United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Sani Mohammed (“Mohammed”), who is currently in
the physical custody of United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Folkston ICE
Processing Center in this District, filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.)
After the Court ordered service, Respondent filed a Response
arguing that the Court should dismiss the Petition. (Doc.
13.) For the reasons which follow, I
RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Mohammed's Petition, (doc. 1),
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to
CLOSE this case, and DENY
Mohammed in forma pauperis status on appeal.
a native and citizen of Ghana, applied for admission to the
United States on May 6, 2016, at the San Ysidro, California,
port of entry by claiming a fear of returning to his country.
(Doc. 8-1, p. 1.) After referral for a credible fear
interview, an Asylum Pre-Screening Officer with the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services referred
Mohammed's case to an Immigration Judge. (Id. at
2.) On October 12, 2016, the Immigration Judge ordered
Mohammed removed to Ghana. (Id.) Though Mohammed
reserved his right to appeal, he did not file an appeal, so
the removal order became administratively final when the
deadline to file an appeal elapsed thirty (30) days later on
November 13, 2016. (Id.)
Mohammed has not yet been removed to Ghana. On November 14,
2016, ICE mailed a request to the Embassy of Ghana for
issuance of travel documents, but Ghana has yet to issue
those documents. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Respondent states
that the issuance of the travel documents was delayed due to
presidential elections in Ghana. (Id.) Thus, ICE
resubmitted the travel document request on January 5, 2017.
(Id. at pp. 4-5.)
taken other actions to facilitate Mohammed's removal. ICE
conducted reviews of Mohammed's custody conditions on
February 22, 2017, and May 22, 2017. (Id. at p. 4.)
After those reviews, ICE found that Mohammed's removal
was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and thus,
decided to continue Mohammed's detention. (Id.)
ICE has also issued several documents to Mohammed advising
him of his responsibilities to assist ICE in the removal
process, with which Respondent contends Mohammed has not
fully complied. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)
to issuing a travel document to one of its nationals, Ghana
requires the national to undergo a telephonic interview.
(Id. at p. 3.) On July 31, 2017, the Embassy of
Ghana notified ICE Removal and International Operations
(“RIO”) that Mohammed would be interviewed in two
weeks. (Id. at p. 4.) ICE Detention and Deportation
Officer David Scarberry avers that Ghana will likely issue a
travel document to Mohammed shortly after the interview, and
his removal will be conducted shortly thereafter.
filed this Section 2241 action on April 28, 2017, in the
Northern District of Georgia. (Doc. 1.) Therein, he argues
that he should be released pursuant to the ruling in
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and that his
continued detention violates his constitutional rights. After
the case was transferred to this Court, on July 18, 2017, the
Court ordered the United States Marshal to serve the
Respondent with a copy of the Petition and to respond to the
Petition within twenty days of service. (Doc. 8.) The Marshal
served Respondent on July 26, 2017, (doc. 10), and Respondent
filed his Response, through counsel, on August 9, 2017, (doc.
Dismissal of Mohammed's Section 2241 Petition
the Immigration and Nationality Act, “when an alien is
ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien
from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8
U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, the Attorney
General must detain the alien. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2).
However, any continued detention under that statute must not
be indefinite. In Zadvydas, the United States
Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of aliens raises
serious constitutional concerns. 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, once
an order of removal becomes final, ICE should make every
effort to remove the alien within a reasonable time.
Id. The Supreme Court found that six months is a
presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien
awaiting deportation. Id.
this does not entail that every alien detained longer than
six months must be released. Id. Rather, to state a
claim for habeas relief under Zadvydas, an alien
must (1) demonstrate that he has been detained for more than
six months after a final order of removal; and (2)
“provide evidence of a good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale v.
Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). If a
petitioner makes these showings, the burden shifts to the
Government to respond with evidence to rebut that showing.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
has satisfied the first prong of Akinwale (i.e.,
detention beyond the six-month removal period). His order of
removal became administratively final on November 13, 2016.
Thus, the six-month mark passed on May 13, 2017.
Nevertheless, he has failed to satisfy the second prong of
Akinwale, He has not presented any evidence of a
good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. Mohammed has not argued,
much less presented evidence, that any department of the
United States has hindered his removal. Rather, in his
Petition, he states that “Ghana is is [sic] not in the
shape that can accept people deported from other countries
and the embassy didn't issue his travel documents.”
(Doc. 1, p. 4.)
conclusory and generalized allegations regarding Ghana's
intentions and practices are insufficient to state a claim
that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Fahim v. Ashcroft,
227 F.Supp.2d 1359, 1365 (N.D.Ga. 2002) (Egyptian
petitioner's “bare allegations are insufficient to
demonstrate a significant unlikelihood of his removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”). Mohammed's wholly
conclusory allegations lack any support in the record and do
not require consideration by this Court, let alone entitle
him to any relief. See Caderno v. United States, 256
F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001) (vague, conclusory
allegations in a Section 2255 motion insufficient to state
basis for relief); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551,
1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 901
F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir. 1990) (petitioner not entitled to
habeas relief “when his claims are merely
‘conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics'
or ‘contentions that in the face ...