BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
County jury found Gregory Claude Adams guilty of driving
under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was less
safe to drive ("DUI"), failure to maintain lane,
and following too closely. On appeal, Adams challenges the
introduction of testimony and documentary evidence of a
stipulation reached at an administrative civil hearing
pertaining to the suspension of his driver's license and
the introduction of a prior incident in which he was arrested
for DUI. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, with the defendant
no longer enjoying a presumption of innocence."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Danley v. State,
342 Ga.App. 61, 61 (802 S.E.2d 851) (2017). So viewed, the
evidence shows that on the afternoon of July 2, 2016, a
trooper with the Georgia State Patrol was traveling
southbound on Georgia State Route 11 when he saw an
overturned pickup truck down an embankment off the shoulder
of the highway. The driver had exited from the overturned
truck and walked back up to the shoulder of the highway, and
the trooper stopped his patrol car and approached the driver,
who identified himself as Adams. The trooper asked Adams
whether he was okay, and Adams indicated that he was fine.
Adams told the trooper that he had been traveling southbound
on the highway when the vehicle in front of him abruptly
stopped and turned onto a side street. According to Adams, he
had swerved to the shoulder to avoid the vehicle, lost
control of his truck, and crashed down the embankment. As
Adams spoke, the trooper noticed a strong odor of alcohol
coming from his breath and observed that he had bloodshot
eyes and slowed speech.
Adams was checked by emergency medical personnel who had
responded to the scene, the trooper continued speaking with
him. Adams denied having anything to drink and declined to
take a preliminary breath test and the walk-and-turn and
one-leg stand field sobriety tests. However, Adams agreed to
take the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") field
sobriety test and exhibited six out of six clues of
on Adams' description of what had occurred on the
highway, the crash scene, his physical manifestations, and
his performance on the HGN test, the trooper concluded that
Adams had been driving under the influence of alcohol and
arrested him for DUI. The trooper read Georgia's implied
consent notice for suspects over the age of 21 to Adams and
requested that he take a State-administered blood test. Adams
declined to take the test.
was charged by accusation with DUI less safe, failure to
maintain lane, and following too closely. The trooper who
had arrested Adams also filed a sworn report with the
Department of Driver Services to initiate the process of
administratively suspending Adams's driver's license
based on his refusal to take the State-administered blood
test. However, at the subsequent administrative
license suspension ("ALS") hearing, the trooper and
Adams's defense counsel agreed that Adams would enter a
guilty plea to the DUI charge in the criminal case in
exchange for the trooper withdrawing his sworn report and
suspending the ALS proceeding.
the trooper and defense counsel filed a joint motion to
withdraw the suspension of Adams's driver's license
that memorialized the stipulation reached by the parties (the
"ALS Stipulation"). The ALS Stipulation pertinently
Come now the parties in the above styled case and
respectfully request that the sworn report, the 1205 form, be
withdrawn and in so doing respectfully show as follows; the
undersigned arresting officer is the plaintiff in this case.
As such the arresting officer completed a sworn report which
was submitted to the Georgia Department of Driver Services
pursuant to OCGA [§] 40-5-67.1[.] [I]t is now the intent
of the undersigned arresting officer to withdraw this sworn
report and suspend the administrative suspension. This
withdrawal of this sworn report is based upon the agreement
between the parties wherein the petitioner, Mr. Adams, agrees
to enter a guilty plea to the underlying [DUI] charge . . . .
