PER
CURIAM.
This
disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of the Review Panel, recommending that Sam
Louis Levine (State Bar No. 448738) be disbarred for his
neglect of matters involving two clients and his misconduct
arising out of his contentious divorce proceeding.
The
State Bar initiated this matter in September 2016 by filing
three formal complaints after Levine rejected notices of
discipline. See Bar Rule 4-208.4 (a). Levine, who was
admitted to the Bar in 2004, acknowledged service and filed
answers and counterclaims. The Bar served written discovery
in December 2016. In early January 2017, Levine filed a
notice of leave of absence in all three matters, covering all
but 22 weekdays of 2017; the notice did not list any pending
cases in which Levine was counsel of record, but stated that
Levine would be on vacation or attending CLE seminars. The
notice further stated, "[a]ll affected judges and
opposing counsel shall have ten (10) days from the date of
this Notice to object to it. If no objections are filed, the
leave shall be granted." The notice cited Uniform
Superior Court Rule 16, and presumably intended to invoke
USCR 16.1, which provides that under certain circumstances a
leave of absence of 30 days or less shall stand granted
without the necessity of a court order.[1] The Bar filed an
objection, noting that Levine had attempted to informally
negotiate an indefinite stay of the disciplinary proceedings
with the first special master appointed, but had not filed a
motion for a stay. In mid-February 2017, the Bar filed a
motion seeking sanctions for Levine's failure to respond
to discovery.
Special
Master Patrick H. Head set a hearing on the motion for
sanctions in all three matters for March 3, 2017. Upon
Levine's objection, the hearing was rescheduled to March
31, because that was one of the days not listed in
Levine's notice of leave of absence. Nonetheless, Levine
did not respond to the motion for sanctions and did not
appear for the hearing; instead, at around 9:00 p.m. on March
30, he sent an email announcing that he would not appear. The
email stated that there was no provision under USCR 6.4 that
allowed for a hearing on a motion for sanctions. But see Bar
Rule 4-210 (11) (special masters have power to exercise
general supervision over discovery matters, including to
conduct hearings). The evidentiary hearing was held in
Levine's absence, and following the hearing, the special
master entered a detailed order concluding that Levine's
failure to respond to discovery was willful and intentional.
As sanctions, the special master struck Levine's answers,
defenses, and counterclaims, with the result being that the
facts of the formal complaints were deemed admitted. Rule
4-212 (a) (facts alleged and violations charged in formal
complaint shall be deemed admitted if respondent fails to
file an answer).
In May
2017, the special master issued his report and recommendation
with findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending
disbarment. The facts, as found by the special master and
based on Levine's default, show the following. With
respect to State Disciplinary Board Docket ("SDBD")
No. 6866, Levine was retained to defend a client in five
civil actions. The client paid Levine $1, 750 to file answers
and negotiate settlements. However, Levine failed to file an
answer in any of the actions, resulting in a default judgment
being entered against the client in one of the cases and his
wages being garnished. Throughout the representation, Levine
misled the client about his actions, falsely telling him that
he had obtained an extension of time for filing answers and
falsely telling him that he was in the process of negotiating
settlements. Levine also falsely told the Bar during the
disciplinary proceedings that settlement negotiations were
ongoing and close to fruition.
The
facts underlying SDBD No. 6878 involve Levine's
representation of another client. Levine was retained by the
client to file suit for damages arising from an automobile
accident. Levine filed the suit in April 2011, dismissed it
without prejudice in April 2012, and refiled it in October
2012. Levine did very little work on the case for 18 months,
and when the case was placed on a trial calendar, Levine, who
had another lawyer as co-counsel, filed for a continuance on
the day the pretrial order was due, stating that he was
unable to act as lead counsel for financial, mental, and
physical reasons arising out of his on-going divorce action
and preexisting medical issues. In communications with the
trial judge, Levine admitted that he had not prepared the
case. After a pretrial conference at which the court
instructed Levine to designate lead counsel for trial, Levine
submitted a letter to the court, asserting that he had a
conflict with another case, contrary to his first request for
a continuance. The client then designated the co-counsel as
lead counsel, but Levine refused to abide by this direction
and instructed co-counsel that he would no longer be needed.
Levine ultimately associated, with his client's
acquiescence, another lawyer. This third lawyer conducted
discovery, including depositions of multiple physicians, and
ultimately resolved the matter with a substantial settlement
in the client's favor.
The
facts underlying SDBD No. 6891 stem from Levine's actions
in and related to his divorce case; Levine represented
himself during most of the divorce proceedings. The divorce
decree awarded various items of property, including the
family dog, to Levine's wife. Levine repeatedly refused
to allow his ex-wife to retrieve these items and challenged
the divorce decree in numerous collateral proceedings, most
of which stemmed from Levine's insistence that the dog
was a therapy dog that he was entitled to have under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In pursuit of this
unwavering belief, Levine filed meritless federal lawsuits
against two judges who at different times presided over his
divorce action; filed a discrimination complaint against one
of the judges; sent a threatening letter to the two judges,
with copies to numerous public figures, alleging that the
judges had committed heinous crimes and were suffering from
psychiatric disorders; filed meritless lawsuits and police
complaints against his brother, whom Levine had asked to act
on his behalf after Levine was incarcerated for contempt;
filed meritless applications for criminal warrants against
his ex-wife and others; and filed meritless applications for
temporary protective orders and a separate civil action
against his ex-wife. Levine was ultimately held in contempt
in the divorce action and was incarcerated for three weeks
when he continued to defy the court's orders. To obtain
his release, his lawyer negotiated a consent order, which
included, at Levine's mother's request, a provision
for a psychiatric examination.
