United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint
Counsel, (doc. 3), and Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, (doc. 4). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's
Motion to Appoint Counsel. Furthermore, I
RECOMMEND the Court DENY
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3)
civil case, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the
appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford, 562
Fed.Appx. 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v.
Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)).
“Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has
broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint
counsel only in exceptional circumstances.”
Wright, 562 Fed.Appx. at 777 (citing Bass,
170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a civil case is
a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are
so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained
practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088,
1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert, 819
F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987) and Wahl v. McIver,
773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit
has explained that “the key” to assessing whether
counsel should be appointed “is whether the pro se
litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his
or her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are
simple, he or she usually will not need such help.”
McDaniels v. Lee, 405 Fed.Appx. 456, 457 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193
(11th Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction asking this Court
to ensure that he cannot be transferred to another prison.
(Doc. 4.) To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the
movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits; (2) an injunction or protective order
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the
threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction or
protective order would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the
injunction or protective order would not be adverse to the
public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). In
this Circuit, an “injunction is an extraordinary and
drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly
established the ‘burden of persuasion' as to the
four requisites.” Horton v. City of Augustine,
Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
plaintiff succeeds in making such a showing, then “the
court may grant injunctive relief, but the relief must be no
broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional
violation.” Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312,
1319 (11th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, where there is a
constitutional violation in the prison context, courts
traditionally are reluctant to interfere with prison
administration, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05
(1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a
broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison
administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped to
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform.”), overruled on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In
such cases, “[d]eference to prison authorities is
especially appropriate.” Newman, 683 F.2d at
1320-21 (reversing district court's injunction requiring
release of prisoners on probation because it “involved
the court in the operation of the State's system of
criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary”
and less intrusive equitable remedy was available).
has not shown that he has satisfied the prerequisites in
order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. Specifically, Plaintiff has not shown the
likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or that
injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has since been transferred to Calhoun
State Prison in Morgan, Georgia so this Motion is moot.
Therefore, I RECOMMEND the Court
DENY Plaintiff's Motion for a
on the foregoing, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, (doc. 3).
Additionally, I RECOMMEND that the Court
DISMISS Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 4).
Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to
this Report and Recommendation to file specific written
objections within fourteen (14) days of the
date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any
objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to
address any contention raised in the pleading must also be
included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or
review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the
objections must be served upon all other parties to the
action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional
receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set
out above, a United States District Judge will make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report,
proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out
above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may
not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation
directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to
serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon