United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ONESSIMUS M. GOVEREH, Petitioner,
TRACY JOHNS, Respondent.
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order. (Doc. 5.) For the reasons
which follow, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY Petitioner's
filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May
18, 2017, alleging that Respondent improperly denied him good
conduct time and refuses to transfer him to a Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) facility wherein Petitioner can
participate in community reentry programs. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4.)
In addition to his Section 2241 Petition, Petitioner filed
the instant Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order on June 6, 2017. (Doc. 5.) Within that Motion,
Petitioner requests that the Court enjoin Respondent from
changing Petitioner's transfer date to a residential
reentry center from July 10, 2017, to August 3, 2017.
(Id. at p. 1.) Petitioner argues that Respondent
improperly postponed his transfer date based upon
Petitioner's loss of twenty-three (23) days' good
conduct time. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) Petitioner requests
that the Court order Respondent to place Petitioner in a
residential reentry center for the remainder of his federal
sentence. (Id. at p. 2.)
entitled to a preliminary injunction, the movant must show:
(1) a substantial likelihood of ultimate success on the
merits; (2) an injunction or protective order is necessary to
prevent irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury
outweighs the harm the injunction or protective order would
inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the injunction or
protective order would not be adverse to the public interest.
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223,
1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). In this Circuit, an
“injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not
to be granted unless the movant clearly established the
‘burden of persuasion' as to the four
requisites.” Horton v. City of Augustine, 272
F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
petitioner succeeds in making such a showing, then “the
court may grant injunctive relief, but the relief must be no
broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional
violation.” Newman v. Ala., 683 F.2d 1312,
1319 (11th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, where there is a
constitutional violation in the prison context, courts
traditionally are reluctant to interfere with prison
administration, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05
(1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a
broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison
administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped to
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform.”), overruled on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In
such cases, “[d]eference to prison authorities is
especially appropriate.” Newman, 683 F.2d at
1320-21 (reversing district court's injunction requiring
release of prisoners on probation because it “involved
the court in the operation of the State's system of
criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary”
and less intrusive equitable remedy was available).
stage, Petitioner has not shown that he has satisfied the
prerequisites in order to be entitled to a preliminary
injunction. Specifically, Petitioner has not shown the
likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or that
injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
Furthermore, because Petitioner's request pertains
specifically to prison policies governing the transfer of
prisoners-a matter squarely within the realm of prison
administration- an order or injunction granting such relief
on this record would be broader and more intrusive than
necessary to remedy any potential constitutional violation.
This is not to say that Petitioner will not be able to
ultimately obtain some form of injunctive relief in this
case. However, he has not made the requisite showing at this
time to obtain the extraordinary relief he currently seeks.
Therefore, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY Petitioner's Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. (Doc. 5.)
reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DENY
Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order, (doc. 5).
Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and
Recommendation to file specific written objections within
fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the
Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in
the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will
bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or
legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all
other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not
a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or
present additional evidence.
receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set
out above, a United States District Judge will make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report,
proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out
above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may
not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation
directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final