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Louidol v. Johns

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division

January 18, 2018

LOUIS LOUIDOL, Petitioner,
v.
TRACY JOHNS, Warden, Respondent.

          ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          R. STAN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Petitioner Louis Louidol (“Louidol”), who is currently housed at D. Ray James Correctional Facility in Folkston, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Response, and Louidol filed a Reply. (Docs. 8, 9.) For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Louidol's Petition, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case, and DENY Louidol in forma pauperis status on appeal.

         BACKGROUND

         On April 13, 2001, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Louidol to a 109-month term of imprisonment, which was later reduced to a 97-month sentence, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), and 846. (Doc. 8-1, pp. 3, 9-18.) During this time, it appears Florida state authorities had primary jurisdiction of Louidol for various state crimes, but Louidol was in federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. (Id. at pp. 2-3.)[1] At his sentencing hearing, the Middle District of Florida remanded Louidol to the custody of the United States Marshal. (Id. at p. 13.) It appears Louidol was then transferred to state authorities for adjudication on his state charges.

         Subsequently, on May 14, 2001, a Florida state court in Pinellas County sentenced Louidol to a 10-month and 4-day term of incarceration for misdemeanor state charges. (Id. at pp. 3, 20-21, 24-25.) However, the court credited Louidol with 304 days of “time served” and, apparently, thereafter released him into the custody of authorities in Hillsborough County, Florida, regarding other state charges. (Id. at pp. 3, 20-21, 28-29.)[2] On October 24, 2001, Hillsborough County dismissed the charges but apparently erroneously released Louidol to agents of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id.)

         It appears an immigration judge then ordered Louidol's removal from the United States of America. (Id. at p. 31.)[3] Thus, on January 4, 2002, the Acting District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”), on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States, commanded Louidol's removal from the United States. (Id.) On March 25, 2002, INS officials deported Louidol to Haiti from the Sarasota, Florida Airport. (Id. at pp. 3, 32.)

         On August 26, 2014, following his return to the United States, INS officials and agents with the Department of Homeland Security arrested Louidol for failure to report for service of his federal sentence. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) The charges were dismissed, and Louidol was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on October 2, 2014, to begin serving his sentence obtained in the Middle District of Florida. (Id. at pp. 3-4, 10-11.) The BOP prepared a sentence computation for Louidol and credited him with 315 days' prior custody. The 315 days were calculated based on the period from when the Pinellas County court credited Louidol with “time served” until ICE official deported Louidol to Haiti (May 15, 2001, to March 25, 2002). (Id.)

         Louidol previously filed a habeas Petition in this Court alleging that the BOP improperly credited his time served and should have also included twenty-five months he spent at the Haiti National Penitentiary and the ten-month, four-day term at Pinellas County. Brief, Louidol v. Johns, No. 5:16-cv-14, ECF No. 3 (S.D. Ga. April 7, 2016). This Court dismissed that Petition because Louidol failed to properly exhaust D. Ray James administrative remedies prior to filing his Petition. Order, Louidol v. Johns, No. 5:16-cv-14, ECF No. 16 (S.D. Ga. September 7, 2016).

         In his current Petition, Louidol again alleges that the BOP has improperly calculated his sentence. However, different than his prior Petition, he now alleges that the BOP should have given him credit for all of the years between his March 25, 2002 deportation to Haiti and his August 26, 2014 detention in the United States, including time that he spent at liberty. (Doc. 1.) Louidol explains that he truly never left the custody of the United States Marshal prior to his deportation, and that he was improperly deported to Haiti due to federal officials' negligence and not due to any mistake of his own. (Id.)

         Respondent argues that the Court should not reach the merits of Louidol's Petition because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on these expanded claims. (Doc. 8.) Respondent contends that while Louidol has filed grievances requesting that he be given credit for the time he spent in the Haiti National Penitentiary following his deportation, he has not properly exhausted the much broader claims he presents in this Petition. (Id. at pp. 5-8.) Additionally, Respondent contends that if the Court does reach the merits of Louidol's claims, it should reject those claims. (Id. at pp. 8-11.)

         DISCUSSION

         I. Whether Louidol Exhausted his Administrative Remedies

         A. Legal Requirements for Exhaustion

         The Eleventh Circuit has held that a Section 2241 petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Fleming v. Warden of FCI Tallahassee, 631 F. App'x 840, 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Section] 2241's exhaustion requirement was judicially imposed, not congressionally mandated, and . . . nothing in the statute itself support[s] the conclusion that the requirement [is] jurisdictional.”). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has noted “that the exhaustion requirement is still a requirement and that courts cannot ‘disregard a failure to exhaust . . . if the respondent properly asserts the defense.'” Id. (citing Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 475). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). However, the normal pleading rules still apply, and dismissal is appropriate when an affirmative defense appears on the face of a complaint-making it clear that a prisoner cannot state a claim for relief. Id. at 214-15. Thus, when a party admits in his complaint or petition that he has not exhausted the grievance process, dismissal is warranted. See Okpala v. Drew, 248 F. App'x 72 (11th Cir. 2007); Cole v. Ellis, No. 5:10-CV-00316-RS-GRJ, 2010 WL 5564632, ...


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