DILLARD, C. J., RAY, P. J., and SELF, J.
Dillard, Chief Judge.
State appeals the trial court's grant of Kevin
Jacobs's motion to suppress breath-test evidence obtained
when he was arrested for, inter alia, driving under
the influence of alcohol. On appeal, the State argues that
the trial court erroneously suppressed the breath-test
evidence based on a finding that the manner in which the
arresting officer read the implied-consent notice would lead
a reasonable person to mistakenly believe that they had no
right to refuse testing. For the reasons set forth
infra, we reverse.
facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. On February 18,
2016, at approximately 1:30 a.m., a police officer with the
DeKalb County Police Department was on patrol when he
observed a vehicle approach a red light, drive past the
"stopping line, " and stop in the middle of a
crosswalk. Based on these observations, the officer activated
his emergency lights and immediately initiated a traffic stop
of the vehicle. The officer first asked the driver, Jacobs,
for his driver's license, and he complied. While the
officer was speaking with Jacobs, he appeared to be confused,
and "he had some slurred speech . . . ." The
officer then asked Jacobs if he had consumed any alcoholic
beverages before driving, and Jacobs responded that he had
two alcoholic drinks at a nearby club.
officer then walked back to his car to confirm that
Jacobs's license was valid, and when he returned, the
officer "smelled a very strong odor of cologne"
that he did not smell previously. At this point, the officer
also observed an open bottle of liquor in the front passenger
seat of the car. When he questioned Jacobs about the bottle,
Jacobs responded that he had been "drinking . . . with
[his] boys." The officer then asked if Jacobs would
submit to any field-sobriety tests, but he refused to do so.
Based on his experience, training, and observations of
Jacobs, the officer believed that Jacobs "wasn't
able to drive safely." The officer then asked Jacobs to
exit the vehicle, and when he did so, the officer observed
Jacobs swaying like he was trying to catch his balance.
Thereafter, the officer took Jacobs into custody, placed him
in the backseat of the patrol car, and read him the
implied-consent notice for ages 21 and older. The officer
asked Jacobs to "designate" whether he wanted to
submit to a State-administered test of his blood, breath,
urine, or other bodily substance for the purposes of
determining whether he was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, and Jacobs agreed to take a breath test.
Jacobs was charged, via accusation, with driving under the
influence per se, driving under the influence less safe,
improper parking, and open container. Jacobs filed a motion
to suppress the results of his breath test, arguing that his
consent to the test was obtained by coercion. Following a
hearing on the motion, the trial court granted it. This
appeal by the State follows.
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate
court generally must "(1) accept a trial court's
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, (2) construe the
evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual
findings and judgment of the trial court, and (3) limit its
consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found
by the trial court." But we review de novo
"the trial court's application of law to the
undisputed facts." Thus, when, as here, the facts are
undisputed,  we owe no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Bearing these guiding principles
in mind, we turn now to the State's specific claim of
sole enumeration of error, the State argues that the trial
court erred in suppressing the results of Jacobs's breath
test based on its findings that the officer failed to
designate the specific test for which he was requesting
consent and that the way in which the officer read the
implied-consent notice to Jacobs improperly asked him to
choose one of the available chemical tests instead of asking
him whether he would consent to a test in the first place. We
it is undisputed that before a breath test was administered
to Jacobs, the arresting officer read Georgia's
implied-consent statute for suspects who are 21 years old or
older almost verbatim. Specifically, at the suppression
hearing, the officer testified that he read the following
notice to Jacobs:
Georgia law requires you to submit to State-administered
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily
substances for the purpose of determining if you are under
the influence of alcohol or drugs.
If you refuse this testing, your Georgia driver's license
or privilege to drive on the highways of this state will be
suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to
submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence
against you at trial.
If you submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your Georgia
driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of
this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year.
After first submitting to the required state tests, you are
entitled to additional chemical test of your blood, breath,
urine, or other bodily substances at your own expense and
from qualified personnel of your own choosing.
Will you submit to the State-administered chemical test of
your designated-designate which one under the Implied Consent
when asked which specific test the officer asked to conduct,
he testified that he allowed Jacobs the option of which test
to take, and Jacobs agreed to breath test.
on the foregoing, the trial court found that Jacobs's
consent was invalid because the way in which the officer read
the question at the end of the implied-consent notice
"would tend to lead a reasonable person to respond with
one of the options . . . rather than agree to or refuse all
possible testing." But instead of citing any legal
authority to support such a conclusion, the trial court
merely distinguished the cases relied upon by the State.
Ultimately, the trial court found that the officer in this
case violated the implied-consent statutes in two ways: (1)
by failing to designate any particular test to be conducted;