Miller, P. J., DOYLE, P. J., and REESE, J.
Miller, Presiding Judge.
a jury trial, Anthony Bernard Taylor was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute crack-cocaine (OCGA
§ 16-13-30). Taylor moved for a new trial, which the
trial court denied. On appeal, Taylor contends (1) the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his drug conviction; and
(2) the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his
time for voir dire with certain prospective jurors.
Discerning no error, we affirm.
in the light most favorable to the verdict,  the evidence
shows that on the evening of October 14, 2009, four members
of the Atlanta Police Department's Red Dog Unit, a
specialty team which handles "street-level" drug
dealers in high drug crime areas, were conducting an
unrelated traffic stop when they heard loud screaming and
banging coming from a house up the street.
officers moved toward the house, and discovered Taylor
standing on the front porch. As one of the officers
approached, Taylor threw something off the side of the porch
that looked like a sandwich bag. One of the other officers
went to the side of the home and retrieved a plastic bag with
a white substance inside that the officers believed to be
crack-cocaine. Officers also found a scale in Taylor's
back pocket while searching him. Moreover, while the officers
were waiting for a prisoner transport van to arrive, Taylor
told one of the officers that although he sells marijuana on
occasion, he does not sell cocaine. Taylor was subsequently
arrested for possession of crack-cocaine and was charged with
possession with intent to distribute. Taylor was convicted of that
charge, and this appeal followed the trial court's denial
of Taylor's motion for new trial.
Taylor contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of possession with intent to distribute. We disagree.
OCGA § 16-3-30 does not specify a quantity of drugs
necessary to support a conviction for possession with intent
. . . mere possession of cocaine, without more, will not
support a conviction for possession with intent to
distribute. We have considered various kinds of additional
evidence as proof of intent to distribute, including drug
measuring and weighing paraphernalia, the packaging of the
contraband, possession of certain amounts or denominations of
currency, a prior possession with intent to distribute
conviction, and expert testimony that the amount of
contraband possessed was consistent with larger amounts
usually held for sale rather than for personal use.
(Citation omitted.) Tate v. State, 230 Ga.App. 186,
187 (1) (b) (495 S.E.2d 658) (1998). Evidence concerning the
quantity of drugs that is consistent with an intent to
distribute can come in the form of the expert testimony of an
officer whose drug training and experience has been tendered,
even if the officer has not been specifically admitted as an
expert. Burse v. State, 232 Ga.App. 729, 730 (1)
(503 S.E.2d 638) (1998).
after recovering the bag dropped by Taylor, the drug officers
weighed it with the substance inside and it weighed 3.6
grams. Subsequent testing by the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation Crime Lab revealed that the substance was 3.19
grams of crack-cocaine. While testifying, one of the officers
opined that, based on his 11 years of training and
experience, the quantity possessed by Taylor was not for
personal use, but rather was for distribution. He further
testified that each gram of crack-cocaine can provide roughly
ten hits, meaning that the crack-cocaine possessed by Taylor
amounted to more than thirty hits. Another officer from the
drug unit who had been on the scene testified at trial that
the cocaine was packaged the way it typically would be prior
to being broken up for sale in individual pieces.
after Taylor was handcuffed, the drug unit officers
discovered a mini digital scale in Taylor's back pocket.
One of the officers testified at trial that based on his
training, scales such as the one found on Taylor are often
used in drug transactions to determine the weight of the
drugs. There was also white residue on the scale that
appeared to be crack cocaine to an officer who had seen the
drug "thousands of times." Additionally, Taylor
admitted to one of the drug officers that he sold marijuana.
Taylor does not dispute on appeal that he was in possession
of the drugs, rather, he argues only that the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate an intent to distribute. We
disagree. The evidence presented here was sufficient for the
jury to infer Taylor's intent to distribute. First, an
officer with years of experience testified that the amount of
crack-cocaine possessed by Taylor was enough for thirty
individual hits, which was consistent with distribution
rather than personal use. Second, Taylor was in possession of
a scale, which one of the drug officers testified, in his
experience, is often used in drug transactions to weigh
drugs. Moreover, the scale was coated in residue and a drug
officer testified that based on his experience, that residue
appeared to be crack-cocaine. Third, Taylor admitted to police
that he sold drugs, even though he denied selling
the evidence in this case was circumstantial, it was
sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except for
Taylor's guilt. Tate, supra, 230 Ga.App. at 187
(1) (a). Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to support Taylor's conviction.
Taylor next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting his time for voir dire with ...