Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Sanyaolu

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

August 25, 2017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
OLU KANNI SANYAOLU, Defendant

          OPINION AND ORDER

          WILLIAM S. DIJFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on Defendant Olu Kanni Sanyaolu's (“Defendant”) Motion for Reconsideration of Bond [119] (“Motion”).

         I. BACKGROUND

         On July 20, 2017, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of Unlawful Procurement or Naturalization and Citizenship, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). ([115]; [116]). The Court remanded Defendant to the custody of the United States Marshals Service pending sentencing. ([115]). The Court found that detention was proper in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), which states that a “judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of a sentence . . . be detained . . . .” On July 30, 2017, Defendant filed his Motion for Reconsideration of Bond. In it, Defendant argues that he should be released because (i) he has no criminal history, (ii) he and his family have lived in Georgia for a number of years and he has stable employment, (iii) he suffers from serious medical ailments, (iv) he was in full compliance with the conditions of bond in this matter, and (iv) he no longer has possession of his passport. (Mot. at 2-3). Defendant states that he is willing to abide by any conditions of release the Court finds appropriate, including electronic monitoring. (Mot. at 3). If the Court is not inclined to release him on bond, Defendant requests that the Court release him “for a week so that he may [make] necessary arrangements for the care of his sons and the management of his home and property.” (Mot. at 3-4).

         On August 7, 2017, the Government filed its Response in Opposition [124] to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Bond. The Government argues that Defendant has not met his burden that he should remain on bond pending sentencing. The Government argues that Defendant is a flight risk because (i) he has a history of creating new identities to avoid detection, (ii) he could potentially have fraudulent passports that the Government has not detected, (iii) his conviction and sentence provide Defendant with a large incentive to flee, and (iv) he has substantial ties to foreign individuals. (Resp. at 3-5).

         On August 12, 2017, Defendant filed his Reply in Support [125] of his Motion for Reconsideration of Bond. Defendant again argues that he is not a flight risk. Defendant states that his closest family ties, particularly with his children, are with individuals who reside in Georgia. (Reply at 2-3). Defendant argues that the Government's assertion that Defendant may have fraudulent passports under different aliases is conjecture without proof. (Reply at 3). Defendant reiterates that his time on pretrial supervision in this matter greatly weighs in favor of the Court reinstating his bond. (Reply at 3-4).

         Defendant, in his Reply, also argues that his medical condition while incarcerated supports his release on bond. Defendant states that his medical condition while incarcerated has worsened and that the Robert A. Deyton Detention Facility (“Detention Facility”), where he is housed in the custody of the United States Marshals Service, does not have the adequate facilities to treat his medical ailments.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. Legal Standard

         Whether a person should be released pending sentencing is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3143, which provides that “the judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence . . . be detained, unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released” on the defendant's personal recognizance or on conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a). The presumption is in favor of detention pending sentencing. United States v. Hill, No. 1:05-cr-0269, 2007 WL 1231729 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). To rebut this detention presumption, a defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that detention is not warranted, because the defendant is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.

         The Government does not argue, and nothing in the record supports, that Defendant is a danger to the community, and the Court focuses on Defendant's potential risk of flight when considering whether to release Defendant.

         B. Analysis

         Defendant presents evidence in favor of his release, including his success while on bond, his stable employment, and his family ties to his children who live locally. However, the evidence in favor of detention is strong. Defendant's underlying criminal conduct, for which a jury found him guilty, was that he used a false identity in order to gain access into the United States after he had been previously ordered removed. Defendant adopted the name Olu Sanyaolu after he was denied immigration benefits under the name Kunle Olukanni. Defendant's history of using false identification in order to escape immigration consequences, coupled with a possible custodial sentence and his substantial foreign ties, including family and a fiancé residing in Nigeria, make Defendant's risk of flight high. Moreover, Defendant's required denaturalization and removal from the United States as a consequence of his conviction adds to Defendant's risk of flight and undermines Defendant's arguments for release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e); see also Hill, 2007 WL 1231729 at *1 (rejecting defendant's argument that he is not a flight risk based on compliance with pretrial release because the now-certainty of a sentence “gives the defendant an overwhelming motivation to flee”); United States v. Manso-Portes, 838 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's release of defendants pending sentencing where district court concluded that because defendants appeared for trial while released on bond, they are sure to appear for sentencing; district court did not consider statutory presumption that defendants shall be detained pending sentence); United States v. Jinwright, No. 3:09-cr-0067, 2010 WL 2926084, at *5 (W.D. N.C. July 23, 2010) (“Something has changed since trial; Defendant is no longer presumed innocent but is guilty of the counts of conviction. His legal status has changed, increasing his incentive to flee.”).

         Defendant argues that he is not likely to flee because he suffers from serious health problems. Defendant was able to actively participate in his trial, including by testifying in his own defense. Defendant has not demonstrated that his health would preclude him from fleeing, and there is no evidence that he cannot obtain necessary medical treatment while in custody.[1]See United States v. Sudeen, No. CR-02-062, 2003 WL 21977170, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003) (denying motion for release pending sentence notwithstanding defendant's health issues, and noting “there is no evidence that the defendant cannot obtain necessary medical treatment while in custody”); United States v. Dimora, No. 1:10-cr-387, 2012 2012 WL 1409396, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2012) (‚ÄúNothing [defendant] ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.