United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DIJFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Olu Kanni
Sanyaolu's (“Defendant”) Motion for
Reconsideration of Bond  (“Motion”).
20, 2017, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count
of Unlawful Procurement or Naturalization and Citizenship, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). (; ). The Court
remanded Defendant to the custody of the United States
Marshals Service pending sentencing. (). The Court found
that detention was proper in this case under 18 U.S.C. §
3143(a), which states that a “judicial officer shall
order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense
and who is awaiting imposition or execution of a sentence . .
. be detained . . . .” On July 30, 2017, Defendant
filed his Motion for Reconsideration of Bond. In it,
Defendant argues that he should be released because (i) he
has no criminal history, (ii) he and his family have lived in
Georgia for a number of years and he has stable employment,
(iii) he suffers from serious medical ailments, (iv) he was
in full compliance with the conditions of bond in this
matter, and (iv) he no longer has possession of his passport.
(Mot. at 2-3). Defendant states that he is willing to abide
by any conditions of release the Court finds appropriate,
including electronic monitoring. (Mot. at 3). If the Court is
not inclined to release him on bond, Defendant requests that
the Court release him “for a week so that he may [make]
necessary arrangements for the care of his sons and the
management of his home and property.” (Mot. at 3-4).
August 7, 2017, the Government filed its Response in
Opposition  to Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration of Bond. The Government argues that Defendant
has not met his burden that he should remain on bond pending
sentencing. The Government argues that Defendant is a flight
risk because (i) he has a history of creating new identities
to avoid detection, (ii) he could potentially have fraudulent
passports that the Government has not detected, (iii) his
conviction and sentence provide Defendant with a large
incentive to flee, and (iv) he has substantial ties to
foreign individuals. (Resp. at 3-5).
August 12, 2017, Defendant filed his Reply in Support 
of his Motion for Reconsideration of Bond. Defendant again
argues that he is not a flight risk. Defendant states that
his closest family ties, particularly with his children, are
with individuals who reside in Georgia. (Reply at 2-3).
Defendant argues that the Government's assertion that
Defendant may have fraudulent passports under different
aliases is conjecture without proof. (Reply at 3). Defendant
reiterates that his time on pretrial supervision in this
matter greatly weighs in favor of the Court reinstating his
bond. (Reply at 3-4).
in his Reply, also argues that his medical condition while
incarcerated supports his release on bond. Defendant states
that his medical condition while incarcerated has worsened
and that the Robert A. Deyton Detention Facility
(“Detention Facility”), where he is housed in the
custody of the United States Marshals Service, does not have
the adequate facilities to treat his medical ailments.
a person should be released pending sentencing is governed by
18 U.S.C. § 3143, which provides that “the
judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found
guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence . . . be detained, unless the judicial
officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety
of any other person or the community if released” on
the defendant's personal recognizance or on conditions.
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a). The presumption is in favor of
detention pending sentencing. United States v. Hill,
No. 1:05-cr-0269, 2007 WL 1231729 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). To
rebut this detention presumption, a defendant must show by
clear and convincing evidence that detention is not
warranted, because the defendant is neither a flight risk nor
a danger to the community.
Government does not argue, and nothing in the record
supports, that Defendant is a danger to the community, and
the Court focuses on Defendant's potential risk of flight
when considering whether to release Defendant.
presents evidence in favor of his release, including his
success while on bond, his stable employment, and his family
ties to his children who live locally. However, the evidence
in favor of detention is strong. Defendant's underlying
criminal conduct, for which a jury found him guilty, was that
he used a false identity in order to gain access into the
United States after he had been previously ordered removed.
Defendant adopted the name Olu Sanyaolu after he was denied
immigration benefits under the name Kunle Olukanni.
Defendant's history of using false identification in
order to escape immigration consequences, coupled with a
possible custodial sentence and his substantial foreign ties,
including family and a fiancé residing in Nigeria,
make Defendant's risk of flight high. Moreover,
Defendant's required denaturalization and removal from
the United States as a consequence of his conviction adds to
Defendant's risk of flight and undermines Defendant's
arguments for release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e);
see also Hill, 2007 WL 1231729 at *1 (rejecting
defendant's argument that he is not a flight risk based
on compliance with pretrial release because the now-certainty
of a sentence “gives the defendant an overwhelming
motivation to flee”); United States v.
Manso-Portes, 838 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing
district court's release of defendants pending sentencing
where district court concluded that because defendants
appeared for trial while released on bond, they are sure to
appear for sentencing; district court did not consider
statutory presumption that defendants shall be detained
pending sentence); United States v. Jinwright, No.
3:09-cr-0067, 2010 WL 2926084, at *5 (W.D. N.C. July 23,
2010) (“Something has changed since trial; Defendant is
no longer presumed innocent but is guilty of the counts of
conviction. His legal status has changed, increasing his
incentive to flee.”).
argues that he is not likely to flee because he suffers from
serious health problems. Defendant was able to actively
participate in his trial, including by testifying in his own
defense. Defendant has not demonstrated that his health would
preclude him from fleeing, and there is no evidence that he
cannot obtain necessary medical treatment while in
custody.See United States v. Sudeen, No.
CR-02-062, 2003 WL 21977170, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003)
(denying motion for release pending sentence notwithstanding
defendant's health issues, and noting “there is no
evidence that the defendant cannot obtain necessary medical
treatment while in custody”); United States v.
Dimora, No. 1:10-cr-387, 2012 2012 WL 1409396, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2012) (“Nothing [defendant] ...