BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
the second appearance of this case in this Court. In
Sadler v. Rigsby, 338 Ga.App. 549 (790 S.E.2d 639)
(2016), following the denial of his motion for new trial,
Benjamin Ryan Sadler appealed the dismissal of his petition
to modify custody. This Court agreed with his contention that
the trial court erred in denying his request that it issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and vacated the
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Id. at 551 (1). Subsequently, on remand, the trial
court issued a second final order denying Sadler's
petition to modify custody, in which it included findings of
facts and conclusions of law. Sadler appeals, contending that
the trial court erred by excluding admissible evidence,
improperly restricting witness testimony and by ignoring
un-refuted evidence. Sadler also contends that the trial
court erred by refusing to modify child support, and by
failing to include in its order the findings of facts ordered
by this Court in the previous case.
A trial court is authorized to modify an original custody
award upon a showing of new and material changes in the
conditions and circumstances substantially affecting the
interest and welfare of the child. Any change in custody is
subject to the trial court's discretion based on the best
interests of the child. We view the evidence in favor of
upholding the trial court's order and will affirm if
there is any reasonable evidence to support the decision.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fifadara v.
Goyal, 318 Ga.App. 196, 197 (733 S.E.2d 478) (2012).
viewed, the evidence demonstrates that Sadler and Savannah
Shawn Rigsby, who were never married, had a son born in 2009.
In May of 2010, the Haralson County Superior Court entered a
consent order of legitimization, which included a parenting
plan and child support agreement. Included in its terms were
that Sadler and Rigsby would share legal custody of the
child, Rigsby would have primary physical custody, and Sadler
would have liberal visitation. Sadler was also ordered to pay
$111 per week in child support based on Sadler's reported
gross monthly income of $4360 and Rigsby's gross monthly
income of $1261.50. In February 2012, Rigsby filed a petition
to modify visitation and child support and motion for
contempt, alleging a material change in circumstances
affecting the health and welfare of their son and requesting
that visitation be modified to address numerous alleged
issues, including Sadler's failure to supervise their son
and ensure that he attended preschool. She also requested an
increase in child support to $718 per month. In the motion
for contempt, Rigsby contended, among other things, that
Sadler had failed to pay child support and half of their
son's medical bills in violation of the prior consent
a hearing, the parties reached an agreement as to all of
these issues, and on September 21, 2012, the Haralson County
Superior Court issued a final consent order and parenting
plan, again awarding the couple joint legal custody, Rigsby
primary physical custody, Sadler liberal visitation, and
ordering Sadler to pay child support in the amount of $900
October 1, 2013, Sadler filed the present petition for
custody in the Superior Court of Carroll County, where Rigsby
and their son now lived. In the petition, Sadler asserted a
substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the
former order, alleging that Rigsby was interfering with his
custody and visitation rights, and alienating him from his
son. A final hearing on the petition was held on August 20
and 21, 2015, at the conclusion of which, Rigsby made an oral
motion to dismiss, maintaining that Sadler had failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating a material change of condition
affecting the child since the last custody award. The trial
court agreed, concluding "there's not been a
substantial change in condition that would warrant a change
in the custody . . . nor in the child support amount, "
and granted the motion to dismiss. Sadler then requested
factual findings and conclusions of law, but the trial court
denied the request, and held that the custody provisions in
the 2012 Haralson County order were still controlling because
there had been "no change." . Sadler filed a motion
for new trial, which, following a hearing, the trial court
appealed the order, and this Court, upon concluding that the
trial court had erred in denying Sadler's request for
written factual findings and conclusions of law, vacated the
order dismissing the petition for custody and remanded the
case to the trial court "with direction that the trial
court make findings of fact and conclusions of law."
Sadler, 338 Ga.App. at 551 (1). In the subsequent
final order containing findings of facts and conclusions of
law, the trial court again dismissed Sadler's petition,
and it is from that order that he now appeals.
Sadler complains that the trial court refused to abide by
controlling law, restricted witness testimony and ignored
certain evidence. These claims are meritless.
Sadler first contends that the trial court erred by ignoring
mandatory provisions in Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule
24.9 related to the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). He contends that
the GAL's dismissal from the proceedings was error,
because Rule 24.9 requires, among other things, that the GAL
be available to assist the trial court, testify at the
proceedings, submit a report into evidence, and be available
as a witness. See USCR 24.9 (3)- 4.9 (7).
case, although a GAL was appointed, on December 8, 2014, the
GAL was released from the case at the parties' request by
a temporary consent order. The GAL submitted her report to
the trial court for the August 2015 final hearing on
Sadler's modification petition, but the trial court ruled
that the report would not be admitted into evidence because
the GAL had been released from the case and was not available
to testify. Sadler maintained that the report was not
hearsay, but then acquiesced and agreed, "That's
fine, Your Honor. We can proceed without it, and if need be
we can get the guardian here." However, Sadler never
subpoenaed the GAL to testify and the report was not admitted
light of Sadler's agreement to proceed without the
report, and failure to avail himself of the GAL's
appearance at trial, he "cannot now complain of a result
he aided in causing, because induced error is not an
appropriate basis for claiming prejudice." Shaver v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp., 273 Ga.App. 140, 141(614 S.E.2d
Sadler next complains that relevant evidence was excluded at
the final hearing because the trial court improperly
restricted the testimony of his expert by forcing him to
testify as a fact witness. The record reveals, however, that
later in the hearing, both parties agreed to limit witness
testimony to the parties because neither side had been
provided a witness list. Thus, the evidence at trial was
limited to testimony from the parties. Sadler cannot now
complain about the omission of evidence he agreed to exclude.
As noted previously, "induced error is not an
appropriate basis for claiming prejudice."
Shaver, 273 Ga.App. at 141. See Wallace v. Swift
Spinning Mills, 236 Ga.App. 613, 617 (2) (511 S.E.2d
904) (1999) ("It is a well-settled appellate ...