United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DIJFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Russell G.
Vineyard's Final Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”), which recommends remanding this
dispossessory action to the Magistrate Court of DeKalb
21, 2017, Plaintiff Trans Am SFE II, LLC
(“Plaintiff”), initiated a dispossessory
proceeding against Terrence Williams, Jenny Williams and all
other occupants (“Defendants”), in the Magistrate
Court of DeKalb County, Georgia.The Complaint seeks
possession of premises currently occupied by Defendants
following a foreclosure sale and seeks attorney's fees
August 16, 2017, Carleton Wright (“Movant”),
proceeding pro se, removed the DeKalb County Action
to this Court by filing his Notice of Removal and an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
Application”). Movant appears to assert that there is
federal subject matter jurisdiction because there is a
question of federal law in this action. Movant claims that
Plaintiff violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692, Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, and that the Court has
“the legal duty to abort eviction pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 51-1-6 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692. (Notice of Removal
 at 1). Movant also asserts that Plaintiff violated his
“rights in respect to fair housing access” and
that Movant exercised his option to buy the property at issue
by signing a “land contract” and making
improvements to the property. (Addendum to Notice of Removal
August 18, 2017, Magistrate Judge Vineyard granted
Movant's IFP Application. (). The Magistrate Judge
then considered, sua sponte, whether there is
federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action removed.
The Magistrate Judge found that federal subject matter
jurisdiction was not present and recommended that the Court
remand the case to the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County. The
Magistrate Judge found that the Complaint filed in Magistrate
Court asserts a state court dispossessory action and does not
allege federal law claims. Because a federal law defense or
counterclaim does not confer federal jurisdiction, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that the Court does not have
federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Although not
alleged in the Notice of Removal, the Magistrate Judge also
considered whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship. The Magistrate Judge found
that Movant failed to allege any facts to show that the
parties' citizenship is completely diverse. The
Magistrate Judge concluded that the Court does not have
diversity jurisdiction over this matter and that this case is
required to be remanded to the state court. There are no
objections to the R&R.
conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject or
modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v.
Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112 (1983). A district judge
“shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and
recommendations to which objections have not been asserted,
the Court must conduct a plain error review of the record.
United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984).
does not object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that
Plaintiff's Complaint does not present a federal question
and that the parties are not diverse. The Court does not find
any plain error in these conclusions. It is well-settled that
federal-question jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of a plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint and that the assertions of defenses or
counterclaims based on federal law cannot confer federal
question jurisdiction over a cause of action. See
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6
(2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). The record also
does not show that the parties are citizens of different
states, or that the amount in controversy exceeds the
statutory threshold of $75, 000. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a); Carter v. Butts Cty., Ga., et al.,
821 F.3d 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Steed v.
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 843, 848
(Ga.Ct.App. 2009)) (“[U]nder Georgia law,
‘[w]here former owners of real property remain in
possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at
sufferance, '” and are thus subject to a
dispossessory proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50, which
“provide[s] the exclusive method by which a landlord
may evict the tenant”); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.
v. Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS, 1:07-cv-2865-RWS,
2008 WL 115096, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A]
dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not an
ownership dispute, but rather only a dispute over the limited
right to possession, title to property is not at issue and,
accordingly, the removing Defendant may not rely on the value
of the property as a whole to satisfy the amount in
the Court lacks both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, this action is required to be remanded to the
Magistrate Court of DeKalb County. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard's Final Report ...