BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Roderick Jordan and Dennis Alonzo Jordan were tried
together before a jury and convicted of armed robbery.
Appellants filed separate motions for new trial, which the
trial court denied following a hearing. They appeal and argue
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their
request for a postponement of the trial after bench warrants
were issued in the presence of the prospective jurors.
Roderick also contends that the trial court erred by refusing
to allow him to recall the victim to testify after he was
cross-examined by appellants. Dennis challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict him and asserts that
the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce his
prior convictions and in charging the jury on the
consideration of this evidence. Having considered these
contentions, we now affirm.
to support the jury's verdict,  the evidence shows that the
victim, was in his apartment on the morning of October 24,
2012. He heard a knock on the door and saw Dennis Jordan,
whom the victim knew as "Ike, " standing at his
door. The victim let Dennis into his apartment and closed but
did not lock his door.
victim and Dennis were standing in the living room talking,
man wearing a mask partially covering his face suddenly
pushed open the door and rushed in. The victim also
recognized this man and identified him as Dennis' brother
Roderick, whom the victim knew as "Pie." Roderick
pulled out a knife and pushed the victim to the floor and
held him down while taking money out of his wallet and front
pocket. Roderick then jumped off the victim, brandished a
hammer, and walked into the kitchen and took an envelope
containing $300 off the table. The men then left the
apartment together. The victim testified that although Dennis
just stood in the living room and did not actively
participate in the robbery, Roderick asked Dennis several
times "Are you sure you didn't tell him who I
victim called police, and the crime was investigated by an
investigator with the Thomaston Police Department. The
investigator interviewed a neighbor, who said he saw two men,
fitting the height and weight descriptions of appellants,
drive up in a beige or champagne colored Chevrolet and park
across the street from the apartment. He observed one of the men
get out of the vehicle and walk around to the back of the
apartment building, and then a few minutes later the other
man got out and went to the trunk of the vehicle, retrieved
something from the trunk, and placed it in his pants. This
man then also walked around "where the other fellow
went" behind the apartment.
on the information the victim gave to her, the investigator
prepared photographic line-ups containing appellants'
pictures. The victim identified appellants from the
line-ups, and they were subsequently arrested and charged,
and convicted of armed robbery. These appeals followed.
Roderick first argues the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to postpone the proceedings until a new jury
venire could be convened after appellants failed to timely
return to court after lunch and the trial court issued a
bench warrant for his arrest in the presence of the
record shows that appellants had been instructed to return to
court at 1:30 p.m. after the lunch break. Appellants failed
to appear, and the trial court indicated during a bench
conference that it would issue a bench warrant and bond
forfeiture. After the court attended to some unrelated
matters, the court again called for the appellants, and the
court issued the bench warrant and bond forfeiture in the
presence of the prospective jurors.
then entered the courtroom, and the court admonished them
that they were supposed to be there at 1:30 p.m. Dennis'
counsel objected to the issuance of the warrant in the
presence of the venire, and the court indicated it would let
her put her objection on the record at a later time. The
trial court proceeded to propound the statutory questions,
but then Roderick's counsel asked to approach the bench
and informed the judge that appellants appeared to be
intoxicated. The trial court dismissed the prospective jurors
and, after it was determined that appellants were in fact
under the influence, ordered them incarcerated and the
proceedings continued to another day. The trial court also
allowed counsel to perfect her objection about the case going
forward before the same potentially prejudiced jurors who had
been present when the bench warrant was issued, but refused
to continue the proceedings to allow a new venire to be
prospective jurors who have not been impaneled or sworn are
exposed to prejudicial remarks, the prejudiced party has two
potential remedies: (1) the more "extreme remedy"
of postponement until a new panel of jurors can be impaneled
or (2) a challenge to the poll. Bankston v. State, 169
Ga.App. 955, 955 (1) (315 S.E.2d 671) (1984); see also
Bell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 289, 292 (2) (715 S.E.2d
684) (2011); Nave v. State, 171 Ga.App. 165 (318
S.E.2d 753) (1984).
appellants sought the extreme remedy of postponement,
apparently because all of the potential jurors summoned for
the week were in the courtroom. However, appellants have
failed to show that they were prejudiced by the issuance of
the bench warrants. Appellants did not request or attempt to
question the prospective jurors about the effect of the
issuance of the bench warrants. And none of the potential
jurors responded affirmatively to the statutory voir dire
questions concerning whether they had formed any opinion
concerning the guilt or innocence of appellants, or were
prejudiced for or against appellants, and none of them
disputed that they were "perfectly impartial."
Also, none of the members of the venire gave any other
indication that they had been prejudiced by the issuance of
the warrants or bond forfeiture against appellants. Further,
appellants did in fact appear in court shortly after the
bench warrants were issued, and the prospective jurors knew
they had simply been late returning from lunch and had not in
fact failed to appear. Under these circumstances, and in the
absence of any showing of possible prejudice, we find no
abuse of discretion in the denial of the request for a
postponement or continuance.
Roderick also argues the trial court erred when it denied his
request to recall the victim to ...