United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
Randal Hall, CTIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
the Court is Defendant Yancey Robertson's Motion to
Dismiss the Petition to Revoke [Defendant's] Supervised
Release. (Doc. 15.) Defendant Yancey Robertson was convicted
of a crime in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas for which he was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment to be followed by a term of supervised release.
(See United States v. Robertson, 2:11-CR-20092-CM-2
(D. Kan. May 29, 2012).) On December 23, 2016, Defendant -
while serving his term of supervised release - was arrested
by the Sheriff's Office of Richmond County, Georgia, for
aggravated assault and false imprisonment. Defendant was held
in state custody on those charges until his initial
appearance in the present action on May 30, 2017. On July 6,
2017, the United States Magistrate Judge concluded that: (a)
probable cause existed as to the alleged violations that form
the basis of the petition for revocation; and (b) Defendant
failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that his detention
pending hearing was inappropriate. (See Doc. 13.) On
September 14, 2017, Defendant filed his present motion to
dismiss, asserting that the approximately four-month delay
between his detainment and forthcoming final revocation
hearing is unreasonable. (Doc. 15.)
Sixth Amendment provides that Mi]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . .
trial." Castillo v. Florida, 630 F.App'x
1001, 1006 (11th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original)
(quoting U.S. Const. Amend. VI). Yet "revocation
hearings are not criminal prosecutions under the Sixth
Amendment and thus, the defendant is not constitutionally
guaranteed a speedy hearing.'' United States v.
Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)).
Nonetheless, the due process rights of an individual on
supervised release may be implicated where there is a
significant delay in conducting the final revocation hearing.
See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82. Indeed, unless
waived by a defendant, "the court must hold the
revocation hearing within a reasonable time." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2); see also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) ("The revocation hearing must
be tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is
taken into custody."); United States v.
Dempsey, 479 F.App'x. 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2012)
(timeframe in which to conduct revocation hearing begins to
run when defendant is transferred to federal custody, not
when he was arrested for state crime) . While the Eleventh
Circuit has not formally announced a framework for addressing
due process challenges in regards to the timeliness of
revocation hearings, it has considered "(1) the length
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to
the defendant." Castillo v. Florida, 630
F.App'x 1001, 1007 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and United States v.
Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11th Cir. 1991)).
the four-month delay between Defendant's detention and
final revocation hearing was not unreasonable. See,
e.g., Dempsey, 479 F.App'x. at 937
(three-month delay not unreasonable); Parrish v.
Wainwright, 614 F.2d 1028, 1029 (5th Cir. 1980) (same);
United States v. Harris, 674 F.App'x. 185, 188
(3d Cir. 2017) (nine-month delay not unreasonable);
United States v. Scott, 850 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir.
1988) (thirteen-month delay not unreasonable); but see
United States v. Pagan-Rodriguez, 600 F.3d 39, 42 (1st
Cir. 2010) (twelve-month delay was unreasonable).
Nevertheless, even assuming that Defendant could demonstrate
that the interval was unreasonable, Defendant's motion to
dismiss would still fail because he has not demonstrated
prejudice to his ability to vigorously contest the violations
that form the basis of the petition for revocation.
See, e.g., United States v.
Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11th Cir. 1991) ("
[D]efendant suffered no harm by the one year delay because it
did not deny him the opportunity to vigorously contest the
violation."). Contrary to his conclusion that he
"is currently being prejudiced as a result of this delay
because the evidence is becoming stale, " Defendant
admits that "he has located a number of witnesses ready
and able to testify on his behalf." (Doc. 15, at 2.)
Indeed, Defendant's inchoate fears that "witnesses
may move or be unable to be located" have yet - and
likely never will - come to fruition given that
Defendant's final revocation hearing is presently
scheduled for October 2, 2017. (See Doc. 16.)
Moreover, while Defendant claims that he has been prejudiced
"because of the mental anxiety this legal limbo
imposes" (id.), such conclusory assertions are
insufficient to constitute proof of- actual prejudice.
See Scott, 850 F.2d at 321 ("Unfortunately,
anxiety and anguish are an inevitable result of criminal
prosecution and imprisonment. Therefore, to show that the
government's delay prejudiced him in a constitutionally
significant sense, [a defendant] must offer evidence of
anxiety beyond that which reasonably corresponds with a
criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment."
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, on
balance, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a violation of
Rule 32.1(b) or his right to due process that would
necessitate the granting of his motion to dismiss the present
upon the foregoing and due consideration, the Court
DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss the