United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Angel Cardenas Martinez (“Martinez”), an inmate
at D. Ray James Correctional Facility in Folkston, Georgia,
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) I have conducted a preliminary
review of Maritnez's claims as required by Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. For the reasons which
follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court
DISMISS Martinez's Petition and
CLOSE this case. I also
RECOMMEND the Court DENY
Martinez in forma pauperis status on appeal.
Petition, Martinez takes issue with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons' (“BOP”) calculation of his current
sentence. He states that he was sentenced in the United
Stated District Court for the Middle District of Florida in
Case Number 8:15-cr-115, on March 15, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 1.)
He contends that the Middle District of Florida gave him
bail, and he was out on pretrial release from April 21, 2015
to September 2, 2015. (Id. at p. 7.) During this
time, he was subject to conditions including weekly drug
testing, daily telephonic reporting to his pretrial services
officer, and a curfew that required him to be at his home
from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. every day. (Id.) During
the hours he was not subject to a curfew, Williams worked as
a carpenter for a construction company. (Id.)
Williams maintains that his time on release constitutes
“home detention, ” and he argues that the BOP has
erroneously failed to give him credit towards his sentence
for the time that he was subject to these conditions.
(Id. at pp. 6, 8.) He requests that this Court order
that he be given 165 days credit toward his federal sentence
for the time he spent in “home detention.”
Standard of Review
to Rule 4 of the Rules governing petitions brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2254:
The clerk must promptly forward the petition to a judge . .
., and the judge must promptly examine [the petition]. If it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the
clerk to notify the petitioner.
Rule 2(c), “[h]abeas corpus petitions must meet
heightened pleading requirements.” McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2254 Rule 2(c)). While pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), complaints in a civil case must contain only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” petitions for
habeas corpus must “specify all the grounds for relief
available to the petitioner” and “state the facts
supporting each ground.” Rule 2 of Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases. In other words, habeas petitions must
contain “‘fact pleading' as opposed to
‘notice pleading.'” Hittson v. GDCP
Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “To properly fact
plead, ‘a petitioner must state specific,
particularized facts which entitle him or her to habeas
corpus relief for each ground specified. These facts must
consist of sufficient detail to enable the court to
determine, from the face of the petition alone, whether the
petition merits further habeas corpus review.'”
Arrington v. Warden, GDCP, No. CV 117-022, 2017 WL
4079405, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2017) (quoting Adams
v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Therefore, a habeas petitioner cannot merely levy conclusory
allegations but must support his claims with specific factual
detail. Id. (citing James v. Borg, 24 F.3d
20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Martinez Failed to Exhausted his Administrative
Legal Requirements for Exhaustion
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a Section
2241 petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is not a jurisdictional defect. Santiago-Lugo v.
Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474 (11th Cir. 2015); see also
Fleming v. Warden of FCI Tallahassee, 631 F. App'x
840, 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Section] 2241's
exhaustion requirement was judicially imposed, not
congressionally mandated, and . . . nothing in the statute
itself support[s] the conclusion that the requirement [is]
jurisdictional.”). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
has noted “that the exhaustion requirement is still a
requirement” and that courts cannot “disregard a
failure to exhaust . . . if the respondent properly asserts
the defense.” Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 475.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, and inmates are not required to specially plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint. Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). However, the normal
pleading rules still apply, and dismissal is appropriate when
an affirmative defense appears on the face of a
complaint-making it clear that a prisoner cannot state a
claim for relief. Id. at 214-15. Thus, when a party
admits in his complaint or petition that he has not exhausted
the grievance process, dismissal is warranted. See Okpala
v. Drew, 248 F. App'x 72, 73 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam); Cole v. Ellis, No. 5:10-CV-00316-RS-GRJ,
2010 WL 5564632, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2010); Rashid
v. Liberty Cty. Jail, No. CV410-092, 2010 WL 3239241, at
*1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. May 3, 2010) (“Nothing in
Jones . . . forbids the Court from dismissing a
complaint pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(a) if it is
clear from the face of the complaint that the prisoner has
not exhausted all administrative remedies available to
requirement that exhaustion of remedies occur “first in
an agency setting allows ‘the agency [to] develop the
necessary factual background upon which decisions should be
based' and giv[es] ‘the agency a chance to discover
and correct its own errors.'” Green v.
Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 212 F. App'x 869,
871 (11th Cir. 2006) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.
1998)). Furthermore, requiring exhaustion in the prison
setting “eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court
interference with the administration of prisons” and
allows “corrections officials time and opportunity to
address complaints internally before allowing the initiation
of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 93 (2006).
United States Supreme Court has noted exhaustion must be
“proper.” Id. at 92. “Proper
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Id. at 90-91. In other words, an institution's
requirements define what is considered exhaustion.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. It is not the role of the
court to consider the adequacy or futility of the
administrative remedies afforded to the inmate.
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 ...