Lamar Graham was tried by a DeKalb County jury, and he was
convicted of the murder of Carlos Daniels and the unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Graham appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred
when it refused to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter
as a lesser included offense. Upon our review of the record
and briefs, we see no error, and we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence shows that on July 9, 2012, Graham drove his
girlfriend and his eight-year-old nephew to the pool at the
Jasmine at Winter's Chapel Apartments in DeKalb County.
Graham lived at Cornerstone Apartments, which is adjacent to
the Jasmine. Graham became involved in a verbal altercation
at the pool with Daniels, a resident at the Jasmine, and
Graham threatened to shoot Daniels. Soon thereafter, Graham -
who was "very angry" - left the pool with his
girlfriend and nephew, and he drove them to his apartment.
Graham left his girlfriend and nephew (and his car) at
Cornerstone, took off on foot, and was gone for about 25
minutes. Meanwhile, Daniels was also upset by the
confrontation at the pool, but he spoke to the property
manager at the Jasmine, calmed down, and walked off in the
direction of his apartment. A few minutes later, Daniels was
fatally shot in the parking lot outside his apartment.
Graham returned to his apartment at Cornerstone, his
girlfriend observed that he was out of breath and that he
threw up in the bathroom. Graham told his girlfriend that he
shot "the dude at the pool" because "the
dude" had "disrespected his family." He also
provided several details about the shooting, including that
he continued firing his weapon at Daniels after he fell to
the ground and that he fled the scene by running through the
"cut, " which was a wooded trail between the
Jasmine and Cornerstone. For several months, Graham's
girlfriend told no one about the confession.
investigators initially were unable to identify or locate the
man who had been involved in the poolside confrontation with
Daniels. But Graham's girlfriend eventually saw a report
that police were "searching for a man who shot and
killed another man after an altercation at a swimming pool at
. . . [t]he Jasmine at Winter's Chapel Apartments."
She told a friend about Graham's confession, the police
were notified, and Graham was arrested. Graham admitted to
the poolside altercation with Daniels, but he denied that he
returned to the Jasmine to shoot him.
appeal, Graham contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions, and he relies upon OCGA §
24-8-823, which provides that "[a] confession alone,
uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a
conviction." But while the State may not rely solely on
a defendant's confession, "no specific manner of
corroboration [of the confession] is required, and
corroboration in any particular is sufficient."
McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174-75 (1) (794
S.E.2d 118) (2016). Here, in addition to the testimony from
Graham's girlfriend about his behavior before and after
the shooting, the confession also was sufficiently
corroborated by an eyewitness, who testified that "after
[Daniels] hit the ground [from the first shot, the shooter] .
. . reached over him, and shot him [again]" before
running off, and by two eyewitnesses who testified that the
shooter ran toward a wooded trail that cut through from the
Jasmine to Cornerstone.
points to the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the
crime, the failure of any eyewitness to identify him, and his
assertion that his girlfriend was not a credible witness. But
the State "was not required to produce any physical
evidence, " Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. 504, 505
(1) (769 S.E.2d 87) (2015), and, as we have explained many
times, "it is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts
in the evidence and to determine the credibility of
witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to
the defendant does not render the evidence
insufficient." Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327,
330 (1) (737 S.E.2d 673) (2013) (citation omitted). Viewing
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational
trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham
was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
turn now to Graham's contention that the trial court
should have charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense. Such a charge is required only when
there is some evidence that the defendant acted "solely
as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion
resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such
passion in a reasonable person." OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).
And "[i]t is a question of law for the courts to
determine whether the defendant presented any evidence of
sufficient provocation to excite the passions of a reasonable
person." Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 767
(2) (740 S.E.2d 115) (2013).
the poolside confrontation was not the type of "serious
provocation" that would require a charge on voluntary
manslaughter. Graham acknowledged that he and Daniels merely
engaged in an argument, and his most serious complaint about
Daniels's conduct was that it initially made him fear
that Daniels "wanted to hit [him] and stuff" or
might try to "push [him] in the pool or something."
Graham points to evidence that he was "very angry"
after the argument with Daniels, but there was no evidence
that Daniels's conduct at the pool would provoke any
reasonable person to go home, get a gun, run back to
Daniels's apartment complex, and shoot him. We find that
Graham's response to the confrontation at the pool was
objectively unreasonable as a matter of law, and it does not
support a voluntary manslaughter charge. See Johnson v.
State, 292 Ga. 785, 787 (2) (741 S.E.2d 627) (2013);
Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 832 (2) (483
S.E.2d 582) (1997) (OCGA § 16-5-2 provides an objective
standard; "[i]t is of no moment whether the provocation
was sufficient to excite the deadly passion in the particular
defendant"). Accordingly, the trial court's refusal
to charge on voluntary manslaughter was no error.
affirmed. All the Justices concur.
 Daniels was killed on July 9, 2012. On
July 15, 2014, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Graham for
malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and the
unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony. (Graham also was charged with the unlawful possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, but that charge was
dismissed by nolle prosequi.) Graham's trial commenced on
February 2, 2015, and the jury returned its verdict four days
later, finding him guilty on all counts (other than the
dismissed count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon). Graham was sentenced to imprisonment for life for
malice murder and imprisonment for a consecutive term of five
years for the unlawful possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. The verdict as to felony murder was
vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault
merged with the malice murder. See Malcolm v. State,
263 Ga. 369, 371-374 (4)-(5) (434 S.E.2d 479) (1993). Graham
timely filed a motion for new trial on March 3, 2015, and he
amended it on April 8, 2016. The trial court denied the
motion for new trial on May 3, 2016, and Graham timely filed
a notice of appeal on May 5, 2016. The case was docketed in
this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for decision
on the briefs.
 Other evidence was presented showing
that this trail was used almost exclusively by residents of
Cornerstone to access the Jasmine and "most people"
would not even ...