DILLARD, C. J., RAY, and SELF, JJ.
interlocutory appeal, Ortho Sport & Spine Physicians
Savannah, LLC ("Ortho Savannah") appeals from
orders granting James Chappuis, M.D., Orthopaedic & Spine
Surgery of Atlanta, LLC ("Ortho Atlanta"), and
Jordan Strudthoff's (collectively "appellees")
motion to strike portions of Ortho Savannah's complaint
and to dismiss Strudthoff as a defendant. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Savannah's complaint alleges that Dr. Chappuis and the
principal of Ortho Savannah, Dr. Armin Oskouei, were
previously partners in a medical practice and surgery center
located in Atlanta, Georgia. After Dr. Chappuis allegedly
threatened to kill Dr. Oskouei and hired individuals to stalk
Dr. Oskouei and his staff, their professional relationship
ended, and litigation ensued that was ultimately settled.
Oskouei then established a new medical practice in Savannah,
Georgia. Approximately one year later, Chappuis Properties,
LLC, a company allegedly controlled by Dr. Chappuis,
purchased the medical building in Savannah where Ortho
Savannah leased space as one of only two tenants in the
building. Around the same time, incidents began occurring
that were "reminiscent of the harassing behavior which
was well-documented and admitted" in the previous
lawsuit. Ortho Savannah's complaint alleged that explicit
racial messages appeared on Dr. Oskouei's windshield,
"suspicious individuals" frequented its lobby,
individuals masquerading as patients attempted to obtain
information about its medical practice, individuals attempted
to solicit its patients or advise them to use a different
doctor, persons stalked and followed Dr. Oskouei, and
Chappuis Properties refused to accept Ortho Savannah's
lease payments from its previous landlord. Based upon fear
for the safety of its staff and patients and the disruption
of its business, Ortho Savannah vacated the property. When
the remaining tenant in the building inquired about
sub-leasing space from Ortho Savannah, the "Defendants
refused, stating they fully intended to take over the space
short, the complaint alleges that the "Defendants have
acted together in a systematic fashion with a deliberate
attempt to destroy Ortho  Savannah's business, as an
end in and of itself, as well as for the pecuniary benefit of
the Defendants." It asserted causes of action for civil
conspiracy, alter-ego liability and piercing the corporate
veil, breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment and constructive
eviction, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
trespass, invasion of privacy, slander per se, slander and
oral defamation, tortious interference with a business
relationship, and sought punitive damages against all
defendants, as well as attorney fees and expenses of
litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11.
appellees subsequently moved to strike paragraphs 7, 19, 25,
27 and 31 of the complaint because they contain
"scandalous statements" or "accusations"
that do not add any probative value to the litigation. The
trial court granted the motion with regard to paragraphs 7,
17-28, and 31-32, with no explanation of its reasoning.
Strudthoff moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the
ground that the complaint failed to allege any facts specific
to him that would entitle Ortho Savannah to any relief
sought. The trial court granted this motion in its entirety,
also without explanation.
Ortho Savannah asserts that the trial court erred by
dismissing the entirety of its complaint against Strudthoff
at the preliminary pleading stage. We agree.
[a] motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6)
will not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the
complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not
be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts
asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence
within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a
grant of the relief sought.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Singh,
291 Ga. 525, 529 (3) (731 S.E.2d 649) (2012). To that end,
minimum pleading requirements are found in OCGA § 9-11-8
(a) (2) (A), which requires that the complaint contain
"[a] short and plain statement of the claims showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, " and we have
held that the touchstone is fair notice - "this short
and plain statement must include enough detail to afford the
defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and a fair
opportunity to frame a responsive pleading."
(Citations omitted.) Aetna Workers' Comp Access v.
Coliseum Medical Center, 322 Ga.App. 641, 651 (4) (746
S.E.2d 148) (2013). While "[a] trial court's ruling
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
subject to de novo review[, ]" Infinite
Energy v. Pardue, 310 Ga.App. 355, 356 (1) (713
S.E.2d 456) (2011), we "accept the allegations of fact
that appear in the complaint and view those allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bush v.
Bank of N.Y.Mellon, 313 Ga.App. 84, 89 (720 S.E.2d 370)
Under this 'notice' theory of pleading, it is
immaterial whether a pleading states 'conclusions' or
'facts'. . . . There are no prohibitions in the rules
against pleading conclusions and, if pleaded, they may be
considered in determining whether a complaint sufficiently
states a claim for relief. It is immaterial whether an