BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
Barker appeals pro se from the denial of his motion for an
out-of-time appeal. He contends that the arrest warrant and
affidavit were insufficient to establish probable cause, that
the indictment was fatally defective, that he was unaware of
his Boykin right against self-incrimination, and
that plea counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we
being indicted on charges for aggravated child molestation,
Barker entered a negotiated guilty plea to child molestation
on August 14, 2014. He was sentenced to twenty years to serve
five. On January 31, 2017, Barker filed a motion for an
out-of-time appeal in which he asserted, among other things,
that his arrest warrant and indictment were invalid, that
plea counsel was ineffective, and that his sentence was vague
and ambiguous. The trial court denied Barker's motion,
and it is from that order that he appeals.
In order to receive an out-of-time appeal from a judgment
entered on a guilty plea, [Barker] must show (1) that the
claims he seeks to raise on appeal can be resolved on the
existing record; and (2) that the failure to pursue a timely
appeal was due to the ineffective assistance of his plea
counsel. But if the claims [Barker] seeks to raise can be
resolved against him on the face of the record, so that even
a timely appeal would not have been successful, then plea
counsel cannot be said to have rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to advise the appellant or otherwise
assist him in pursuing an appeal. Accordingly, in reviewing
[Barker's] claims, we first assess whether they may be
resolved on the record before us. For those that cannot, no
relief is available; for those that can be resolved on the
record but only against [Barker], relief is also unavailable;
and for any claims that remain, we must proceed to consider
whether plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to pursue such claims.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Waye v. State,
S17A0310, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 530, at *1-2 (June 19, 2017).
"The denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court, " and
the "decision to deny such a motion will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion."(Citation
omitted.) Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 321, 321 (1) (720
S.E.2d 617) (2012).
Barker first contends that the arrest warrant and attached
affidavits were insufficient to establish probable cause
because certain information was omitted, including the source
of the officer's information.
[A] plea of guilty generally waives all defenses except that
based on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, [and]
[a]n exception will only be made if the error goes to the
very power of the State to bring the defendant into court. No
such situation is presented here. It follows that [Barker]
was not entitled to challenge the validity of the arrest
warrant by way of an out-of-time appeal.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Moore v. State,
285 Ga. 855, 858 (2) (684 S.E.2d 605) (2009).
Barker next contends that his indictment was fatally
defective in that it alleged that the crime occurred between
May 1, 2013 and August 30, 2013, and thus failed to track the
language of OCGA § 17-7-54, which provides, in pertinent
part, that an indictment must state with "sufficient
certainty" the date of the alleged
offense. However, if the State can show that the
evidence does not permit it to allege a specific date on
which the offense occurred, the State is permitted to allege
that the crime occurred between two particular dates.
O'Rourke v. State, 327 Ga.App. 628, 631-632 (2)
(760 S.E.2d 636) (2014).
The true test of the sufficiency of the indictment is . . .
whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to
be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what
he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other
proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense,
whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may
plead a former acquittal or conviction.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jordan v.
State, 220 Ga.App. 627, 629 (2) (470 S.E.2d 242) (1996).
first note that Barker did not challenge the indictment, and
"[g]iven that [Barker] pled guilty to the crime charged,
his only possible challenge to the indictment would be the
sufficiency thereof." Golden v. State, 299
Ga.App. 407, 411 (3) (683 S.E.2d 618) (2009).
order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal, the trial
court found that "[s]ubstantive defects did not exist in
the indictment, " and at the plea hearing the State
presented as a factual basis for the charges that the time
period at which the acts occurred was during the time that
Barker lived with the family of the victim, which put Barker
on notice with "sufficient certainty" of the date
of the offense. See OCGA § 17-7-54 (a). Accordingly,
Barker's claim that the indictment was invalid is ...