United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
ORDER
Proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, Eric LaTroy
Harris brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two
unknown Counter Narcotics Team agents at the Savannah Chatham
Metropolitan Police Department (SCMPD). Doc. 1. The Court is
screening his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.[1]
Harris
is confined at Chatham County Jail. Doc. 1 at 2. He alleges
that on July 13, 2017, SCMPD Counter Narcotics Team agents
entered a home he was visiting, ordered him to the ground,
put him in handcuffs, then lifted him bodily by his arms and
dragged him out. Id. at 3. This “treatment was
very unwarranted, ” he contends, because he “was
never found in possession of any illegal drugs.”
Id. As a result, he received “multiple
abrasions to [his] arms and legs as well as [an] unknown
injury to [his] back.” Id. at 4. He seeks $1.5
million in compensation for the “cruel and unusual
punishment [he] received as well as for the defamation of
character, mental anguish, pain and suffering that [he]
endured at the hands of SCMPD.” Id. at 4.
Liberally
construed, plaintiff alleges that SCMPD officers utilized
excessive force during his arrest. He does not, however, tell
the Court what he was arrested for. Prior to screening,
Harris must amend his Complaint to further elucidate (1) the
events that transpired on July 13, 2017, and (2) the charges
that have been leveled against him in Chatham County criminal
court.[2] Amendment is necessary to clarify whether
his excessive force claim can survive
screening.[3]
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
the Court ORDERS Eric LaTroy Harris to file
an Amended Complaint within 30 days of the day this Order is
served or face a recommendation of dismissal. Harris is
advised that his Amended Complaint will supersede the
original Complaint and therefore must be complete in
itself.[4] Once he files an Amended Complaint, the
original pleading will no longer serve any function in the
case.
Meanwhile,
it is time for Harris to pay his filing fee. His PLRA
paperwork reflects a current balance of $16.45, with $2.25 in
average monthly deposits and a $2.85 average reserved monthly
balance over the six month period prior to the date of his
Prison Account Statement. Doc. 5. He therefore owes a $0.71
initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b) (1) (requiring an initial fee assessment “when
funds exist, ” under a specific 20 percent formula).
Plaintiff's custodian (or designee) shall remit the $0.71
and shall set aside 20 percent of all future deposits to his
account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each time the
set aside amount reaches $10.00, until the balance of the
Court's $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full.
Also,
the Clerk is DIRECTED to send this Order to
plaintiff's account custodian immediately, as this
payment directive is nondispositive within the meaning of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), so no Rule 72(b) adoption is required. In
the event he is transferred to another institution, his
present custodian shall forward a copy of this Order and all
financial information concerning payment of the filing fee
and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. The
balance due from plaintiff shall be collected by the
custodian at his next institution in accordance with the
terms of the payment directive portion of this Order.
SO
ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] Congress enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321-71, to establish procedures to govern civil complaints
filed in federal court by prisoners and other detainees.
Among the PLRA's procedures is the requirement for this
Court to conduct an early screening in all civil cases of any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a government
entity or official. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
purpose of the early screening is to “identify
cognizable claims” in the prisoner's complaint and
to dismiss any claims that: (1) are frivolous; (2) are
malicious; (3) fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; or (4) seek monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. Id. Similarly, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c)(2) allows the Court, under the same four standards
for dismissal listed in § 1915A, to dismiss any prisoner
suit brought “with respect to prison conditions.”
Therefore, the Court examines Plaintiff's Complaint to
determine whether he has stated a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
[2] § 1983 claims for excessive force
are tricky, depending on the facts of the case. They may end
up being stayed, pending the outcome of the state court
proceedings, where civil recovery would necessarily undermine
plaintiff's criminal conviction. Campos v. City of
Naples, 202 F. App'x 361, 383 (11th Cir. 2006) (in
the case of a conviction for resisting arrest); see Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n. 6 (1994) (§ 1983
claim against arresting officer for unreasonable seizure in
violation of Fourth Amendment is barred when state defendant
is convicted of resisting arrest). Or they may go forward.
See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394-96 (2007)
(rejecting the notion that Heck applies to
ongoing prosecutions, and explaining that the state
always has “a strong interest in timely notice of
alleged misconduct by [its] agents.”); Wells v.
Cramer, 158 F. App'x 203, 204 (11th Cir. 2005)
(where the outcome of the § 1983 claim would
not necessarily undermine any yet-to-be-imposed
criminal conviction, it is not barred by
Heck).
[3] Harris must include a
coherent “short and plain statement of the
claim showing” that he is entitled to the relief
sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That means he must present the
Court with the factual allegations that support his
constitutional claims. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (complaints must
contain factual allegations “sufficient to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level”). Mere
conclusions that defendant violated the law are not enough.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to include with
service of this Order a copy of the Southern District of
Georgia's form prisoner § 1983 Complaint.
[4]
See Malowney v. Fed. Collection
Deposit Grp, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“An amended complaint supersedes an original
complaint”); Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365,
1370 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“As a general rule, an
amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original
complaint ...