United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Dublin Division
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY and FOREMOST SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs,
DUBLIN EYE ASSOCIATES, P.C.; DR. ROGER D. SMITH; and DR. JAMES Y. JONES; Defendants.
GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
before the Court is Plaintiffs' Maryland Casualty Company
("MCC") and Foremost Signature Insurance
Company's ("Foremost") (collectively
"Plaintiffs") Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No.
55). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion is
the facts of this case are not in dispute. On April 13, 2011,
Defendant Jones and two other parties filed an Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") lawsuit
against Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
("Mass. Life") in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 13). That
court ultimately granted summary judgment in Mass. Life's
favor on July 12, 2013. Dublin Eye Assocs., P.C. v. Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 957 F.Supp.2d 843 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
On August 12, 2013, Mass. Life filed a claim for
attorney's fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
On March 24, 2014, the motion was granted. Dublin Eye
Assocs., P.C. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No.
5:ll-cv-128, 2014 WL 1217664 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2014).
Defendant and his co-plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit
were ordered to pay $1, 191, 799.99. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 22. On
May 4, 2015, Plaintiffs were notified of the judgment and the
award of attorney's fees.
time, MCC insured Defendant with the following policy
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We
will have the right and duty to defend the insured against
any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will
have no duty to defend the insured against any
"suit" seeking damages for "personal and
advertising injury" to which this insurance does not
apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and
settle any claim or "suit" that may result.
(Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 28).
the Policy covered a "personal and advertising
injury" arising out of "malicious prosecution"
(as well as a number of other offenses not at issue in this
may seek to alter or amend a judgment in a civil case within
28 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy which should be
used sparingly. Bostic v. Astrue, No. 1:12-CV-082,
2012 WL 3113942, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2012). A Rule 59(e)
motion may not be used to re-litigate old matters, raise new
arguments or present new evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment, as "the only grounds for
granting a Rule 59(e) motion are newly-discovered evidence or
manifest errors of law or fact." Arthur v.
King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations omitted). "Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle for
rehashing arguments already rejected by the court or for
refuting the court's prior decision."
Bostic, 2012 WL 3113942, at *1 (quoting
Wendy's Int'l v. Nu-Cape Const., Inc., 169
F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1996)).
have failed to demonstrate newly discovered evidence or
manifest errors of law or fact that would justify
reconsideration. Plaintiffs restyle arguments previously
considered and raise new arguments that could have been made
before dismissal of their claims. Neither form of argument is
appropriate on a motion to alter, amend, or vacate.
Id. at *1.
Plaintiffs point to arguments that were already considered on
their motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiffs assume
the Court misunderstood or ignored. This is not so.
Plaintiffs assert that the Court did not address their
primary argument-that the elements of a motion for
attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1) need
to be comparable to an action for malicious prosecution under
Kentucky law in order for Defendant to survive summary
judgment. Dkt. No. 55-1.
Court only considers whether the facts from the underlying
case could have also sustained a malicious prosecution under
Kentucky law-not whether the two laws are similar, as
Plaintiff suggests. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Atlanta
Datacom, Inc., 139 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam). The holding in Atlanta Datacom
undercuts Plaintiffs' 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
arguments and therefore the ...