MELTON, PRESIDING JUSTICE.
the denial of her motion to hold John Paul Bracy (Husband) in
contempt, Linda Holmes-Bracy (Wife) filed an application for
discretionary appeal with this Court. We granted Wife's
application and posed the following question to the parties:
"Did the trial court err in concluding that husband
could not be held in contempt for failing to make any of the
monthly payments of 50% of his military retirement that he
was required to make under the terms of the parties'
final divorce decree because the judgment had become
dormant?" For the reasons set forth below, we
reverse in part and remand with direction.
pertinent facts of this case are not disputed. Wife and
Husband were divorced in 1995. The final decree of divorce
incorporated a settlement agreement providing, in relevant
part: "At such time as the husband shall no longer be
obligated to pay child support, then the husband shall pay
unto the wife fifty (50%) percent of his Armed Services
retirement pay per month. This money shall be the property of
the wife and the husband shall be obligated to pay this sum
until her death." Husband's child support obligation
terminated in June of 2006, and his first payment of
retirement benefits was due to Wife the following month.
Husband, however, has never paid Wife any amount of his
retirement benefits. (Because Husband was in active service
for less than ten years, the military informed Wife that it
could not pay the benefits directly to her.) Although Wife
employed attorneys to demand payment from Husband, Wife took
no court action until February 25, 2016, when she filed a
motion for contempt. The trial court denied Wife's
motion, finding that, although the divorce decree clearly
entitled Wife to the payments, the trial court could not
enforce those payments because the decree, in its entirety,
had become dormant pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-60 (a) (1)
(judgment becomes dormant seven years after its rendition).
Specifically, the trial court held that the first payment of
retirement benefits became due on July 1, 2006, and the
judgment went dormant on July 1, 2013. Although filing a
scire facias within three years of dormancy would have
revived the judgment if it were dormant, see OCGA §
9-12-61, Wife made no such filing. Therefore, the trial court
held: "[This c]ourt finds that although [Husband] has
clearly and knowingly failed to uphold his obligations under
the decree, this [c]ourt may not hold him in
ruling is incorrect. As an initial matter, the trial court
did properly find that the dormancy period of the judgment
does begin to run from the time when the judgment could first
be enforced. See Corwin v. Debter, 281 Ga. 500,
500-501 (639 S.E.2d 477) (2007). In this case, Wife's
first viable opportunity to enforce the judgment occurred in
July of 2006, when the initial payment became due. In order
to properly analyze the application of the dormancy statute
to the award of military pay extended to Wife, it must first
be recognized that Wife is entitled to installment payments,
not a lump sum amount. In a number of previous cases
(especially with regard to installment payments of alimony),
we have held that the dormancy period does not begin to run
until each installment is due. In other words, each
installment payment is treated as a new and separate
judgment. See Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 163
(205 S.E.2d 223) (1974) ("[W]ith respect to
instalment-payment [sic] alimony judgments, instalments that
became due within seven years preceding the issuance and
recording of the execution are collectible and enforceable,
and instalments that are dormant, having become due seven to
ten years prior to the filing of a revival action, are
subject to being revived through the applicable statutory
revival procedure."). See also Heakes v.
Heakes, 157 Ga. 863, 868 (122 SE 777)
(1924). This method of applying the dormancy
statute to installment payments, however, has not been
limited solely to alimony payments and child support, as
Husband contends. To the contrary, in Taylor v. Peachbelt
Properties, Inc., 293 Ga.App. 335 (2) (667 S.E.2d 117)
(2008), the Court of Appeals applied the dormancy rules set
forth in Bryant, supra, to disability installment
payments from a workers' compensation award. Without
support, Husband bases his case on an overly narrow reading
of Bryant, supra, which he contends applies solely
to installment payments of alimony or child support. Nothing
in the text of Bryant or its subsequent
consideration supports or requires such a limited
we find that the rule set forth in Bryant is
applicable to the installment payments of Husband's
military retirement here. As such, installments that became
due within seven years preceding the issuance and recording
of the execution are collectible and enforceable.
Installments that are dormant remain subject to revival
pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-61. We must, therefore, reverse
the trial court's ruling that any and all installment
payments due to Wife cannot be enforced,  and we remand
this case in order to allow the trial court to properly apply
the dormancy statute pursuant to the manner set forth in
reversed in part and case remanded with direction.
 As a matter of current law, the Court
of Appeals, rather than this Court, has subject matter
jurisdiction over "[a]ll divorce and alimony cases"
in which a notice of appeal or application to appeal is filed
on or after January 1, 2017. Appellate Jurisdiction Reform
Act of 2016, Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, §§ 3-1 (codified
at OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (5)), 6-1 (c); Merrill v.
Lee, 301 Ga. 34, 36 (1) n.1 (799 S.E.2d 169) (2017).
Because Wife filed her application to appeal before January
1, 2017, we have jurisdiction over this case.
 OCGA § 9-12-60 was amended in
1997 to explicitly exempt child support and spousal support
from the dormancy provisions of subsection (a). The amendment
applies prospectively to judgments entered after July 1,
1997. See Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724, 726 (2) (506
S.E.2d 108) (1998).
 We affirm the trial court's ruling
that " [Husband] has clearly and knowingly failed to
uphold his obligations under ...