered herein. (See Doc. 42; see
also Docs. 17, 21, 22, 30.)
Recusal
is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Jones
v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 Fed.Appx. 808,
810 (11th Cir. 2012). Under Section 144, a judge must recuse
himself when a party to a district court proceeding
''files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the
judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party." 28 U.S.C. § 144, To warrant recusal under
§ 144, the moving party must allege facts that would
convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists."
Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000); see also Jones, 459 Fed.Appx. at 811
("The facts alleged in the affidavit must show that the
bias was personal, not judicial in nature." (citing
United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 682
(5th Cir. 1977))). Section 455(a) requires recusal where
''an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully
informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal
was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the
judge's impartiality." Parker v. Connors Steel
Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) . Any doubts
must be resolved in favor of recusal. United States v.
Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989). Generally,
judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis for recusal
or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving party]
establishes pervasive bias and prejudice."[3] Jones,
459 Fed.Appx. at 811 (citing Archbold-Newball, 554
F.2d at 682). "Neither a trial judge's comments on
lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction
between the court and counsel constitute pervasive
bias." Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of
Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted) .
Here,
Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse is rife with feeble
conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements
and over-simplifications of the relevant cases'
proceedings and the Court's Orders and reasoning in
relation thereto. More importantly, however, Plaintiff's
allegations stem solely from his disagreements with the
rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and myself and the unsound
assumptions Plaintiff has drawn therefrom. (See Doc.
52, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported instances of alleged
bias/prejudice, including disparate docket management,
incorrect application of legal precedent,
''flipflopping" instructions, and sua
sponte resolution of various issues (i.e., acting as
a "surrogate prosecutor")).) These are reasons for
appeal, not recusal. See Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). Moreover, Plaintiff's motion
fails to: (i) establish pervasive judicial bias or prejudice
against Plaintiff; (ii) demonstrate deep-seated or
unequivocal antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible; or
(iii) otherwise raise an objective doubt about the assigned
judges' impartiality. Accordingly, recusal by the
assigned judges is not warranted.
Based
on the foregoing and upon due consideration, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse
(doc. 52} is DENIED.
---------
Notes:
[1] Notably, Plaintiff has filed identical
motions for recusal in two other matters he has brought in
this Court, namely: (i) Daker v. Allen, No.
6:17-cv-23 (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 3, 2017) (the "Allen I
Case"); and (ii) Daker v. Dozier, et al., No.
6:17-cv-110 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Jan. 29, 2018) (the
''Dozier Case"). (See Allen I Case, Doc. 95;
Dozier Case, Doc. 18.) Short histories of the factual
background and proceedings of the Allen I Case and Dozier
Case are available in the Orders entered in those respective
matters. (See, e.g., Allen I Case, Docs. 10, 15, 52,
93, 94; Dozier Case, Docs. 4, 14.)
[2] (See also Doc. 52, at 4
("Magistrate Smith [sic] has displayed a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible. Judge Story [sic] has ruled against [Plaintiff]
on numerous issues and requests for relief that, taken
together, demonstrate a pattern of judicial conduct of such
pervasiveness that an outside observer could fairly question
the district court's impartiality." (internal
quotations, citations, and alterations omitted));
id. at 9 ("[W]hatever Plaintiff requests, then
Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall do the opposite out of
spite."); id. at 17 ("In Judge Hall's
biased and prejudiced eyes, Plaintiff can do no right, and
Judge Hall will find a pretext to dismiss anyways.");
id. at 22 ("Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall
have acted as a surrogate prosecutor." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).)
[3]
See also Liteky v. United
States,
510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994)
(''[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
valid basis for a bias or partiality-motion. In and of
themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or
accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance
upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism
required (as discussed below) when no extrajudicial source is
involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for
appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge
on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,
do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial
remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that
derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if
they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as
to make fair judgment impossible. An example of the latter
(and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement that was
alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger
v. United States,255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921), a World War I
espionage case against German-American defendants. 'One
must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced
against the German Americans' because their 'hearts
are reeking with disloyalty.' Not establishing bias or
partiality, however, ...