United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
Muhammad Nuriddin (“Nuriddin”), who is currently
incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Jesup, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 7), to which Nuriddin filed a
Response, (doc. 9). For the reasons which follow, I
RECOMMEND that the Court
GRANT Respondent's Motion,
DISMISS Nuriddin's Section 2241
Petition, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to
CLOSE this case. I also
RECOMMEND the Court DENY
Nuriddin in forma pauperis status on appeal.
pled guilty in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee of distribution of five grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). On November 5, 2007,
the Honorable Harry S. Mattice, Jr., sentenced Nuriddin to
210 months' imprisonment. J., United States v.
Nuriddin, 1:07-cr-31 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007), ECF No.
30. Consistent with the terms of his plea agreement, Nuriddin
did not file an appeal.
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on June 15, 2016. Mot.,
United States v. Nuriddin, 1:07-cr-31 (E.D. Tenn.
June 15, 2016), ECF No. 33. However, after the United States
Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States, __
U.S.__, 137 S.Ct. 886 (Mar. 6, 2017), Nuriddin filed a Motion
for Voluntary Dismissal. Mot., United States v.
Nuriddin, 1:07-cr-31 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2017), ECF No.
39. Judge Mattice denied Nuriddin's Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal and denied Nuriddin's Section 2255 Motion with
prejudice. Mem. Op., Nuriddin v. United States,
1:07-cv-31 (E.D. Tenn. May 5, 2017), ECF No. 41. Nuriddin did
not apply for a Certificate of Appealability with the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
subsequently filed the instant Section 2241 Petition,
contending that his 210 month sentence is excessive and
violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(Doc. 1, pp. 6-8.) Respondent asserts that this Court should
dismiss Nuriddin's Petition because he does not satisfy
the requirements of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
“saving clause.” (Doc. 7.)
I. Whether Nuriddin can Proceed Pursuant to Section
2241 habeas corpus petitions “are generally reserved
for challenges to the execution of a sentence or the nature
of confinement, not the validity of the sentence itself or
the fact of confinement.” Vieux v. Warden, 616
F. App'x 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal punctuation
and citation omitted). Ordinarily, an action in which an
individual seeks to collaterally attack “the validity
of a federal sentence must be brought under § 2255,
” in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a); Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709
F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013). To utilize Section 2241 to
attack the validity of a federal sentence or conviction, a
petitioner must show that the remedy afforded under Section
2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”. Taylor
v. Warden, FCI Marianna, 557 F. App'x 911, 913 (11th
Cir. 2014); Turner, 709 F.3d at 1333 (noting the
petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the remedy
under Section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention). A motion to vacate covers only
challenges to the validity of a sentence, but the saving
clause and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cover
challenges to the execution of a sentence. Cf. Antonelli
v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that a § 2255
motion to vacate is a separate and distinct remedy from
habeas corpus proper. . . . A prisoner in custody pursuant to
a federal court judgment may proceed under § 2241 only
when he raises claims outside the scope of § 2255(a),
that is, claims concerning execution of his sentence.”)
(internal citations omitted)); United States v.
Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[The
prisoner's] appropriate remedy is under § 2255, not
28 U.S.C. § 2241, since the alleged errors occurred at
or prior to sentencing.”).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). The
above-emphasized portion of Section 2255(e) is referred to as
the “saving clause.” “Section 2255(e) makes
clear that a motion to vacate is the exclusive mechanism for
a federal prisoner to seek collateral relief unless he can
satisfy” the saving clause. McCarthan v. Dir. of
Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081
(11th Cir. 2017).
years, lower courts were to utilize a test to determine
whether a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to
Section 2241 met the saving clause and could proceed with a
Section 2241 petition. However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has determined its “precedents have ignored the
text” of Section 2255. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at
1080. The McCarthan court took “the rare step
of overruling [Eleventh Circuit] precedents for three
reasons. First, they are wholly divorced from the text.
Second, reliance interests are minimal. And third, our
precedents have proved unworkable. Continuing to follow these
erroneous precedents would do more harm than good.”
Id. at 1096.
after McCarthan, to determine whether a prisoner
satisfies the saving clause, a court need only analyze
“whether the motion to vacate is an adequate procedure
to test the prisoner's claim.” Id. at
1086. To answer this question, a court should “ask
whether the prisoner would have been permitted to bring that
claim in a motion to vacate. In other words, a prisoner has a
meaningful opportunity to test his claim whenever section
2255 can provide him a remedy.” Id. at
1086-87. In short, when reviewing a Section 2241 petition,
courts should look to whether the petitioner's claim is
of a kind that is “cognizable” under Section
2255. If so, the petitioner cannot meet the “saving
clause” and cannot proceed under Section 2241. To be
sure, “[t]he remedy [afforded] by [a Section 2255]
motion is not ineffective unless the procedure it provides is
incapable of adjudicating the claim.” Id. at
1088. Whether the petitioner could ...