United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
JANEY M. LYONS, Plaintiff,
v.
COURTNEY DUGUSKI; SERCOYER REID WILSON; and OFFICER BATTIE, Defendants.
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
R.
STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff,
currently housed at Pulaski State Prison in Hawkinsville,
Georgia, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 contesting certain conditions of her confinement while
housed at Emanuel Women's Facility in Swainsboro,
Georgia. (Docs. 1, 15, 20.) For the reasons set forth below,
I RECOMMEND that the Court
DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint, as
amended, for failure to state a claim,
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the
appropriate judgment of dismissal and CLOSE
this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
PLAINTIFF'S
ALLEGATIONS [1]
Plaintiff
appears to allege that, sometime in December 2016, Defendant
Battie requested to see Defendant Duguski outside the dorm.
(Doc. 20, p. 7.) Afterwards, Defendant Duguski “came
back in raising hell because Officer Battie was calling her
out on bull crap.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
Defendant Duguski then proceeded to sexually assault
Plaintiff in the bathroom. (Id. at pp. 5, 7.)
Plaintiff also appears to allege that, at some point,
Defendant Wilson also sexually assaulted Plaintiff and
physically beat her in their shared dorm. (Id. at p.
8.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Plaintiff
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the
Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the
prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an
inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement
of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled
to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court
must dismiss the action if it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or which seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).
When
reviewing a complaint on an application to proceed in
forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions
for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain [among other
things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in
numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of
circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without arguable
merit either in law or fact.'” Napier v.
Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001)).
Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable
to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675,
678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not
only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251
F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327 (1989)).
In its
analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle
that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a
less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . .
.”) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's
unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding
procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993) (“We have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”).
DISCUSSION
I.
Claims Against Private Actors
In
order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must
allege that an act or omission deprived her “of some
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.” Hale v. Tallapoosa
Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a
plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed
by “a person acting under color of state law.”
Id. The state-actor requirement traditionally
precludes suit against a private party under Section 1983,
because a private party may qualify as a state actor for
Section 1983 purposes only in “rare
circumstances.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d
1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recognizes that a private party may be liable as a
“state actor” for a constitutional violation only
in the following circumstances: (1) “the State has
coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action
alleged to violate the Constitution”; (2) “the
private parties performed a public function that was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State”;
or (3) “the State had so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the [private parties] that
it was a joint participant in the enterprise[ ].”
Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341,
1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting
NBC, Inc. v. Comm'cns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d
1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint does not allege facts supporting any
of these circumstances. Defendants Duguski and Wilson are
inmates at Emanuel Women's Facility, and Plaintiff makes
no allegations that Defendants are in any way affiliated with
the State of Georgia.[2] (Doc. 20, p. 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to allege sufficient facts plausibly suggesting
that Defendants Duguski and Wilson are state actors subject
to liability under Section 1983.
Therefore,
I RECOMMEND the Court
DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against
...