United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendant Russell R.
Appearance Motion to Dismiss  (“Motion to
Dismiss”) and Motion to Stay Discovery . Also before
the Court is Plaintiff Andrew Clarke's
(“Plaintiff”) Request for Entry of Default
April 2, 1996, Plaintiff Andrew Clarke
(“Plaintiff”) was struck by a drunk driver while
operating a Georgia Department of Transportation
(“DOT”) vehicle in a construction zone on I-20
West in Atlanta, Georgia. (Complaint  at 4). Plaintiff
allegedly suffered “extreme trauma” as a result
of the accident, including traumatic brain injury,
neurological damage, skeletal damage, and “[e]xtreme
emotional distress.” (Id. at 4-5).
April 20, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se,
commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendant
in his official capacity as Commissioner of DOT. Plaintiff
alleges a deprivation of his right to substantive due
process, procedural due process, and equal protection in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 2-3).
The Complaint also appears to assert a state law claim for
fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff seeks
$10 million in damages. (Id.).
November 7, 2017, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss based
on insufficient service of process, the Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations, and
failure to state a claim under § 1983. ([3.1] at 2). In
the alternative, Defendant moves the Court, pursuant to Rule
12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to require
Plaintiff to submit a more definite statement of his claims.
([3.1] at 2). Defendant also filed, on November 7, 2017, his
Motion for Stay of Discovery pending the final resolution of
the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff did not file a response to
either of Defendant's Motions, and they are deemed
unopposed. See LR 7.1(B), NDGa.
November 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of
Default Judgment seeking the “Clerk to enter a default
against  [D]efendant, on the basis that the record in this
case demonstrates that there has been a failure to plead or
otherwise defend as provided by Rule 55(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Motion to Dismiss
motion to dismiss, the Court must “assume that the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and give the
plaintiff the benefit of reasonable factual
inferences.” Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). Although reasonable
inferences are made in the plaintiff's favor,
“‘unwarranted deductions of fact' are not
admitted as true.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84
F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (1996)). Similarly, the Court is not
required to accept conclusory allegations and legal
conclusions as true. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna
Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (construing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); see
also White v. Bank of America, NA, 597 F.
App'x 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.”) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. V.
Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)).
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). Mere “labels and conclusions”
are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Am.
Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must “nudge
their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Id. at 1289 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Pro Se Pleading Standard
filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with
the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms.
Inc., 146 F. App'x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Even though a pro se complaint should be
construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must
state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief.”
Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F.Supp.2d 26, 28 (D.D.C.
2007). “[A] district court does not have license to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 297 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th Cir.