ELLINGTON, P. J., ANDREWS and RICKMAN, JJ.
ELLINGTON, PRESIDING JUDGE.
29, 2009, a Lincoln County jury found James Glenn Wilder
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in Case No. 2005-CR-3630 of
aggravated child molestation, child molestation, statutory
rape, and sexual exploitation of a child (two counts), based
on acts he committed in 2003 and 2004. After a series of
proceedings, including consideration by the Supreme Court of
Georgia, Wilder's convictions were
affirmed. In August 2013, the case returned to the
trial court for resentencing as directed in Wilder's
original direct appeal, Wilder v. State, 304 Ga.App.
891, 895- 896 (6) (698 S.E.2d 374) (2010).
trial court sentenced Wilder to thirty years, to serve twenty
in prison, for aggravated child molestation; five years for
child molestation,  consecutive; five years for
statutory rape, concurrent; and five years for each count of
sexual exploitation of a child, concur rent. The sentences
totaled thirty-five years, to serve twenty-five years in
filed a motion for new trial after the
resentencing. The trial court conducted a hearing on
February 16, 2017. The parties informed the court that they
were in agreement that Wilder was entitled to be resentenced
with respect to the child molestation conviction, which was
Count 2, on the basis that OCGA § 17-10-6.2, which was
enacted in 2006, requires a split sentence of at least the
statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment for the offense
plus at least one year of probation. At the time of the hearing,
the applicable statutory range for child molestation was not
less than five nor more than twenty years imprisonment. OCGA
§ 16-6-4 (b) (1) (2017) ("[A] person convicted of a
first offense of child molestation shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20
years[.]"). The trial court resentenced Wilder on Count
2 to five years consecutive to Count 1 (aggravated child
molestation) plus an additional year on probation, for a
total of six years, to serve five, on Count 2. The sentences
now total thirty-six years, to serve twenty-five years in
prison. Wilder again appeals.
current appeal, Wilder contends that, because OCGA §
17-10-6.2 was not enacted until after he committed the
offenses in 2003 and 2004, the parties were mistaken in
believing that the Code section applies. In this, Wilder is
correct. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that reversal is required.
Georgia law, a sentence is void if the court imposes
punishment that the law does not allow. A sentence that falls
within the prescribed statutory limits, however, is legally
authorized and is not subject to review by this Court."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Few v. State,
311 Ga.App. 608 (716 S.E.2d 644) (2011). See also Monroe
v. State, 250 Ga. 30, 36 (7) (295 S.E.2d 512) (1982)
("The trial court has the discretion to impose sentence
within the parameters prescribed by the statute and if the
sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellate courts
will not review it.") (citations omitted). Wilder's
present sentence on Count 2 of six years, to serve five,
falls within the applicable statutory range of sentencing,
that is, according to the provisions of the law existing in
2003 and 2004, for a first offense of child
molestation. Because the sentence is legally
authorized, we will not review it. Moreover, even if the
trial court mistakenly believed that it was required, rather
than merely authorized, to impose a split sentence on Count 2
of at least five years in prison plus at least one year on
probation, any such sentencing error was induced by Wilder
and affords no grounds for reversal. See Torres v.
State, 272 Ga. 389, 392 (7) (529 S.E.2d 883) (2000)
("It is well established that induced error is
impermissible and furnishes no ground for reversal.")
(citation omitted); Gorman v. State, 318 Ga.App.
535, 540 (4) (734 S.E.2d 263) (2012) ("One cannot
complain of a result he procured or aided in causing, and
induced error is not an appropriate basis for claiming
prejudice.") (punctuation and footnote omitted).
Andrews and Rickman, JJ., concur.
 See Wilder v. State, 304
Ga.App. 891 (698 S.E.2d 374) (2010); Wilder v.
State, 290 Ga. 13 (717 S.E.2d 457) (2011); Wilder v.
State, 320 Ga.App. 497 (740 S.E.2d 241) (2013).
 An additional count of child
molestation merged with the greater offense.
 See Wilder v. State, Case No.
A16A1288, decided September 8, 2016 (unpublished decision
reversing the denial of Wilder's motion for an ...