United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Catherine M.
Salinas' Non-Final Report and Recommendation
(“Non-Final R&R”)  on Defendant Covington
Credit's (“Defendant”) Motion for Partial
Dismissal of Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)  (“Motion for Partial
19, 2017, Plaintiff Ricky Eason (“Plaintiff”)
filed this action asserting claims for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §
1692d(5); and the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act
(“FBPA”), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a). (Complaint
 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that on September 23, 2016, he
received a phone call on his cellular phone from Defendant
attempting to collect a debt relating to a Covington Credit
personal loan. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14). Plaintiff
alleges that at that time he verbally advised Defendant to
stop calling his cellular phone and revoked any prior express
consent to contact Plaintiff via cellular phone or any other
form of communication. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15).
claims that from September 23, 2016 through the filing of his
Complaint on May 19, 2017, Defendant continued to call
Plaintiff's cellular phone up to four times per day,
despite Plaintiff's express revocation of consent to be
contacted. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19-20, 28). Plaintiff
argues that he did not initiate any communication, that
Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or
artificial or pre-recorded voice to contact him, and that
some of the calls included delays in time before the call was
transferred to a live representative. (Compl. ¶¶
14, 2017, Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Dismissal,
under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that
Plaintiff's claims relating to violations of the FDCPA
and FBPA should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
( at 1). On June 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal 
(“Response”) in which he conceded that his claim
for violations of the FDCPA should be dismissed but that his
claim relating to violations of the FBPA are viable.
September 21, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued her Non-Final
R&R and recommended granting Defendant's Motion for
Partial Dismissal. Plaintiff does not object to the Non-Final
Motion to Dismiss
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must “assume that
the factual allegations in the complaint are true and give
the plaintiff the benefit of reasonable factual
inferences.” Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). Although reasonable
inferences are made in the plaintiff's favor,
“‘unwarranted deductions of fact' are not
admitted as true.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84
F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (1996)). The Court also is not required to
accept as true conclusory allegations and legal conclusions.
See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d
1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (construing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); see also White v.
Bank of America, NA, 597 F. App'x 1015, 1018 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted
deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
facts will not prevent dismissal.”) (quoting Oxford
Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). Mere “labels and conclusions”
are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Am.
Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must “nudge
their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Id. at 1289 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Standard of Review on a Magistrate Judge's
conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or
modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With
respect to those findings and recommendations to which
objections have not been asserted, the Court must conduct a
plain error review of the record. United States v.
Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). Petitioner did not file
objections to the R&R, and the Court thus reviews it for