Based
on Levine's conduct in these three matters, the special
master concluded that Levine violated the following Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d):
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4, 8.1, and 8.4 (a)
(4). The maximum sanction for violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3,
1.7, 3.3, 4.1, 8.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, and the
maximum sanction for violations of Rules 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, and
4.4 is a public reprimand.
The
special master looked to the American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for mitigating and
aggravating factors and found that few mitigating but many
aggravating factors applied. He concluded that Levine's
personal or emotional problems were a mitigating factor,
describing them as "self-evident" but noting that
Levine offered no medical evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding to support his claim of disability. As aggravating
factors, the special master found that Levine's
misconduct demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive; there
was an extensive pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses;
Levine engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
process by lying to the Bar, intentionally refusing to comply
with Bar rules governing disciplinary proceedings, and
engaging in deceptive practices; he refused to acknowledge
the wrongful nature of his misconduct; and he had substantial
experience in the practice of law. The special master noted
Levine's sole prior disciplinary offense, a Letter of
Admonition in 2009, but did not consider it an aggravating
factor. See ABA Standard 9.32 (m) (mitigating factors include
remoteness of prior offenses).
The
special master recommended disbarment, and although he found
that the facts strongly suggested that Levine suffers from
the want of a sound mind, such that he would be subject to
removal from the practice of law based on State Bar Rule
4-104 (a), he did not rely on that rule in making his
recommendation.
Levine
sought review by the Review Panel. The Review Panel granted
Levine's motion for oral argument, but ultimately issued
a report and recommendation rejecting all of Levine's
complaints about the procedure before the special master,
adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
special master's report, and recommending that this Court
impose the sanction of disbarment.
In this
Court, Levine filed three separate exceptions to the report
and recommendation, despite there being only one consolidated
case in this Court. His filings, which fail to comply with
this Court's procedural rules, see Supreme Court Rule 49,
are largely duplicative of each other and contain numerous
exhibits, most of which are not included in the record
established before the special master and many of which are
illegible. In addition to filing exceptions to the Review
Panel report, Levine filed three separate motions styled
"Motion to Dismiss Bar Complaint, " which he has
supplemented in various forms more than a dozen times. These
filings-totaling hundreds of pages-seek to relitigate his
divorce and the underlying facts of the two client matters
and make meritless claims challenging the Bar's actions
in these disciplinary matters. He also filed a motion to have
this Court pay for the production and filing of the written
and video transcripts of a hearing in the divorce case, and a
motion for appointment of counsel.[2]
As we
understand Levine's position, he contends that the entry
of the sanctions order was improper and that in the absence
of a default, he is entitled to offer evidence to counter the
factual allegations of the underlying grievances. We agree
with the Review Panel, however, that the special master did
not err in striking Levine's pleadings and finding him in
default for his willful failure to participate in discovery.
Additionally, there was no requirement that the special
master enter an order compelling Levine to respond to
discovery prior to entering sanctions for his failure to
engage in the discovery process. See In the Matter of
Burgess, 293 Ga. 783, 784 (748 S.E.2d 916) (2013)
(noting that special master struck respondent's answers
for failure to respond to discovery requests and lack of
evidence supporting mitigation); In the Matter of
Browning-Baker, 292 Ga. 809, 809-810 (741 S.E.2d 637)
(2013) (special master authorized to strike respondent's
answer after respondent twice waited until the day before her
scheduled deposition before advising that she would not
appear and after respondent failed to appear for subsequently
scheduled hearing before special master); In the Matter
of Hawk, 269 Ga. 165, 166 (496 S.E.2d 261) (1998)
(finding facts alleged in formal complaint were deemed
admitted based on special master's striking of
respondent's answers as sanction for failure to appear at
depositions and to produce documents). See also Rule 4-212
(c) (both parties may engage in discovery under the rules of
practice and procedure applicable to civil cases); OCGA
§ 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C) & (d) (1) (upon failure to
serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for
inspection, court may make such orders as are just, including
an order striking pleadings or rendering a judgment by
default against disobedient party).
In
addition to the misconduct in the underlying matters, which
amply supports disbarment, the record of the disciplinary
proceedings and Levine's filings in this Court strongly
support the special master's belief that Levine is not
emotionally or mentally fit for the practice of law. Levine
persistently ignored Bar Rules that provide an orderly
process for contesting allegations of disciplinary violations
and instead made multi-pronged, unauthorized attacks on the
disciplinary process. For example, rather than responding to
the Bar's discovery, Levine filed Bar complaints against
the Investigative Panel member assigned to investigate the
grievances against him and against Bar counsel. After the
special master issued the sanctions order finding Levine in
default, Levine filed a motion to stay discovery, a motion to
dismiss the disciplinary proceedings, and a notice of appeal
of the sanctions order, directed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals because the appeal "stems from a trial
court's Order on a Motion." After the special master
issued his report and recommendation, Levine filed a motion
to disqualify Bar counsel; a motion to recuse the special
master based in large part on the special master's prior
service as a district attorney;[3] and objections to the report and
recommendation, attaching thousands ...