United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE
ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
the Court is yet another of pro se Plaintiff Waseem
Daker's motions for this Court to reconsider its Order
and vacate its Judgment dismissing his case. Plaintiff is, to
say the least, a promiscuous filer, having filed well over 1,
000 motions in more than 150 civil cases and appeals in the
Middle District of Georgia, Northern District of Georgia,
Southern District of Georgia, Central District of California,
District of Columbia, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. In this district alone, Daker has filed 10
civil cases,  has moved to intervene in six civil
lawsuits,  and has filed well over 250 motions. In
those cases filed in this district, Daker routinely moves the
Court to reconsider its Orders and vacate its Judgments,
having filed more than 20 such motions.
Motion to Vacate currently at bar, Daker moves this Court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to
reconsider its Order dismissing his case and denying his
various motions for injunctive relief, and to vacate the
Judgment. Yet again, however, Daker fails to provide proper
grounds for such relief. Reconsideration of a previous order
is an extraordinary remedy and should be employed
sparingly. Reconsideration is justified when (1)
there has been an intervening change in the law; (2) new
evidence has been discovered that was not previously
available to the parties at the time the original order was
entered; or (3) reconsideration is necessary to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest
Daker's pro se filings must be generously
construed,  his Rule 59(e) Motion cannot “serve
as a vehicle to relitigate old matters or present the case
under a new legal theory ... [or] to give the moving party
another ‘bite at the apple' by permitting the
arguing of issues and procedures that could and should have
been raised prior to judgment.”Rather, a motion for
reconsideration “must demonstrate why the court should
reconsider its prior decision and set forth facts or law of a
strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its
prior decision.” In his Motion, Daker merely re-asserts the
same arguments and evidence this Court previously considered
in its original ruling. His allegations of the need to
correct clear error of law and the need to prevent manifest
injustice are merely conclusory statements. Daker's
Motion is without merit, and reconsideration of the
Court's previous Order would be inappropriate.
has abused the judicial process through the repeated filings
of these motions, blatantly disregarding this Court's
Local Rule providing that “[m]otions for
reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine
practice.” These motions, like his various other
post-judgment motions, serve only to unnecessarily prolong
litigation in this Court, and the Court will not allow
Daker's pattern of abuse of the judicial process to
continue. Although the Court must give substantial weight to
a prisoner's right of access to the Courts,
that right “is neither absolute nor
unconditional.” Although courts may not construct
blanket orders that completely shut the courthouse doors to
the overly litigious, they may erect reasonable barriers that
protect their Article III duties.
again, Daker is reminded that this Court's Local Rules
prohibit the filing of motions for reconsideration as a
matter of routine practice. If Daker continues to seek
reconsideration of the Court's orders, the Court will
impose appropriate sanctions.
accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to
Vacate [Doc. 26] is hereby DENIED.
 Daker v. Donald, Case No.
5:04-cv-337; Daker v. Donald, Case No. 5:04-cv-392;
Daker v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., Case No.
5:05-cv-205; Daker v. Owens, Case No. 5:12-cv-459;
Daker v. Humphrey, Case No. 5:12-cv-461; Daker
v. Head, Case No. 5:14-cv-138; Daker v. Bryson,
Case No. 5:15-cv-88; Daker v. Bryson, Case No.
5:16-cv-538; Daker v. Bryson, Case No. 5:17-cv-25;
Daker v. Dozier, Case No. 5:17-cv-25.
 Smith v. Owens, Case No.
5:12-cv-26; Gumm v. Jacobs, Case No. 5:15-cv-41;
Nolley v. Nelson, Case No. 5:15-cv- 75; Nolley
v. McLaughlin, Case No. 5:15-cv-149; Upshaw v.
McLaughlin, Case No. 5:15-cv-395; Sterling v.
Sellers, Case No. 5:16-cv-13.
Region 8 Forest Servs. Timber
Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 805-06 (11th