United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, Jr. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Russell G.
Vineyard's Final Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”), recommending that this action be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff George Bolden
(“Plaintiff”) appears to allege that he was
hired, in October 2016, by Defendants Asbury Automotive Group
and Nalley Nissan of Atlanta (together,
“Defendants”). Plaintiff states that, during his
employee orientation, he “signed paperwork stating how
[he would] deal with customer[s] [and] what [he could] and
[could not] do, ” but once he “started at the
dealership all of the practices that [he] signed on stating
that [he] wouldn't do [were] being done and asked for
[him] to also do by management.” (Am. Compl. at 7).
Plaintiff alleges that, on one occasion, he “was
working a deal with a customer” on a “$5, 999
[vehicle] that was marked up for $8, 999.” (Am. Compl.
at 7). Plaintiff was told, presumably by another staff
member, to offer the customer a “monthly payment of
almost $400” with “$1000 down.” (Am. Compl.
at 7). The customer said Plaintiff “was cheating him
and left.” (Am. Compl. at 7). Plaintiff, at the
direction of his manager, offered the customer a lower
monthly payment option, which the customer also rejected.
(Am. Compl. at 7). Plaintiff told his manager that he wanted
to talk to “human resources because [he] was told not
to do that.” (Am. Compl. at 7). The next day, Plaintiff
spoke with Defendants' general sales manager, who told
him “he [would] handle it.” (Am. Compl. at 7).
finance manager later sold a new Nissan Versa vehicle to a
customer who had requested a used Nissan Altima. (Am. Compl.
at 7-8). The customer called the next day and told Plaintiff
he “didn't want th[e] car.” (Am. Compl. at
8). At the direction of Defendants' general sales
manager, Plaintiff told the customer, “don't worry
about it, to drive [the] car for [the] weekend and just come
in on Monday with mom [and Defendants will] redo the
deal.” (Am. Compl. at 8). When the customer arrived on
Monday, Defendants' finance manager instructed Plaintiff
to tell the customer that, “because the deal was
already funded, ” the customer could only trade the
Nissan Versa for another vehicle. (Am. Compl. at 8).
Plaintiff reported this incident to his general sales
manager, told him “it ain't right, ” and said
he wanted to speak to human resources because he did not
“want to get accused of cheating customers.” (Am.
Compl. at 8-9). The general sales manager told Plaintiff
that, if he did not “want to tell the customer that the
other deal was already funded, [the general sales manager
could] get someone else to finish [the] deal for
[him].” (Am. Compl. at 8-9). A few days later, the
general sales manager told Plaintiff that the general manager
thought he was not “a good fit” and that he
should join a different “dealership under the Nalley
brand.” (Am. Compl. at 9). Plaintiff contacted a human
resources employee, who told him he “didn't do what
[he] was supposed to do, that [he was] being fired and put on
the no rehire list.” (Am. Compl. at 9). “Multiple
write ups [then] showed up in [Plaintiff's] file to cover
the company.” (Am. Compl. at 9). Plaintiff claims his
employment was terminated because he “talked about
addressing HR and then [he] was set up with HR while doing
[his] job.” (Am. Compl. at 9).
23, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Application for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) to
which he attached his Pro Se Employment Discrimination
Complaint Form [1.1] (“Initial Complaint”). The
Initial Complaint asserted a Title VII retaliation claim
against Defendant Asbury Automotive Group. On July 3, 2017,
the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff's IFP Application,
identified several deficiencies in Plaintiff's Initial
Complaint, and ordered Plaintiff to file a properly pleaded
amended complaint “or face dismissal of this
action.” ( at 7). On August 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed
his Amended Pro Se Employment Discrimination Complaint Form
 (“Amended Complaint”), asserting a Title VII
retaliation claim against Defendants Nalley Nissan of Atlanta
and Asbury Automotive Group. Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint contains allegations similar to those in his
Initial Complaint. On August 8, 2017, the Magistrate Judge
screened Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and issued his
R&R, recommending that this action be dismissed, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff did not file objections to the R&R.
Frivolity Review under 28 U.S.C. §
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss
an in forma pauperis action if the court determines
that the action is ‘frivolous or malicious; fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.'” Thibeaux v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 275
F. App'x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). “Failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc., 366 F.
App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). To avoid
dismissal under this standard, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Mere “labels and
conclusions” are insufficient. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). This requires more than the “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Am. Dental, 605
F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The
well-pled allegations must “nudge [plaintiff's]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
filed his Amended Complaint pro se. “A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, a pro
se plaintiff must comply with the threshold requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v.
Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App'x 368, 371
(11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se
complaint still must state a claim upon which the Court can
grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506
F.Supp.2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court
does not have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.”
Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App'x 863,
864 (11th Cir. 2008).
Magistrate Judge's ...