The petitioner, Mr. Adams, further agrees that if he fails to
enter a plea of guilty to the underlying [DUI] charge . . .
on or before December 1, 2016, if he request any motions,
preliminary hearings or any court action other than entering
a guilty plea the petitioner waives his right to hearing
under OCGA [§] 40-5-67.1 [(g) (1)] and authorizes the
arresting officer to sign and file ex parte the affidavit
below with this Court which shall immediately enter an order
reinstating the administrative suspension without a hearing.
ultimately failed to enter a guilty plea, and a criminal
trial ensued. During the trial, the trooper testified to his
encounter with Adams on the roadside as previously
summarized, and the State introduced and played for the jury
an audio recording of the encounter captured on the
microphone worn by the trooper. Additionally, the trooper
testified about the ALS Stipulation reached with defense
counsel, the ALS Stipulation was introduced into evidence and
read to the jury, and the ALS Stipulation was sent out with
the jury after jurors requested to see it during their
deliberations. The State also introduced, through the
testimony of a deputy sheriff from a different county,
evidence of a prior occasion in which Adams had been arrested
for DUI. After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Adams
guilty of DUI less safe, failure to maintain lane, and
following too closely. This appeal followed in which Adams
challenges several evidentiary rulings by the trial
related enumerations of error, Adams contends that the trial
court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of
the ALS Stipulation because it was irrelevant, unfairly
prejudicial, and could not be introduced as an admission
against him in his criminal trial. Adams further contends on
the same grounds that the trial court should have granted a
mistrial in response to the trooper's testimony about the
however, Adams neither moved for a mistrial nor objected to
the introduction of the ALS Stipulation on the grounds that
it was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and should not be
treated as an admission. "To preserve an objection upon
a specific ground for appeal, the objection on that specific
ground must be made at trial, or else it is waived."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sneed v. State,
337 Ga.App. 782, 785 (1) (b) (788 S.E.2d 892) (2016). As we
have explained, "where an entirely different objection
is presented on appeal, we cannot consider it because this is
a court for review and correction of error committed in the
trial court." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Volcey v. State, 200 Ga.App. 881, 883 (2) (410
S.E.2d 36) (1991). For the same reason, an appellant is
barred from raising a ground for mistrial on appeal that was
never raised in the trial court. Chenoweth v. State,
281 Ga. 7, 12 (4) (b) (635 S.E.2d 730) (2006). Accordingly,
Adams waived his argument raised for the first time on appeal
that evidence of the ALS Stipulation was inadmissible as
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial and should not be treated
as an admission against him.
Adams demonstrated that the admission of testimony and
documentary evidence of the ALS Stipulation constituted plain
error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).
In regard to a plain-error review of a ruling on evidence,
the analysis consists of four parts. First, there must be an
error or defect - some sort of deviation from a legal rule -
that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,
i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the
legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the
appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome
of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the
above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the
discretion to remedy the error - discretion which ought to be
exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Thus,
beyond showing a clear or obvious error, plain-error analysis
requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that
the error probably did affect the outcome below.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State,
301 Ga. 83, 88 (2) (799 S.E.2d 757) (2017). "Satisfying
all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should
be." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v.
Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 S.E.2d 232) (2011).
cannot show error, much less plain error, in the admission of
evidence pertaining to the ALS Stipulation. The present case
is controlled adversely to Adams by Flading v.
State, 327 Ga.App. 346, 348-351 (1) (759 S.E.2d 67)
(2014), where this Court upheld the admission of a similar
written stipulation entered in an ALS hearing that was signed
by defense counsel and a law enforcement officer, where there
was no evidence of fraud or mistake in reaching the
stipulation and no evidence that the defendant ever
repudiated his counsel's authority to make the
stipulation. We concluded in Flading that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
stipulation in the defendant's criminal trial because a
stipulation entered in an ALS hearing that the defendant
"would plead guilty to DUI in exchange for the return of
his driver's license [was] relevant to, though certainly
not dispositive of, the charge that he was driving under the
influence of alcohol, " and its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Id. at 351-352 (2).
Flading, Adams does not claim fraud or mistake in
entering the ALS Stipulation, and he never repudiated his
counsel's authority to make the Stipulation.
Accordingly, [Adams], having accepted the benefit of the
stipulation in the form of the reinstatement of his license
and having shown no fraud or mistake, acquiesced to his
counsel's stipulation to plead guilty to the DUI and to
the admissibility of the [ALS ...