United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
CAMETRICE P. WALKER, Plaintiff,
MARY F. WALKER, et al. Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
se plaintiff Cametrice Walker has filed this case
against several defendants, apparently relatives of her
husband, who she contends stole two million dollars from
See doc. 1 at 22. Nevertheless, her case must be
dismissed because this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over her claims. She also seeks to pursue her
case in forma pauperis. Doc. 2. For jurisdictional
purposes only, her request is GRANTED.
Court has an obligation to determine “whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in
the proceedings.” Nalls v. Country Wide Home
Servs., LLC, 279 F. App'x 824, 825 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotes and cite omitted). Federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction. It is presumed that a case lies outside
that jurisdiction, and the party asserting jurisdiction
(here, the plaintiff) bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
“In a given case, a federal district court must have at
least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1)
jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or
(3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128
F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (cites omitted).
first instance, a plaintiff's Complaint must establish
the grounds for a federal court's jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Butler v. Morgan, 562 F. App'x 832, 834 (11th
Cir. 2014) (noting that court may dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction “based on . . . the complaint
alone, ” among other bases). “Federal question
jurisdiction exists only when the ‘well-pleaded
complaint standing alone establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right
to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.'” Id. at 472
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. V.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1983)). “Diversity jurisdiction requires
complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from
every defendant.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota,
Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
alleges both that her claims present a federal question and
that there is diversity of citizenship between her and the
defendants. Doc. 1 at 5. She states that her claim presents a
federal question under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, the Third Amendment (which limits the
quartering of soldiers in private homes), “United
States antitrust law[, ] basic human rights from abuse[, and]
the right to privacy.” Doc. 1 at 5. Despite her
references to the Constitution and federal law, and even
liberally construed, her Complaint suggests only a state-law
conversion claim. See, e.g, O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1
(recognizing a cause of action for deprivation of possession
of personal property). She has also failed to allege complete
diversity because she alleges that one of the defendants,
like her, is a Georgia resident. See doc. 1 at 6-7
(alleging defendant Dempsey Walker, Sr. resides in Pooler,
Walker has not borne her burden of establishing any basis for
this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over her claims,
her Complaint should be DISMISSED.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3 (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Although a pro se plaintiff should generally be
afforded the opportunity to amend her complaint before
dismissal, the Court discerns no basis for a viable
amendment, given the Complaint's
allegations. See Langlois v. Traveler's Ins.
Co., 401 F. App'x 425, 426-27 (11th Cir. 2010). Any
amendment, therefore, would be futile. See Id. at
426 (quoting Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163
(11th Cir. 2001)) (opportunity to amend is not necessary
“‘where amendment would be futile.'”).
Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the
district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3.
Within 14 days of service, any party may file written
objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on
all parties. The document should be captioned
“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendations.” Any requests for additional time to
file objections should be filed with the Clerk for
consideration by the assigned district judge.
the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district
judge. The district judge will review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that
failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver
of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v.
V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir.
2016); Michell v. United States., 612 F. App'x
542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED
 Given the scattered presentation of
the factual allegations, it is impossible to discern exactly
what wrongful conduct she is alleging. The allegation that
the funds were “stolen” is conclusory, at best.
Thus, it seems unlikely that her Complaint states a federal
claim upon which relief can be granted. However, those
references suggest a state-law conversion claim.
That suggestion might support giving Walker leave to amend
her allegations where the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. Even supposing the assertion of
such a claim, however, Walker's Complaint fails to
sufficiently allege any basis for such jurisdiction, as
discussed below. Accordingly, there is no need to delve
further into the factual basis, if any, of such a
 Despite the lack of any apparent basis
for viable amendment, Walker's opportunity to object to
this Report and Recommendation within 14 days of service,
see infra. affords her an ...